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Notes from the Editor
Dear readers,
I am pleased to present you with the Spring 2021 – 2022 issue of The Hilltop Review Journal.
As an interdisciplinary journal, The Hilltop Review provides a venue for sharing scholarly and
creative work of graduate students at Western Michigan University. Over two years ago the
COVID-19 virus outbreaks caused global pandemic affected most sectors including education.
As a result, the university rapidly converted into online formats. Although the pandemic is not
over yet, we are moving on a better situation. Starting from Fall 2021, the university transitioned
into in person formats bringing hopes to be back to the ‘new normal’. This is a great opportunity
for graduate students across disciplines to continue working on any delayed activities and
publishing their work.
The Director and Editor of The Hilltop Review Journal position have enriched my experiences
in managing publication process, which requests masses of efforts and collaborations from the
editor, the authors, and the reviewers. I would like to thank to the Spring 2021 – 2022 Executive
Board of the Graduate Student Association for their supports and assistance throughout the
academic year. My special thank you to the GSA president, Opheria Cheng and GSA Vice
President, Jill Braman for their invaluable guidance throughout this term. I am also thankful for
additional insights on manuscripts that the 2021 – 2022 Editorial Board members have provided.
I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all who served as peer reviewers for this issue. We
would not be possible to publish the graduate students’ works without their voluntary
commitment to the success of the journal’s publication.
Lastly, I would like to congratulate to the winners of the various awards that are offered to our
writers. Xiaolong Wang will receive $500 for the paper “The Moral Significance of Empathy: A
Scottish Sentimentalist Perspective,” Jacob C. Riccioni will receive $250 for the paper “Black
(Muslim) Lives Matter: African American Muslim Social Activism,” Maria Isabel Lozano
Becerro will receive $150 for the paper “La figura de la mujer en El burlador de Sevilla.” For
the creative work, Stephanie Leaver will receive $250 for her photograph “Bumbelbee on Pink
Milkweed,”Lauren Coyne will receive $250 for a the story of “How To Make Cemetery Tea,”
and Stephanie A. Kurzenhauser will receive $250 for the poem “784 Grams.”

Sincerely,
Listiani
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The Moral Significance of
Empathy: A Scottish
Sentimentalist Perspective
By Xiaolong Wang
Abstract: Which feature of human nature accounts for moral motivation? From a Scottish
Sentimentalist perspective, the answer lies in our fellow feelings: empathy, the capacity
for sharing what other people feel; and sympathy, the capacity for feeling concern for
other people’s well-being. Recently, disagreement has emerged within Scottish
Sentimentalism on which of the two fellow feelings does the real work in motivating
moral acts. Paul Bloom famously argues that sympathy is sufficient for moral motivation
with the help of theory of mind (or often called mind reading), and thus concludes that
empathy is not necessary from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective. I argue that Bloom’s
conclusion is too quick. With the latest views of the complicated nature of empathy, I
argue that empathy is necessary for forming sympathy due to its three contributions that
theory of mind cannot make: the appreciation of other people’s suffering given their
situation, the empathic perspective-taking that breaks the boundary between self and
others, and the phenomenal knowledge of how bad other people’s suffering feels. Hence,
empathy is indirectly necessary for moral motivation by virtue of being directly necessary
for sympathy (because sympathy is a direct necessary condition for moral motivation
according to Scottish Sentimentalism). Therefore, I conclude contra Bloom that empathy
is necessary, though indirectly, for moral motivation from a Scottish Sentimentalist
perspective.
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1. Introduction
Philosophers and moral psychologists have long been interested in the
nature of moral motivation. Which feature of human nature accounts for our moral
motivations? Does reason, sentiment, intellectual intuition or something else
motivate us to do moral things? Moral sentimentalists1 contend that sentiments are
essential for moral motivations, but disagree on which sentiments are of
fundamental importance. An influential camp of sentimentalism about moral
motivation argues that the sentiments essential for moral motivation are our two
types of fellow feelings: empathy, the sentiment of sharing what other people feel,
and sympathy2, the sentiment of feeling concern for other people’s well-being (at
the first approximation).3 Since this camp is founded by the eighteenth-century
Scottish sentimentalists such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume and Adam
Smith, let us call this camp the Scottish Sentimentalism about moral motivation 4
(hereafter, Scottish Sentimentalism), though it is also defended by many
contemporary philosophers and moral psychologists5.
Recently, disagreement has emerged within Scottish Sentimentalism on
which one of the two fellow feelings is necessary for motivating moral behavior.
The eighteenth-century sentimentalists put a strong emphasis on empathy.
However, in the recent decade, the significance of empathy to moral motivation
1

Moral sentimentalism is a general view of the importance of sentiments to morality. In this paper,
I use moral sentimentalism in a narrow sense, meaning the particular sentimentalism about moral
motivation. So, I will not discuss sentimentalist accounts of other moral phenomena, such as Shaun
Nichol’s sentimentalism about moral judgment, or Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson’s
sentimentalism about moral concepts, etc. See respectively Nichols, Shaun. Sentimental rules: On
the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford University Press, 2004, and D'arms, Justin, and
Daniel Jacobson. "Sentiment and value." Ethics 110, no. 4 (2000): 722-748.
2
Contemporary philosophers tend to use ‘sympathy,’ ‘pity,’ ‘compassion,’ ‘concern’
interchangeably, while contemporary psychologists prefer ‘empathic concern.’ For the sake of
convenience, I will use ‘sympathy’ throughout the paper
3
Other sentiments of potential moral importance include self-blame emotions such as guilt and
shame and other-blame emotions such as contempt, anger, disgust. See Schroeder, Timothy, Adina
L. Roskies, and Shaun Nichols. "Moral motivation." In Doris, John M., and Moral Psychology
Research Group. Themoral psychology handbook. OUP Oxford, (2010), at 122
4
As I said in Note 1, I will not talk about sentimentalism about other moral phenomena in addition
to moral motivation, and so accordingly, I will also not talk about Scottish Sentimentalism about
other moral phenomena, such as Scottish Sentimentalism about moral judgment, the view that
empathy and sympathy are fundamental to moral judgment. See Slote, Michael. The ethics of care
and empathy. Routledge, (2007).
5
See Hoffman, Martin L. Empathy and Moral Development: Implications for Caring and
Justice. Cambridge University Press, 2000, and “Empathy, Justice and Social Change.” In Empathy
and Morality, edited by Heidi L. Maibom, 71-96. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014; Batson,
C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L. & L, S. L., 1995. Immorality from empathy-induced altruism:
When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Volume 68,
pp. 1042-54; Simmons, Aaron. "In Defense of The Moral Significance of Empathy." Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 1 (2014): 97-111; Persson, Ingmar, and Julian Savulescu. "The
Moral Importance of Reflective Empathy." Neuroethics 11, no. 2 (2018): 183-193; Jefferson,
William. “The Moral Significance of Empathy.” PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2019.
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has received severe criticism from within the camp of Scottish Sentimentalism,
which started by Jesse Prinz’s challenge in 20116 and matured as Paul Bloom’s
monograph Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion7 came out in
2016. The common line of argument in the criticism is that for motivating moral
behavior within a sentimentalist picture, only sympathy should be promoted while
empathy should be completely abandoned because empathy is not only
unnecessary but also detrimental to moral motivation.
In this paper, I will raise an objection to the prominent skeptic view about
the significance of empathy to moral motivation developed by Bloom, and argue
that Scottish Sentimentalism must need empathy to explain moral motivation,
though in an indirect way. In section 2, I will introduce Bloom’s objection to the
significance of empathy and his view of the importance of sympathy. In section 3,
I will raise an objection to Bloom’s view, arguing that he does not have the
resource to explain where sympathy comes from. In section 4, I correct Bloom’s
mischaracterization of the nature of empathy and argue contra Bloom while
sympathy can solely generate moral motivation, sympathy itself cannot be
generated without empathy, and so empathy is indirectly necessary for moral
motivation from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective. In section 5, I will consider
three anticipated objections, and I will conclude in section 6.

2.

Bloom’s Skepticism About Empathy and Support for Sympathy

Among historic and contemporary philosophers and psychologists who are
in favor of Scottish Sentimentalism, the concepts of empathy and sympathy have
been used to refer to various fellow-feeling-related phenomena, so unsurprisingly,
Bloom starts his argument with stipulations of what he means by empathy,
sympathy, and other fellow-feeling-related concepts.
First, Bloom uses the concept of empathy to refer to “the act of feeling
what you believe other people feel – experiencing what they experience.”8 So, in
Bloom’s view, empathy is an affective mental state in which the empathizer
experiences a feeling that is similar to what he thinks the empathized person is
feeling, where the feeling that Bloom focuses on is mainly the negative feeling of
physical pain and emotional distress. Second, Bloom distinguishes empathy as an
affective state from theory of mind as a cognitive state 9 . By theory of mind,
6

See both Prinz, Jesse. “Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?." Empathy: Philosophical and
psychological perspectives 1 (2011): 211-229, and "Against empathy." The Southern Journal of
Philosophy 49 (2011): 214-233.
7
Bloom, Paul. Against empathy: The Case For Rational Compassion. New York: HarperCollins,
2016.
8
Supra note 7, at 3.
9
Bloom uses ‘theory of mind,’ ‘social cognition,’ ‘social intelligence,’ ‘mind reading,’
‘mentalizing’ interchangeably. (Id.) Bloom even thinks that ‘theory of mind’ is the cognitive form
of empathy – namely ‘cognitive empathy’ that is contrasted with ‘affective empathy.’ But given
that Bloom has clearly said that “The notion of empathy that I’m most interested in is the act of
feeling what you believe other people feel— experiencing what they experience,” (Id, at 13) I will
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Bloom means the act of understanding what’s going on in the minds of other
people without any contagion of feeling. That said, by theory of mind we read the
thoughts, desires, feelings of other people without necessarily feeling the similar
mental states in our minds, which thus makes this process of mind-reading
cognitive rather than affective. Third, as most Scottish sentimentalists do, Bloom
makes a distinction between empathy and sympathy10. To empathize with other
people’s feelings is to share or mirror their feelings, no matter whether their
feelings are positive or negative. For example, if you are distressed, I would also
feel similar distress on my end if I empathize with you. If you are happy, I will
also feel happy in a similar way when empathizing with you. By contrast, instead
of mirroring other people’s feelings, to sympathize with other people is to feel
concern for their well-being, generating a feeling of worry about their unhappiness
and a feeling of wanting them to be good (physically, mentally, economically,
etc.).
With these concepts in hand, we can get into Bloom’s argument for his
view that Scottish Sentimentalism should abandon empathy and promote
sympathy. As I read Bloom, the argument has three main premises.
First, drawing on the influential psychological studies of empathy by C.
Daniel Batson, Bloom argues that though empathy can generate altruistic
motivation which is sometimes morally unproblematic, empathy in fact often
motivates altruistic behavior in a morally objectionable way due to its biased
nature. To begin with, it is sometimes questioned that empathy cannot lead to
altruistic motivation because empathy with other people’s distress can bring us
personal distress, which tends to motivate us to distance ourselves from the
distressing situation instead of being moved to help. But Batson shows that this is
not the case because in his experiments, subjects are motivated to help the sufferer
when empathizing with them even if it is way easier to avoid the situation than
offering help. 11 However, Bloom argues that altruistic behavior is not equal to
moral behavior because altruistic behavior can clash with significant moral
considerations like justice and fairness. Further, he argues that empathy-based
altruistic behavior is often morally objectionable in such a way because empathy
is often biased like a spotlight and thus innumerate: we are more likely to
empathize with the sufferers who are physically or relationally closer to us and
so ignore those who are in more severe suffering and more urgent need from a
larger populational perspective. For example, in one of Batson’s experiments, for
a ten-year-old girl named Sheri Summers who had a fatal disease and was waiting
in line for treatment, subjects are motivated by their empathy (induced by
experimenters) to help move her to the front of the line to alleviate her pain as
not use ‘cognitive empathy’ when reformulating Bloom’s argument to avoid conceptual confusion.
For a more detailed exporation of ‘cognitive empathy,’ see Spaulding, Shannon. "Cognitive
empathy." In The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy, pp. 13-21. Routledge, 2017.
10
Bloom uses ‘compassion’ and ‘concern’ most often while only using ‘sympathy’ and ‘pity’
forseveral times in his book. For convenience, I will stick to ‘sympathy’ in this paper.
11
See Batson, C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L. & L, S. L., 1995. Immorality from empathyinduced altruism: When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, Volume68, pp. 1042-54.
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soon as possible even if they were told that ahead of Sheri there were other
children who were presumably more deserving, which is obvious injustice to other
children.12
Second, Bloom further argues that Scottish Sentimentalists should not
worry about abandoning empathy because sympathy combined with theory of
mind is sufficient for moral motivation. To be motivated to help others within a
sentimentalist picture, one needs to 1) know what others need or suffer and 2) feel
the motive to help satisfy their need or alleviate their suffering. Empathy is able to
motivate us to help (though often in a morally objectionable way) because it
makes us 1) know what others feel by generating a similar feeling on our end, and
2) feel the motive to help others which comes from the similar feeling we have on
our end13. But according to Bloom, these two jobs of empathy can be smoothly
taken over by theory of mind and sympathy respectively. By theory of mind, we
1) read what others need or suffer from their behavioral, linguistic, facial cues
without necessarily having a similar mental state. By sympathy, we 2) feel the
motive to help others because sympathy itself is a feeling of concern for other
people’s well-being and a feeling of wanting other people to be good.
Third, the combination of sympathy and theory of mind can not only take
over the function of empathy but also do better than empathy. According to
Bloom, on the one hand, although both empathy and sympathy can be affected by
spotlight bias, sympathy is more diffuse and tamable than empathy. Sympathy is
more diffuse in the sense that we can form concern for a large number of people
or an abstract issue such as environmental protection which is hard to be
empathized with. Sympathy is more tamable in the sense that it is less immune to
voluntary self-control while more compliant to the guidance of reason. On the
other hand, similarly, theory of mind can provide us with the knowledge of what’s
going on in others’ minds from a distanced perspective that does not get us
emotionally involved too much in the sufferer’s distress so that we are less likely
to be biased due to the strong empathic emotions.
3.

The Problem For Bloom: Where Does Sympathy Come From?

In the last section, we have seen that Bloom argues that Scottish
Sentimentalism should replace empathy with sympathy plus theory of mind
because the latter is sufficient for moral motivation and can even motivate moral
behaviors in a more controllable, rational and non-biased way. Although I
seriously doubt this is the case14, I argue that even if empathy turns out to be more
untamable, irrational and biased, Bloom’s view is still problematic, and thus
Scottish Sentimentalism cannot abandon empathy in explaining moral motivation.
A starter to see how Bloom goes astray is to consider a significant but
12

Id.

13

I will explain how this is so later in section 4.
For similar objections to Bloom in this direction, see Persson and Savulescu (2018), and Zaki,
Jamil. “Moving Beyond Stereotypes of Empathy.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(2) (2017): 59–
60.
14
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unanswered question in Bloom’s view: where does sympathy come from? 15 If
sympathy is the act of feeling concern for other people, how could we be
concerned about someone who has nothing to do with us? Perhaps Bloom could
reply that though we tend to sympathize with those who are closer to us, we could
extend our concern to strangers through moral reasoning. For instance, maybe we
can generalize from our concern for people of importance to us to reach an idea
that all persons are worthy of our concern.16 However, this still does not answer
where our previous concern for people close to us comes from, namely what
makes us sympathize with people close to us.
It seems that the most available resource for Bloom’s sentimentalism to
explain the source of sympathy is theory of mind that he uses together with
sympathy to explain moral motivation. Again, theory of mind refers to our ability
to read what’s going on in others’ minds without feeling similar mental states in
our minds. So, theory of mind appears to be able to promote sympathy by helping
us see that others are in pain or distress, which gives us reason to feel concern for
the sufferers.
However, theory of mind itself is never sufficient to generate sympathy for
other people. Consider the most extreme case: psychopathy, a mental disorder
associated with traits such as persistent violent and antisocial behavioral
tendencies, impaired emotion systems, boldness, selfishness, etc. 17 It has been
established in abnormal psychology that psychopaths have no trouble in their
capacity for theory of mind: they do well in reading other minds through bodily
cues, which is often a means for them to exploit other people effectively for
egoistic purposes. 18 However, psychopaths systematically lack sympathy for
other people even if they can recognize their pain and distress, which means
theory of mind is not sufficient for sympathy for other people.
Then, what deficiency explains the lack of sympathy and moral concern in
psychopaths? Although it seems psychologists have not explored the cause of
psychopaths’ lack of sympathy in particular, there is a rich literature on what
deficiency of psychopaths explain their failure to understand moral right and
wrong, which I think can shed light on what causes lack of sympathy in
psychopaths, given that their failure to understand moral norms is often
characterized (perhaps from a sentimentalist perspective) as knowing what is
15

Persson and Savulescu (2018) also recognize this problem of Bloom’s view and propose
empathy as the solution to it. However, my view in section 4 differs from their proposal in two
important ways. For one, we disagree on what real empathy is. For another, we disagree on how
empathy is necessary for empathy.
16
See Gopnik, Alison. The Philosophical Baby: What Children's Minds Tell Us About Truth,
Love and the Meaning Of Life. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009, at 209.
17
Maibom, Heidi. "Psychopathy: Morally incapacitated persons." Handbook of the Philosophy of
Medicine (2017): 1131-1144.
18
See Felisberti, Fatima Maria, and Robert King. "Mind-Reading in altruists and
psychopaths." In Neuroscience and Social Science, pp. 121-140. Springer, Cham, 2017. Richell,
Rebecca A., Derek GV Mitchell, C. Newman, A. Leonard, Simon Baron-Cohen, and R. James R.
Blair. "Theory of mind and psychopathy: can psychopathic individuals read the ‘language of the
eyes’?." Neuropsychologia 41, no.5 (2003): 523-526.
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morally right and wrong in an undedicated way, namely without being concerned
about living up the that moral knowledge. As Heidi L. Maibom 19 recently
surveyed, although there has not been a unanimous agreement among
psychologists on what is responsible for psychopaths failing to understand moral
right and wrong, a popular view claims that the deficient emotions are the real
answer, of which the best candidate is often thought to be the deficient empathy of
psychopaths.
Enlightened by these psychopath studies, I think that empathy is a good
candidate for answering Bloom’s unanswered question about where sympathy
comes from. But although these psychopath studies suggest a close relationship
between empathy and sympathy, the discoveries are not decisive.20 Hence, I must
provide a philosophical argument for the significance of empathy to sympathy
that does not rely on the current controversial psychological studies.
4.

Why Is Empathy Necessary for Sympathy

To see how empathy is necessary for sympathy, we need to first correct
Bloom’s mischaracterization of empathy. Recall that by ‘empathy’ Bloom means
feeling what one believes other people feel, namely an affective state in which the
empathizer experiences a feeling that is similar to what he thinks another one is
feeling.This characterization lowers the bar of empathy too much. Consider the
following case.
John and Amanda are roommates. One day, John excitedly told Amanda that
his boss assigns an important design task to him so that he got the precious
chance to impress his boss and get a promotion. However, whenever Amanda
comes back home, she sees John relaxing instead of working. She asks John
when he expects he can finish the design, and John always says to finish it on
the next day. One night in the next week, John comes to Amanda’s room to
complain in deep frustration that his boss does not like his work and the
promotion is finally offered to his colleague. John’s emotional distress is so
strong that it evokes interpersonal emotional contagion, and thus Amanda
feels a similar episode of distress affected by the emotional congation.
However, despite the felt similar distress, Amanda does not think John’s
frustration makes sense because in her eyes, John is responsible for his failure
given that he did not make enough effort to work on the design.

For this case, no matter whether John has made enough efforts to finish the
task, would we like to say that Amanda is empathizing with John’s frustration
when having a similar feeling of frustration? I think we would not. The basic
attitude of Amanda is to deny John’s distress as an appropriate response to his
situation. In other words, Amanda is averse to John’s distress instead of
appreciating it. As a result, we can expect that Amanda would not show any
19
20

Supra note 17, at 1118.
Id, at 1119.
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concern for John’s loss of promotion or give any comforting words, but rather
would be more likely to keep silent or even (perhaps mildly) blame John for
insufficient efforts. Thus, in the first place, real empathy requires the empathizer
to appreciate other people’s feeling as appropriate (or fitting, proper) given their
situation, which dates back to one of the founders of Scottish Sentiemtnalism
Adam Smith 21 , and has recently become one of the latest consensuses on the
conditions of empathy.22
Further clarification about how we feel what other people feel in empathy
is also needed. As we just saw in the John case, emotional contagion – the
phenomenon where one’s emotion is so strong that it directly passes to or bleeds
onto another person – is unreliable for empathy because it is often independent of
our evaluation of the appropriateness of other people’s feeling. Then, what makes
us feel what other people feel in empathy? The answer is a unique kind of
perspective-taking, the act of imagining ourselves being other people and
figuring out what we as them would feel in the given situation. For example,
Amanda might imagine what she would feel if she becomes John in his situation.
By imagining that she as John gets an important task from her employer, sets
herself a goal of finishing the task beautifully and so getting a promotion, but later
wastes time on weekdays and finally fails to impress her employer, Amanda can
feel shameful because she thinks that she was too lazy to live up to her own
standard. This is how imaginative perspective-taking can generate an empathic
feeling. Notice that in this new scenario, we are entitled to say that Amanda feels
empathy for John, but Amanda feels empathy for John not because she has a
similar episode of distress with John affected by emotional congation, but because
she feels shame for John, which is a feeling that she believes to be appropriate for
John to feel in his situation despite John did not feel it.23
With these clarifications, we can see that real empathy is more
complicated than some Scottish sentimentalists like Bloom characterize, which is
probably the main reason why empathy is undervalued in generating moral
motivation. As we see, empathy has an affective component of feeling an
appropriate emotion. It has cognitive components of recognizing the empathized
person’s situation and imagining being the empathized person. It also has an
evaluative component of figuring out what is appropriate for the empathized
person to feel in her situation. So, we now get a mature view of what real empathy
is:
Real empathy is to feel what one believes to be appropriate for other
people to feel in their situation through imagining being them and figuring
out what one would feel in their situation.
21

Smith, Adam. The theory of moral sentiments. Penguin, 2010.
See Maibom, Heidi Lene, ed. The Routledge handbook of philosophy of empathy. New York:
Routledge, 2017, at 2.
23
Hence, real empathy does not need a perfect affective match between the empathizer and the
empathized. See Schwan, David. "Does Affective Empathy Require Perspective-Taking or
Affective Matching?." American Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2019): 277-288.
22
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With the correct view of empathy in hand, now we can get into the core question:
for Scottish Sentimentalis like Bloom, how is empathy helpful in filling the gap
between theory of mind and sympathy? I argue that compared to theory of mind,
the contribution of empathy to the formation of sympathy is three-fold.
First, while theory of mind only gives us descriptive knowledge of what’s
going on in other minds, empathy involves an appreciation of the empathized
person’s feeling (if it is appropriate) in light of the given situation, which clears
people’s potential aversive or indifferent attitude to the empathized person’s
feeling due to an incomplete understanding of her situation. We can see how this
is so by tweaking the Amanda-John case one more time. Other things being equal,
suppose that it happens that Amanda comes back home whenever John is having a
fast break between hard work. So, John in fact made a lot of efforts to finish the
design task but Amanda mistakenly believes that he did not. Also, the fact is that
John’s boss does not like his work because of some bad discrimination, of which
both John and Amanda are ignorant. Then, after John knows that he messed up
and comes back to complain about his boss with Amanda, she recognizes that
John is in distressful frustration by inferring from his behavioral, linguistic, facial
cues. But due to her misunderstanding of the situation, Amanda fails to empathize
with John in the sense that she does not appreciate his frustration. So, her averse
attitude to John’s frustration remains all the time, which motivates her to tend to
blame John and so blocks her from sympathizing with him.
Nonetheless, the appreciation of the empathized person’s feeling is just a
necessary condition that does suffice for sympathy. So, we should go on to find
more features of empathy to explain the formation of sympathy for other people.
Second, while theory of mind provides us with the knowledge of what’s
going on in other minds in a distanced way, empathy relates other people’s feeling
to ourselves through the unique kind of perspective-taking so that it motivates us
to be concerned about other people’s feeling just like our own. 24 As we can see in
the cold-blooded people (not necessarily psychopaths), there is a boundary
between others and self lying in the gap between theory of mind and sympathy
for other people. The cold-blooded people have no difficulty in reading other
minds and recognizing others’ pain and distress, but this often means nothing to
them because it is other people’s suffering instead of their own. By contrast,
empathy can help break the boundary between self and others at least to some
extent. In empathizing with other people in suffering, we imagine being them and
thus getting into their situation, which in some sense generated an experiencer in
which we and the empathized person are unified. Then, we as the unified
experiencer realize how bad that situation is, and what kind of reaction we would
24

It might be objected that theory of mind can also involve perspective-taking, which is often
called ‘simulation’ in philosophy of mind. So my argument might be said to be unfair to supporters
of theory of mind like Bloom. However, I will argue later in section 4 that empathy does more than
just perspective-taking because empathy can provide us with the phemonemal knowledge of how
bad other people’s suffering feels that can strengthen the reason for sympathizing them, which
cannot be guaranteed by perspective-taking.
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appropriately have in that situation – say, pain and distress. Since in imagination
we become the unified experiencer, the pain and distress falling on the empathized
person also falls on us through our imagination, and hence evokes our sympathy
for ourselves, namely feeling concern for our unhappiness. Finally, since our
sympathy is formed when we are as the unified experiencer, that sympathy is not
only directed at my well-being but also the well-being of the empathized person as
another part of the unified experiencer. Therefore, through this emotionally
charged perspective-taking, empathy helps us to extend the sympathy for our own
well-being to other people’s well-being.
Third, empathy also generates a vivid affective feeling – often pain and
distress, echoing the empathized person’s suffering – that helps us learn how bad
the empathized person feels and thus strengthens the reason to show concern for
her. In fact, this has been partly mentioned in the last paragraph when I talk about
how emotionally charged empathic perspective-taking can direct our sympathy for
ourselves to other people, but the significance of the affective feature of empathy
is worth discussing independently because it is an important feature that not only
theory of mind (as we saw in the last paragraph) but also general perspectivetaking might not have.
In general perspective-taking, we imagine being other people and figuring
out what they are feeling, but this process could be done in a non-affective way in
which we end up knowing what others feel in an abstract manner. For example,
we can imagine right now being some victims, figuring out what we would feel,
namely great pain and distress and thus attribute them to the victims. But we could
take such a perspective without necessarily having a similar kind of pain and
distress in our mind. As a result, we have no idea of how bad that pain and
distress feel, and so feel less motivated to show sympathetic concern for their
suffering. By contrast, empathy requires one to stand in a closer position to the
empathized person – acquired often by being exposed to details as rich as possible
about the situation of the empathized person, delivered by witnessing, narratives,
videos – to an extent that the position is close enough for the empathizer to
actually feel the affective state that she inferred from imaginative perspectivetaking. And compared to theory of mind and general perspective-taking, the
significance of this affective feeling of empathy is that it offers us a piece of
phenomenal knowledge about how bad other people’s suffering feels and thus
strengthens the reason to show (more) sympathetic concern for them, provided we
have already felt the reason to show sympathy to them by unifying ourselves and
the empathized targets in the empathic perspective-taking. Thus, the affective
feature of empathy serves as a significant supplement to the empathic perspectivetaking, strengthening our willingness to show (more) sympathy for the empathized
person.25
25

For a more detailed defense of how the affective feature of empathy contributes to moral
motivation in this way, see Jefferson, William. “The Moral Significance of Empathy.” PhD diss.,
University of Oxford, 2019. For other defenses of the significance of affective feature of empathy,
see Simmons (2014) and Marshall, Colin. Compassionate Moral Realism. Oxford University Press,
2018.
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If my argument for the three-fold necessary contribution of empathy to
sympathy is correct, Bloom’s view will be in danger. To clarify, I agree with
Bloom that sympathy together with theory of mind can be sufficient for specific
moral motivations from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective. After all, there are
so many everyday cases where we can be motivated to do the morally good thing
without empathizing with the target; for example, when a mother sees her child
drowning in the water, she would be immediately motivated to save her child
simply out of her sympathy and concern for her child together with her awareness
that her child is in danger gained by theory of mind. However, this does not mean
that Scottish Sentimentalism should abandon empathy, for I have argued that
empathy is indirectly necessary for moral motivation in that empathy is necessary
for the formation of sympathy, and sympathy (together with theory of mind) is
further necessary and sufficient for moral motivation in a Scottish Sentimentalist
view. Therefore, if my view is correct, Bloom would be wrong in claiming that we
are morally better off without empathy, for we would not be concerned about
anything and anyone without empathy, even if empathy might sometimes lead to
morally objectionable acts that cannot be controlled and guided by reason
(which I doubt).
5.

Three Anticipated Objections

The first anticipated objection to my argument asks: if I agree with Bloom
that sympathy (together with theory of mind) can be sufficient to generate specific
moral motivations without empathy, doesn’t that mean empathy is not necessary
for sympathy in specific cases? If so, in what sense are the three-fold contributions
of empathy necessary for sympathy?
Let me begin by adding a minor distinction regarding sympathy. Recall
that I use ‘sympathy’ in the same way with Bloom, which means the act of feeling
concern for other people’s well-being. Now let us distinguish sympathy from
sympathetic concern: the former is a specific short-term episode of feeling concern
for something (e.g., a social issue) or someone, while the latter is a long-term
mental state of being concerned about something or someone. With this
distinction in hand, we can see that my argument for the three-fold contribution of
empathy to sympathy only means to show that empathy is necessary for the initial
formation of a sympathetic concern instead of every specific short-term episode of
sympathy in which we feel the pre-existing sympathetic concern for other people.
That said, I am arguing that we cannot form any long-term sympathetic concern
without empathy providing us the appreciation of others’ feelings, the empathic
perspective-taking as a breaker of the boundary between self and others, and the
phenomenal knowledge about how bad others’ suffering feels, though I admit that
once a long-term sympathetic concern has formed based on empathy, it can
generate specific episodes of sympathy later together with theory of mind without
the help of empathy. For example, Oscar has never been concerned about the
social issue of sexual harassment against women until he happens to watch a
documentary illustrating the narrative details of women’s experience of being
sexually harassed. With the help of those narrative details, Oscar forms strong
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empathy with the women victims, which generates a firm, stable long-term
sympathetic concern for the sexual harassment issue. Later he becomes a lawyer
engaged with supporting sexual harassment victims. In his job, he shows sympathy
to every victim he assists, but he does not feel much empathy anymore to avoid
being too distressed to work efficiently. So, although empathy can be unnecessary
for every specific episode of sympathy and moral motivation, it is necessary for
the formation of the long-term sympathetic concern.
The second anticipated objection questions that it seems we are willing to
empathize with those in suffering because we have already had a concern for their
well-being, instead of the other way around.26 For people who have already had
concern for a kind of issue or a person, empathy can help them discover more
problems and suffering that they want to deal with; but for people lacking the
concern for a particular issue or person in the first place, the recognition of the
problem or suffering seems to only bother them instead of triggering their
sympathy.
I have two replies to this objection. First, the idea that sympathetic concern
which already existed can promote empathy is compatible with my view. Back to
the Oscar example. We see that the developed sympathetic concern for sexual
harassment issue makes Oscar become a lawyer engaged with assisting sexual
harassment victims, and thus makes him more likely to be exposed to victims and
empathizing with them, though Oscar chooses to suppress his empathic distress
later for the sake of offering more professional assistance.
But second, the benefit of sympathetic concern to empathy does not mean
that the initial formation of sympathetic concern can develop without empathy. In
fact, an implicit assumption behind the given objection to my view is that
empathy can only be intentional and effortful, which is thus taken to require a preexisting sympathetic concern or general kindness. However, this assumption is
problematic. On the one hand, empathy could be (and maybe is often) triggered
passively, automatically, unconsciously. In Batson’s influential experimental
studies of the association between empathy and moral motivation, the experiment
is cleverly designed in a way that makes the suffering salient enough so that it is
hard to ignore. As a result, although it is the first time for the subjects to meet the
sufferer in the experiment, most of them are found to have different degrees of
empathic reactions to the sufferer.27 We can also see passive and unintentional
empathy in the Oscar case in which Oscar happens to watch the sexual harassment
documentary and thus unintentionally forms empathy with the victims.
On the other hand, in cognitive science, the latest study of the development
of fellow feelings shows that empathy does develop prior to sympathy. As

26

It seems that Bloom also would like to make this objection, though he uses a way more general
concept ‘kindness’ instead of ‘sympathy’ or ‘concern’ in particular in the book. “It’s not that
empathy itself automatically leads to kindness. Rather, empathy has to connect to kindness that
already exists. Empathy makes good people better, then, because kind people don’t like suffering,
and empathy makesthis suffering salient.” Supra note 7, at 66.
27
Supra note 11.
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Spaulding et al 28 survey, the development of fellow feelings starts with the
emergence of emotional congation at birth, followed by personal distress
affected by recognizing other people’s suffering very early. Then, the real
empathy capacity – namely affective perspective-taking abilities – develops
sometime in the two-year-olds (though it is only directed at other people’s simple
emotions in simple contexts). For instance, as shown in the experiments done by
Denham (1986)29 and Vaish et al30, the two-year-olds start to emotionally attribute
correct emotional reactions through perspective-taking because the targets do not
display apparent emotional cues to the babies in the experiments. Unsurprisingly,
the capacity for theory of mind and sympathy develops later than empathy. In
particular, it is argued that the capacity for sympathy is relatively late-developing
because it requires more mental mechanisms, including perspective-taking, theory
of mind, the awareness of self in contrast to others, and emotional self-regulation.
The last anticipated objection is also somehow inspired by Bloom. It
seems that Bloom wants to agree that past empathy is needed for generating
sympathy from theory of mind, though this seems to be inconsistent with his
claim that “on balance, we are better off without it (empathy).”31 He writes:
“There is a world of difference, after all, between understanding the
misery of the person who is talking to you because you have felt misery in
the past, even though now you are calm, and understanding the misery of
the person who is talking to you because you are mirroring them and
feeling their misery right now. The first, which doesn’t involve empathy
in any sense, just understanding, has all the advantages of the second and
none of its costs.”32

In light of this, perhaps what Bloom proposes is not to eliminate empathy from the
start, but rather the idea that we should no longer use empathy to motivate moral
behaviors after it has generated the long-term sympathetic concern which is
sufficient for morality with the help of theory of mind. However, this modification
of Bloom’s proposal is still problematic. As I have argued in section 4, one of the
contributions of empathy is to provide us with an appreciation of other people’s
suffering after we recognize their situation, which is important for us to form
concern for new social issues. Recall the Oscar example. He lives in an era that
witnessed the revolution of the social concern of sexual harassment, which was a
new issue to him when he first learned about it. If Scottish Sentimentalists follow
28 28
Spaulding,

Shannon, Rita Svetlova, and Hannah Read. “The Nature of Empathy.” in
Philosophy of Neuroscience, edited by Felipe De Brigard and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, MIT Press,
forthcoming.
29
Denham, Susanne A. 1986. "Social cognition, prosocial behavior, and emotion in preschoolers:
Contextual validation." Child development:194-201.
30
Vaish, Amrisha, Malinda Carpenter, and Michael Tomasello. 2009. "Sympathy through affective
perspective taking and its relation to prosocial behavior in toddlers." Developmental psychology
45(2):534
31
Supra note 7, at 33.
32
Supra note 7, at 130.
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Bloom’s proposal, they cannot ask Oscar to use empathy anymore when watching
the documentary provided that Oscar has formed almost all the basic sympathetic
concern. If so, although Oscar might recognize the victims’ suffering by theory of
mind, he cannot appreciate their distress as appropriate given the detailed reports
of their situation. So, as I have argued in section 4, Oscar would not form
sympathetic concern that changes his life without using empathy. Similarly, since
new social issues would come up with the development of human society,
especially technologies, we still need to continue to use empathy for forming
sympathetic concern for new social issues.
6.

Conclusion

The main project of this book has been focused on whether Scottish
Sentimentalists about moral motivation should abandon the fellow feeling of
empathy in explaining moral motivation. I began the exploration by considering
Bloom’s skepticism about the significance of empathy to moral motivation.
Bloom argues that sympathy is sufficient for moral motivation with the help of
theory of mind, and that empathy often motivates altruistic behaviors in a morally
objectionable way that goes against justice and fairness, and therefore concludes
that we are better off without empathy from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective.
Then, I made a diagnosis of Bloom’s view, arguing that Bloom does not
answer where sympathy comes from, and that theory of mind as the most
available resource for him is not sufficient to generate sympathy. Enlightened by
psychological studies of the association between lack of empathy and lack of
moral concern in psychopaths, I explored whether empathy can explain the
formation of sympathy. I first correct Bloom’s mischaracterization of empathy by
adopting the latest consensus on the nature of empathy: real empathy is to feel
what one believes to be appropriate for other people to feel in their situation
through imagining being them and figuring out what one would feel in their
situation. Then I provided my central argument for the idea that empathy is
necessary for sympathy (or rather, sympathetic concern) by making three
contributions that theory of mind cannot make: the appreciation of other people’s
suffering given their situation, the empathic perspective-taking that breaks the
boundary between self and others, and the phenomenal knowledge of how bad
other people’s suffering feels. Hence, since empathy is necessary for sympathy,
and sympathy is both necessary and sufficient (together with theory of mind) for
moral motivation from a Scottish Sentimentalist perspective, I conclude that
empathy is indirectly necessary for moral motivation, and therefore Scottish
Sentimentalists about moral motivation cannot abandon empathy.
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Black (Muslim) Lives Matter:
African American Muslim
Social Activism
By Jacob C. Riccioni
Abstract: Over the past eight years, the Black Lives Matter movement has advocated for
marginalized communities within the African American population and called for police
brutality and anti-black racism to be abolished. With the rise of Black Lives Matter in
contemporary society, I am left wondering, do African American Muslims support the
Black Lives Matter movement? There is no simple answer for African American Muslim
leaders and laypeople because the Black Lives Matter movement supports LGBTQ+
rights, which some Muslims do not condone, and some rallies have broken out into riots.
Religious leaders and scholars are split between supporting Black Lives Matter and
supporting alternative faith-based activist groups. This article attempts to explore how
African American Muslims engage in activism within the context of the Black Lives
Matter movement and other social activism alternatives. Through the analysis of key
terms relating to social activism and African American Muslims, this article explores
how the Black Lives Matter movement began, the importance of activism online and inperson, exegetical statements on activism, how the concept of “double consciousness”
can be applied to African American Muslims, and how African American Muslims
engage in activism via the Black Lives Matter movement or alternatives. This research is
a contemporary analysis in understanding how African Americans are called to challenge
the status quo, anti-black racism, violence, and injustice through race and religion amidst
the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement.

18

Introduction
The goal of this research is to explore how African American Muslims
understand and engage in contemporary anti-racist social activism concerning the
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and other social activism alternatives. To
better understand this process, this paper explores how African American Muslim
leaders and public figures understand how Muslims should engage in activism by
analyzing the exegetical statements of several African American Muslims
activists and leaders. Ethnographic research previously completed by scholars is
incorporated to understand how African American Muslims have engaged in
social activism. Research on various media platforms was gathered to understand
how African American Muslims are currently engaged in forms of activism.
Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to better understand how African American
Muslims engage in social activism through race, religion, representation, and
power in the 21st century.
Understanding Key Terms
Before exploring how African American Muslims are discussing and engaging in
social activism, it is necessary to define multiple terms for the sake of clarity in
understanding what specific social groups and categories are being discussed. The
goal of this paper is not to gatekeep whether someone can or cannot ascribe a
certain social identity to themselves. Nor is it the goal of this paper to make
stipulative boundaries related to social identities. For these reasons, anyone who
identifies as African American is considered African American. However, the
“American” of “African American” refers to those born in the United States or
living in the United States, whether permanently or temporarily. This is because
the goal is to analyze African American Muslim activism in the United States, not
the Americas. Also, some scholars and individuals prefer to use the term “Black
American” rather than “African American.” For this reason, both terms will be
used interchangeably. The next social identity that needs to be explored is what
“Muslim” means.
Once again, Muslim identity is taken at face value; anyone who identifies
as Muslim is a Muslim for the sake of this paper. This includes, but is not limited
to, various denominations such as Sunni, Shia, the Nation of Islam, and the
Moorish Science Temple. This also includes those who do not ascribe to a
specific denomination but identify as Muslim. As described by sociologist Lori
Peek in her 2005 article “Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious
Identity,” religious identities can be ascribed (e.g., being born Muslim or being a
Muslim nominally), chosen (e.g., someone choosing to be Muslim), or declared
(e.g., a Muslim affirming their identity publicly, typically in response to a crisis).
These identities should not be understood as salient or static, but that one’s
understanding of their own religious identity can shift over time. Due to the
fluidity of religious identity, the goal of this paper is not to examine to what
degree a person’s beliefs are held to be considered Muslim. Now that the terms
“African American” and “Muslim” are defined, the next key terms to explore are
“social justice” and “activism.”
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Defining an ambiguous term with varying semantics, such as “social
justice,” can be a daunting task; however, using a definition that encompasses the
multiple facets of social reality was opted for. Social justice, as defined by The
Investopedia Team in their website article titled “Social Justice,” is:
a political and philosophical theory which asserts that there are
dimensions to the concept of justice beyond those embodied in the
principles of civil or criminal law, economic supply and demand, or
traditional moral frameworks. Social justice tends to focus more on
just relations between groups within society as opposed to the justice
of individual conduct or justice for individuals (2020).

This definition acknowledges that social justice seeks to rise above already
established morals and laws of a group. Social justice seeks to reform these
morals or laws to promote equality for a marginalized group. Overall, social
justice seeks to correct the societal ills that disenfranchise a group within the
larger context of society. Activism is one of the many ways people engage in the
fight for social justice.
Like social justice, activism is another term that can be defined in several
diverse ways. I will offer a stipulative definition of activism due to this. Activism,
as I define it, is the actions of individuals or groups that seek to challenge the
status quo and go beyond conventional mores and laws in the pursuit of justice,
equality, and/or liberty. Furthermore, activism goes beyond the individual for the
sake of a greater cause. Activism can occur in person or online and can be enacted
through words (e.g., a sign, social media post, a speech, etc.), through
mobilization (e.g., blocking a road, rallying, etc.), through alternative action (e.g.,
boycotts, draft-dodging, etc.), and more. The end goal of activism typically is
social justice. One group fighting for social justice through activism is the Black
Lives Matter movement.
The Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement can be considered anything
from a Twitter hashtag to the various groups in the United States and abroad
challenging racial injustice through protest. The BLM movement was initially
started in 2013 by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi. This
movement was started online via Facebook posts in response to the police
brutality and unjust murders of African Americans in the United States. Typically,
these violent acts are committed by white males who often get acquitted of the
charges brought against them. Since 2013, the Black Lives Matter movement has
grown from a Facebook hashtag into a global movement seeking justice for all
people of color (Black Lives Matter 2021).

A Hashtag Revolution
On July 13, 2013, Alicia Garza posted on the popular social media site Facebook
“black people. I love you. I love us. Our lives matter” (Black Lives Matter 2021).
Not long after, Patrisse Marie Cullors-Brignac replied to Garza’s post on
Facebook adding “declaration: black bodies will no longer be sacrificed for the
rest of the world’s enlightenment. i [sic] am done. i [sic] am so done. trayvon[sic],
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you are loved infinitely #blacklivesmatter” (Black Lives Matter 2021). These
words were posted in response to George Zimmerman's acquittal of charges
against him for the death and murder of Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African
American. Also, Cullors’ post was the first time the hashtag “#BlackLivesMatter”
ever appeared on social media. However, this hashtag would quickly gain
popularity among various social media users, and their words would soon
transform how people fight for social justice and racial equality in the 21st
century.
Incorporating the number of hashtags used by social media users also
helps give credence to the importance of social media usage. According to
Monica Anderson (2016), associate director of research at Pew Research Center,
approximately 13.3 million tweets have used the hashtags #BlackLivesMatter or
#AllLivesMatter, a counter-protest hashtag, between July 12, 2013, and March
13, 2016; a vast majority of these posts used the former hashtag. In less than
three years, the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter has gained popularity in the U.S. and
abroad.
The most notable trends in the use of #BlackLivesMatter are in response
to the fatal shooting of Tamir Rice in 2014, when Officer Darren Wilson was not
indicted for the shooting of Michael Brown in 2014, and when Sandra Bland was
found hanged in her jail cell in 2015 (Anderson 2016). Social media is typically
used as a response to hate crimes committed against African Americans based on
the trends previously stated. Overall, Anderson’s research helps explain how
people react to events in the real world through online communication using
quantifiable numbers. So, do social media posts count as a form of activism?
Social media posts count as social activism that shapes online discussions
and real-life action. Social media serves as a way for African American Muslims
and other marginalized groups to gain representation in the public sphere that
virtually anyone can access, provided they have access to the internet. The
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter is not only a way for people to learn the latest
information and opinions related to the topic, but also the hashtag serves as a
collective signifier for mobilizing people online and in person. The hashtag helps
spread awareness of assorted topics related to anti-racism, protests, and even
public lectures on social media. Furthermore, Black Lives Matter groups can be
created on various social media platforms, and these groups can create event
pages for planned protests or speeches. These groups can make their page more
accessible to people looking to be involved in public demonstrations by using the
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter. Social media and the use of hashtags proved to be
crucial in helping organize protests and disseminate information after unarmed
African American teenager Michael Brown was fatally shot by police in 2014.
Cultural anthropologists Yarimar Bonilla and Jonathan Rosa explore how
online hashtags and other forms of online media can be used as field sites in their
research article “#Ferguson: Digital Protest, Hashtag Ethnography, and the
Racial Politics of Social Media in the United States” (2015). Specifically, they
are looking at how Twitter is used to condemn police brutality and fight racism.
Bonilla and Rosa argue that social media platforms are field sites. However, they
distinguish that Ferguson, Missouri, and the hashtag #Ferguson are two unique
research fields. These fields do overlap, but the online field site allows
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individuals from all over the world to protest the murder of Michael Brown,
systematic racism, and police brutality in the U.S. (Bonilla and Rosa 2015).
Furthermore, Bonilla and Rosa (2015) argue that digital activism is a
“real” form of social activism. They use the hashtag #HandsUpDontShoot as an
example to substantiate their claim. Bonilla and Rosa claim that “[t]hrough this
campaign [hashtag #HandsUpDontShoot], users sought to call attention to the
arbitrary nature of racialized policing, the vulnerability of black bodies, and the
problematic ways in which blackness is perceived as a constant threat” (2015:8).
The hashtag allows users to fight the portrayals of African Americans in
mainstream media and signify what being African American means to the author
of the post. Overall, social media allows users to counter-protest the stereotypes
and the stigmatization of African Americans in the U.S. The concept of
signification plays a major role in how African Americans redefine themselves
against stereotypes imposed upon them by white American representations of
African Americans.
In Islam in the African-American Experience (2003), African American
religious studies scholar Richard Brent Turner argues that African Americans
have constantly fought to signify themselves while being signified by white
Americans. Turner defines signification as “the process by which names, signs,
and stereotypes were given to non-European realities and peoples during the
western conquest and exploration of the world” (2003:2-3). However, Turner
adds that “Islam has undercut this signification by offering black Americans the
chance to signify themselves, giving them new names and new political identities
and cultural identities” (2003:3). Signification can be used as a method of
oppression (e.g., white Americans labeling African American teenage boys as
“thugs”) or as a method of liberation (e.g., using Islam as a way of reclaiming
African American religious heritage). Turner (2003) claims that African
Americans continuously contend with how they are signified by white
Americans. As stated in the previous paragraph, the BLM movement is a
contemporary effort that gives African Americans the power to signify
themselves amidst racism and police brutality in the U.S.

Exegetical Activism
Before exploring what Muslim leaders are saying about how Muslims should
react to and engaged with the BLM movement, it is necessary to briefly discuss
how Muslims define and understand activism. In the Foreword by Imam Zaid
Shakir in Towards Sacred Activism (2018) by scholar Imam Dawud Walid, Shakir
explores how activism is understood as a secular activity in the West. However,
Shakir expresses that religion ought to be part of activism. Specifically, Shakir
states that “it [justice] is a gift decreed by God” (Walid 2018:14) and that
“activism can become a source of despair and frustration” (14) when God is not
considered as part of the reason why people should engage in activism. Shakir
believes that there should be no divide between religion and activism; activism
should rely on God as a source of inspiration. Walid concurs with Shakir’s
statements throughout Towards Sacred Activism and offers his thoughts on justice
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and activism.
Walid attempts to explain what justice is and how to define justice, both
conventionally and functionally. Walid cites Muhammad bin Abi Bakr ar-Razi
and defines justice “as being the opposite of oppression or tyranny which derives
from deviation and encroachment” (2018:27-28). Justice serves as a form of
equality and equity. Furthermore, Walid concludes that justice is dispensed by
Allah and only occurs “[w]hen matters operate within the parameters as Allah[…]
made them to operate in” (2018:28). For Walid, Muslims ought to strive for
justice because justice is deontologically ethical (i.e., justice is intrinsically good
because Allah dispenses justice). In the next chapter, he explains why Muslims
should be called to engage in social justice activism.
Walid argues that all able-bodied Muslims are “obligated” to be advocates
for and engage in social justice activism. Walid explains that “[s]upporting
existing expressions of justice in society, restoring individuals’ God-given rights
that are currently denied, and interrupting factors that produce injustice are part of
the Islamic faith” (2018:31). According to Walid, engaging in social justice
activism is not only a civil obligation but also a religious obligation. His overall
thesis guiding Towards Sacred Activism is that activism is not a secular but a
sacred act for Muslims; hence, the title of the book. Walid’s and Shakir’s
understanding of justice and activism are a limited perspective of how African
American Muslims ought to understand their religious obligations towards
activism. However, it is important to incorporate their perspectives into this paper
due to Walid’s influence and prominence in the public sphere as an Islamic
intellectual. So, what are African American Islamic scholars’ opinions on the
Black Lives Matter movement and Muslims allying with them?
While Dawud Walid does not discuss BLM in Towards Sacred Activism,
he does elsewhere. In a recently published article by Walid titled “Muslims’
Engagement in 2020 with BLM: Promise and Problems” (2021), he expresses his
opinions on whether Muslims should align with BLM or not. First, Walid is
appalled when he learns that there is a general apathy toward anti-black racism
from non-African American Muslims during the height of the Ferguson protests,
especially when the victims of racism are not Muslim (2021). However, he does
note that discussions on anti-racism and confronting systematic oppression have
become more prominent in Muslim discourses since 2016. According to Walid,
many Muslims, regardless of race or national origin, have “seemingly jumped on
the BLM bandwagon without critical analysis based on our [Islamic] spiritual
tradition” (2021) and critiques these Muslims for not contemplating what BLM
stands for.
Furthermore, Walid believes that Muslims can, and ought to, protest racial
injustice while not becoming a part of the BLM. He supports his claims by
explaining that the Mosque Cares group and the Muslim Alliance of North
America group do not sponsor the BLM movement (Walid 2021). Walid
concludes that African American Muslims should not support the BLM
movement because BLM is partially funded by white foundations, some protests
turn into rioting even though BLM does not condone these violent actions, and
because BLM supports LGBTQ+ equal rights (2021). Walid claims same-sex
attraction and nontraditional gender expressions to be antithetical to Islamic
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teachings on gender, sexuality, and marriage (2018). Walid argues that African
American Muslims, and Muslims in general, should not ally with the BLM
movement because BLM does not align with and, in some instances, contradicts
Islamic moral teaching (2021). However, he contends that Muslims ought to
engage in social activism and social justice through an Islamic understanding of
how to engage in activism (Walid 2018).
As a side note, although Islam is against same-sex attraction dogmatically,
not all Muslims would agree with Walid (2018; 2021) and be against supporting
LGBTQ+ equal rights. Imam Daayiee Abdullah is one Muslim leader and scholar
attempting to reform Islamic teachings on LGBTQ+ rights. He is the director of
LGBT outreach for Muslims for Progressive Values and Imam and educational
director for Light of Reform Mosque in Washington D.C., a queer and interfaith
friendly mosque. Also, he is an openly gay Imam whose work focuses on creating
an inclusive space for LGBTQ+ Muslims (Khan 2013). So, while Walid (2018;
2021) and other Muslims may condemn same-sex attraction based on religious
understanding, not all Muslims agree with this viewpoint; one can be a Muslim
and a member of the LGBTQ+ community as is the case for Imam Abdullah.
On the other side of the argument are anthropologist Donna Auston and
ethnic studies scholar Sylvia Chan-Malik who discuss the importance of African
American Muslims allying with the BLM movement in their transcribed dialogue,
“Drawing Near to God’s Pleasure: A Dialogue on the Black Muslim Political
Tradition and the Moral-Ethical Imperatives of American Islam” (2019). Like
Walid, Auston is surprised that engaging in anti-racism, social activism, and
condemning the systematic oppression and violence towards African Americans
was rarely discussed by non-African American Muslims. Auston continues by
arguing that non-African American Muslims do not see the BLM movement as a
“Muslim issue” (2019:187), and Chan-Malik adds that this lack of concern “stems
from a lack of knowledge on the part of non-Black Muslims” (2019:187). So, the
BLM movement has struggled to gain support from Muslims due to the
segregation of African American Muslims from non-black Muslims, resulting in
some Muslims believing anti-black racism is not a Muslim issue. However, they
diverge from Walid on if Muslims should ally with BLM.
Auston and Chan-Malik argue that the BLM movement is a Muslim
issue, and that Muslims should ally with the BLM movement. Auston asserts that
“social justice is a moral imperative and an act of worship [emphasis added by
Auston]” (2019:199) and that Muslims ought to align themselves with the BLM
movement. Furthermore, she claims that Muslims cannot be tacit when injustice
occurs. Auston makes an exegetical statement saying, “the Last Sermon of the
Prophet Muhammad[…] is an anti-racist message” (2019:197). Auston backs up
her claims that Muslims should ally with BLM by using the Prophet Muhammad
as a source of inspiration and religious authority. Muslims can be called to
support or find alternatives to the BLM movement depending on how religion is
interpreted.
Double Consciousness: Being African American and Muslim
In another article written by Auston titled “Prayer, Protest, and Police Brutality:
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Black Muslim Spiritual Resistance in the Ferguson Era” (2017), she explores the
concept of “double consciousness” and how it applies to African American
Muslims. Auston states that “‘double consciousness’ allows us to theorize
experience through the contemplation of multiple, simultaneously embodied
subjectivities, at times with considerable friction and despite one another”
(2017:14). This quote explains that African American Muslims are African
American and Muslim concurrently. However, these two identities can create an
identity crisis at times. In the case of the BLM movement, these two identities can
create friction.
African American Muslim laypeople can have an identity conflict between
their racial identity and religious identity depending on whom they are seeking
spiritual guidance from. For example, Dawud Walid (2021) claims that African
American Muslims should not ally with the BLM movement. However, laypeople
who look to Walid for guidance may feel conflicted because, as African
Americans, they feel the need to ally with BLM. However, Walid does offer
alternatives to the BLM movement to help alleviate the identity strain this may
cause. On the other hand, if the layperson seeks religious guidance from someone
who supports BLM, then these two identities are less likely to conflict.
Anthropologist Robert Dannin also explores the significance of being African
American and Muslim.
In Black Pilgrimage to Islam, Dannin explores why African Americans,
who are already a minority in the U.S., would make themselves a double minority
by becoming Muslim. What Dannin (2002) finds is that Islam reinvents African
American identity while connecting to African roots; “Islam promises liberation
from social problems” (262); the hijra becomes a symbolic narrative of one’s life
experience; and “Islam rewrites biography and even seeks to reinterpret history”
(263) of African Americans. For African American Muslims, Islam helps solidify
their racial and ethnic identities. Islam also justifies the fight for civil rights and
equality. Other scholars have examined how Muslims still must fight for civil
rights in post 9/11 America.
Anthropologist Sunaina Marr Maira (2016) explores how identity relates
to activism in her book The 9/11 Generation: Youth, Rights, and Solidarity in the
War on Terror. She finds that “activism focused on Muslim civil liberties has also
become an opportunity to wage a battle for inclusion into the national community
and recognition as political subjects via a discourse of rights” (Maira 2016:82).
Not only are African Americans still fighting for equal rights, but Muslims are
too. Activism can help coalesce the identity of being African American and
Muslim through the fight for equal rights. It can also promote racial solidarity
between Muslim groups (Maira 2016).
Overall, the concept of “double consciousness” is important in
understanding how African American Muslims live within two unique social
identities. These identities can cause internal conflict if the person does not
believe the BLM movement aligns with their religious teachings. However, both
identities can also coalesce to create an identity that promotes liberation from
oppression and activism for civil rights. Indeed, Sherman A. Jackson (2005)
argues in his chapter “Islam and Black Religion” from Islam and the
Blackamerican: Looking Toward the Third Resurrection that Islam was
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“appropriated” by African Americans and syncretized with “Blackamerican
Religion” to become a theology of liberation (28). Regardless, Islam has served as
a means of signifying liberation through religion. With this in mind, let us now
look at how African American Muslims are engaged in the Black Lives Matter
movement.
African American Muslims, BLM, and Alternative Activism
In the earlier mentioned article by Donna Auston (2017), she explores how
African American Muslims support the BLM movement. The first main point that
Auston makes is that not all African Americans are Muslim, and not all Muslims
are African American. Due to this, African American Muslims and non-Muslim
African Americans protest differently in some respects. Therefore, African
American Muslims tend to be overlooked by research and media outlets
discussing BLM due to them being a small group within the larger protest.
However, she argues that social activism and the fight for social justice are
integral parts of African American Muslim identity. Auston words this best by
stating, “Black American Islam has always been about the struggle for racial
equality and religious freedom shaped by the intersectional concerns necessitated
by the fight on multiple fronts against state power, anti-Blackness, and entrenched
White supremacy” (2017:20). To be an African American Muslim is to be
someone who constantly works towards social justice and equality on multiple
fronts. Overall, Auston concludes that some African American Muslims are
engaged in the BLM movement but are a small group within the movement,
causing them to be overlooked (2017). Muslim organizations have also spoken
out against racism and how Muslims should engage with BLM.
Muslim Anti-Racism Collaborative (ARC) is a nonprofit organization
founded in the U.S. committed to racial justice education with a heavy emphasis
on African American Muslims. Muslim ARC started as an online organization in
2014, creating the hashtag #beingblackandmuslim. They created the hashtag to
bring awareness to racial and religious topics. The organization has quickly
gained prominence and international attention since its inception (MuslimARC
2017). Muslim ARC even created a toolkit to help guide Muslims in their
interactions with the BLM movement after Michael Brown’s case resulted in a
non-indictment. However, Muslim ARC is rather vague about whether Muslims
should support and be a part of the BLM movement.
The “#BlackLivesMatter: MuslimARC Toolkit” was first created in 2014,
authored by Magari Hill, and revised in 2016. The toolkit offers a variety of
information and other resources on how Muslims should interact with BLM.
Muslim ARC neither supports nor opposes BLM. However, they offer alternative
groups to BLM, including Muslim ARC’s “Call for Justice” letter and Muslims
for Ferguson. The toolkits discuss how Muslims should engage in activism and
anti-racism. Also, the toolkit suggests that if Muslims interact with the BLM
movement, they should do so from an Islamic perspective, promoting
egalitarianism and engaging in non-violent protests (Hill 2016). Muslim ARC
released a letter in 2014 calling Muslims to condemn murder and racism in the
wake of the Ferguson trial of Darren Wilson but makes no mention of the BLM
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movement (Hill 2014).
The Center for Global Muslim Life is another Muslim organization
analyzing how African American Muslims and Muslims, in general, engage in
anti-racism and activism through the BLM movement and alternatives. Their
article “The Muslim Community Rises with Ferguson: From Ferguson to
Palestine” explores how Muslims supported the Ferguson protests after 18-yearold Michael Brown was fatally shot by police officers both within the U.S. and
abroad. Many Muslims opted to join the Muslims for Ferguson protesters.
However, some Muslims protested as part of the BLM movement (The Center for
Global Muslim Life 2015). Overall, African American Muslims found a way to
stand in solidarity against police brutality and racism via either group.
African American Muslim support for the BLM is not entirely clear. On
the one hand, some African American Muslims seek alternative protest groups
more aligned with Islamic teachings, as Dawud Walid (2018; 2021) argues they
should be. On the other hand, some African American Muslims see no issues in
joining the BLM movement, as Donna Auston (2017; 2019) finds. However,
African American Muslims engage in social activism strategically by using their
religion to help shape how they protest. Either way, Muslims can be found
engaging in social activism and justice.
Conclusion
African American Muslims are strategically engaged in activism. Race and
religion play a key role in how African American Muslims understand activism
and justice. African American Muslims are caught in a “double consciousness” by
being African American and Muslim, which can create conflict at times.
However, Muslim groups have attempted to rectify this potential conflict of social
identities (Auston 2017). Attempts are made through disseminating information
such as the Muslim ARC’s BLM toolkit and creating alternative activist groups
like Muslims for Ferguson (Hill 2016). Regardless, African American Muslims
feel racially and religiously obliged to fight for social justice, engage in antiracism, and support social activism
Activism is one way many African American Muslims are able to
challenge the status quo. The power created in numbers through protests
challenges the power held by anti-black racists in the U.S. Protestors attempt to
give a voice to African Americans that are silenced by racist oppression. The
hashtag #BlackLivesMatter is one way African Americans regain the power to
represent themselves. Furthermore, African American Muslims leaders such as
Dawud Walid (2018; 2021) attempt to inform Muslims on how they should
represent themselves when engaging in political activism by discouraging
Muslims from allying with the BLM movement. Ultimately, African American
Muslims engage in activism in an attempt to gain the power to represent
themselves and abolish oppression.
African American Muslims strategically fight for social justice and engage
in anti-racism through social media and taking part in protests hosted by the Black
Lives Matter movement or alternative protest groups. Social media has played a
key role in the BLM movement, broadcasting information and opinions on racial
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injustice and creating representation for African American Muslims with hashtags
such as #beingblackandmuslim. Muslim leaders, scholars, and groups have
spoken out about how Muslims should engage in social activism, both in support
and opposition to the BLM movement. However, African American Muslims are
caught in a state of “double consciousness” by being African
American and Muslim. This can cause tension between their religious identity and
racial identity, especially when engaging in social activism. Although this may
cause friction, African American Muslims have found ways to reconcile potential
conflicts by justifying supporting BLM or finding alternative activist groups.
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La figura de la mujer en El
burlador de Sevilla
By Maria Isabel Lozano Becerro
Abstract: The battle against machismo in favor of equality is currently the order of the day.
Society is more cognizant that men and women must have equal rights and
responsibilities, and while we still have a long way to go, we are gradually gaining the
equality that the majority want. Four hundred years ago, however, this was not the case.
When El burlador de Sevilla was first published in 1630, gender roles were considerably
more clearly defined. Both women and men were required to possess particular attributes
that, if not met, resulted in the person's marginalization.
In this work we will discuss how Tirso de Molina dealt with the subject of women in his
work El burlador de Sevilla, as well as how he dealt with various sensitive issues of the
time in a clear, even disruptive manner. An we will do all this looking at the perspectives
of the various characters on women, as well as place everything in historical context.
Abstract in Spanish: Actualmente la lucha contra el machismo, a favor de la igualdad, está a la
orden del día. Cada vez la sociedad es más consciente de que hombres y mujeres deben
tener los mismos derechos y deberes y, aunque todavía nos queda un gran camino por
recorrer, poco a poco vamos consiguiendo esa igualdad tan deseada por la mayoría. Sin
embargo esto no era así hace cuatrocientos años, en 1630, cuando El burlador de Sevilla
se publicó, los roles de género estaban mucho más marcados. Tanto mujeres como
hombres debían tener ciertas características las cuales, si no se cumplían, solían llevar a
la marginación de la persona en cuestión.
En el presente trabajo hablamos de cómo Tirso de Molina trató el tema de la mujer en su
obra El burlador de Sevilla, de cómo trata ciertos temas controversiales para época de una
manera clara, incluso disruptiva para aquellos tiempos. Analizaremos la visión de los
diferentes personajes con respecto a la mujer y también pondremos todo esto dentro de un
contexto histórico..
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Desde los principios de la historia hasta ahora la mujer ha estado siempre
en el punto de mira de la sociedad. Siempre ha habido conflictos sobre cómo es
vista la mujer, lo que debe hacer y cómo debe ser, tópicos que han influido
directamente a las mujeres en su forma de comportarse. En el presente artículo
nos proponemos analizar la figura de la mujer en la obra de El burlador de
Sevilla, atribuida a Tirso de Molina. La intención del autor con esta obra era
retratar exactamente cómo las mujeres eran vistas desde diferentes perspectivas
por la sociedad del Siglo de Oro, siglo XVII, y, a través de este retrato, pretendía
hacer una crítica a esta situación humillante y desfavorecedora en la que estas se
encontraban. En este ensayo analizaremos varias de esas perspectivas con la
intención de mostrar al lector esa crítica que el autor pretende presentar en esta
obra de teatro. En primer lugar se hará una breve introducción en la que se relatará
la historia de la mujer en esta época, con el deseo de poder reforzar los posteriores
argumentos y análisis de la obra que aquí nos atañe. Una vez hecha esta pequeña
introducción se hablará en términos generales del protofeminismo en este teatro.
En esta sección se pondrán ejemplos sobre ciertos detalles que aparecen en la obra
que tienen ese toque protofeminista, siempre pensando por supuesto en un
feminismo del siglo XVII, es decir, protofeminismo, ya que analizar esta obra
desde el feminismo de hoy en día no sería algo coherente puesto que en la época
que fue escrita no existía ni el término “feminismo” ni el movimiento feminista
como tal.
A continuación se pasará a analizar la imagen que diferentes personajes
masculinos de la obra tienen sobre las mujeres en general y sobre algunas en
particular. En esta parte también se hablará del protagonista, Don Juan, pero sin
darle mucha más importancia que al resto de personajes de la obra, puesto que ya
existen un gran número de ensayos que analizan ampliamente la figura de este
personaje. Para finalizar con el análisis de El burlador de Sevilla, se analizará la
figura del personaje femenino de Tisbea, el personaje que rompe más
radicalmente con los esquemas de su época dentro de la obra en cuestión. Se
examinarán sus diferencias y similitudes con el resto de personajes femeninos y se
estudiará no solo la imagen que otros personajes tienen de ella sino también cómo
el autor nos muestra la forma en la que Tisbea se ve a ella misma en el transcurso
de la historia. Como se ha mencionado previamente, este ensayo defiende la tesis
de que Tirso de Molina pretendía mostrar la realidad de la mujer de la época,
reflejando así en este drama cómo la sociedad en general veía a la mujer como un
ser débil que debía satisfacer al hombre y preocuparse solo por eso y por su
apariencia. Sin embargo, Molina también muestra a través de la figura de Tisbea
cómo algunas mujeres están empezando a salirse poco a poco de estos
estereotipos y empiezan a ser mujeres cada vez más independientes, capaces de
valerse por ellas mismas, mujeres dueñas de sus propias vidas.
En el siglo XVII la vida era difícil para muchas personas, pero sobre todo
para aquellas que pertenecían a grupos marginados por la sociedad. Entre estas
personas se encuentran las mujeres, maltratadas por la sociedad que las etiquetaba
y las prejuzgaba, atribuyendo roles a estas los cuales se sentían obligadas a
cumplir para poder evitar las burlas y discriminaciones de las personas de su
alrededor. Como bien nos dice Teresa Ordorika en su artículo “Entre la
obediencia y la libertad. Una mujer española del siglo XVII”, los únicos cargos
socialmente aceptados para las mujeres eran de esposa, monja o beata (23).
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Además la iglesia tampoco ayudaba a cambiar esta situación de las mujeres en la
sociedad, ya que, a pesar de regular las relaciones extramaritales y condenarlas
con la exclusión de la comunidad religiosa, normalmente eran solo las mujeres las
que sufrían este castigo. Normalmente era a ellas a quienes se les echaba la culpa
de estas relaciones, saliendo así los hombres casi siempre impunes de este castigo
eclesiástico. Según cuenta Ordorika, el control de la iglesia en las mujeres llegaba
hasta tal punto que se ordenó la reclusión completa de estás y se castigaba con la
excomunión a cualquier persona que participara en la desobediencia de esta
norma (25). Sin embargo, como ya hemos mencionado anteriormente, otro puesto
social en el cual estaban bien vistas las mujeres era el de beatas. Como bien nos
define la RAE (Real Academia de la Lengua Española), estas eran mujeres que
habían sido beatificadas por la Iglesia Católica y además solían recibir culto
público en algunos actos o lugares. Esto, como es de imaginar, no benefició
mucho a la iglesia, ya que muchos fieles, tanto mujeres como varones, empezaron
a seguir a estas mujeres y a obedecerlas, dejando un poco de lado las normas de la
Iglesia Católica. Sin embargo, incluso a estas mujeres, a las que algunas personas
seguían y obedecían, las trataban, según Alejandra Araya Espinoza1, de crédulas,
diciendo que eran muy fáciles de engañar, pero a la vez que eran buenas
embaucadoras (9); es decir, la sociedad siempre conseguía de alguna manera
hacer de menos incluso a las mujeres que se habían ganado el respeto de cierta
parte de la sociedad. De todo esto, se puede sacar que la Iglesia Católica
consiguió, a través de juzgar el pensamiento de las mujeres como inmoral y frágil,
que la imagen que querían dar de la mujer se propagase más allá de la iglesia, esto
último con el objetivo de que llegara a toda la sociedad e incluso que las propias
mujeres llegaran a aceptarse y a verse tal y como la iglesia y la sociedad en
general afirmaban que eran. Sin embargo, Ordorika nos muestra en su artículo la
creencia de que la imagen de las beatas sí que consiguió mover en cierto modo la
iglesia para que empezaran a cambiar ciertas normas de su sistema patriarcal y
aunque, como bien dice ella, no se puede definir a estas mujeres como
transgresoras, sí se puede tomar la aparición de estas mujeres como el inicio de un
pequeño cambio en la sociedad (28).
Ahora que ya se ha presentado la realidad de la época, pasamos a ver la
representación del protofeminismo en la obra que nos atañe, El burlador de
Sevilla, y a comparar lo que nos expone el autor en esta con la realidad de este
siglo. Primero de todo, debemos tener en cuenta, como bien dice Teresa Langle de
Paz, que tenemos que ver el protofeminismo en una sociedad con unas diferencias
sociales muy marcadas, unos conocimientos culturales escasos y que rechaza todo
aquello que se sale de las normas que la propia sociedad se ha marcado (463). A
esto se debe que incluso los más diminutos atisbos de trato igualitario a hombre y
mujer en la obra pueden tratarse como un pequeño signo de cambio. De hecho, en
el principio del drama, cuando el rey encuentra a Isabela y a Don Juan juntos, este
no le echa la culpa solo a Isabela, sino que condena a los dos: “Haced prender y
matar / ese hombre y esa mujer” (1: 40 - 41). En un principio esto puede parecer
algo casual, pero como ya hemos explicado anteriormente, en esta época se
1

Alejandra Araya Espinoza se refiere al siglo XVIII en su artículo, sin embargo hemos creído
conveniente mencionarlo, pues muchas de las cosas que hemos usado para este artículo aplican
por completo al siglo XVII.
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condenaba a la mujer siempre, saliendo el hombre indemne. Cierto es que en la
obra Don Juan consigue escapar; esto se debe a que su tío lo ayuda, pero la
sentencia del rey en un principio era firme, y por más que Octavio le dice que él
no ha hecho aquello de lo que Isabela lo acusa, el rey sigue creyendo la palabra de
Isabela y decide castigar a Octavio también. Sin embargo, de acuerdo con Langle
de Paz, el discurso protofeminista siempre se veía irrumpido por las normas de la
sociedad (466). Así podemos ver en esta misma situación de la obra, como Isabela
decide mentir y salvar a Don Juan, dejándola así el autor de débil, ya que a pesar
de que ella misma admite haber perdido la honra por culpa de un hombre, toma la
decisión de defender a ese hombre. A pesar de esto, si seguimos leyendo la obra,
podemos ver más actos protofeministas enmascarados detrás de un contexto
masculino. En concreto aquí me gustaría hablar de Tisbea, la cual analizaremos
más tarde de manera más profunda. Esta persona se muestra como un personaje
femenino con características típicas de los hombres e igualmente respetada. Sin
embargo, Don Juan consigue aprovecharse también de ella. Esta deshonra que el
personaje recibe es lo que hace que pase desapercibida la parte protofeminista de
la obra. Sin embargo, podemos ver como a lo largo de toda la aparición de Tisbea,
esta no deja de repetir, “Plega a Dios que no mintáis”, lo que nos da a entender
que mentalmente ella nunca fue engañada. Tisbea era inteligente y sabía que Don
Juan se quería aprovechar de ella. Es por esto que cuando él consigue lo que
quiere, ella se siente avergonzada, pero no por lo que pensará el resto de la
sociedad, como fue el caso de Isabela que acabamos de comentar, sino porque
siente que se ha traicionado a ella misma, que ha traicionado sus propios valores.
Es decir, vemos como este personaje ya ha dejado de mirar por lo que la sociedad
le dicta y ha empezado a mirar solo por ella misma, un claro ejemplo de símbolo
protofeminista que puede pasar desapercibido tras las acciones machistas del
protagonista de la historia.
Tisbea es el ejemplo más claro que hay de una voz protofeminista en El
burlador de Sevilla. Sin embargo, hay otro personaje que también se da cuenta de
que la forma en la que Don Juan trata a las mujeres no es la apropiada y así se lo
hace saber en repetidas ocasiones, incluso haciéndole comentarios insultantes y
dándole a entender que depende totalmente de las mujeres. Este personaje es
Catalinón, el acompañante de Don Juan durante toda la historia, y que le advierte
claramente que sus comportamientos tendrán consecuencias: “Los que fingís y
engañáis / las mujeres de esa suerte / lo pagaréis en la muerte” (1: 992 - 94).
Además, al final de la obra vemos que Catalinón no se equivocaba y que el
protagonista paga sus malas acciones con la muerte. Sin embargo, es importante
añadir que Catalinón es representado en la obra como un bufón, por lo que su voz
pierde credibilidad. También podrían interpretarse sus palabras como algo satírico
y, por lo tanto, como una burla hacia las mujeres. Aun así, este personaje da una
gran cantidad de consejos muy válidos al protagonista, por lo que quizás la
intención de poner este tipo de protestas en la boca de esta especie de bufón sea
pasar la censura de la época más que hacer una burla de las mujeres.
Para terminar con esta parte del ensayo vamos a hablar del final de la obra,
cuando Don Pedro e Isabela se encuentran teniendo una discusión y, de repente,
Tisbea irrumpe. Al principio Isabela no sabe quién es y simplemente le pregunta
qué es lo que le pasa y por qué llega tan agitada. Tisbea responde que se queja del
mar, que es el causante de sus penas, utilizando esto como metáfora para referirse
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a un hombre. Así ellas hablan e Isabela le cuenta a Tisbea que quieren llevarla a
Sevilla para que se case a la fuerza. En este momento Tisbea le cuenta que el
hombre del que habla es Don Juan, y aunque Isabela al principio no le cree, al
final le acaba creyendo. Con el lema “Mal haya la mujer que en hombres fía”, las
dos deciden dirigirse juntas hacia Sevilla con la intención no solo de reclamarle al
rey venganza sino de vengarse ellas mismas si es necesario. Esto es el ejemplo
más claro de sororidad que podemos encontrar en este drama teatral. Además, se
sale de las normas de obras anteriores como La Celestina, en la que la propia
Celestina solo se preocupa por el dinero, sin importarle estar propiciando el
maltrato a otras mujeres. Otro ejemplo es Romeo y Julieta, obra en la que la
madre de Julieta no defiende a esta, anteponiendo las relaciones amistosas con
otras familias a la felicidad de su propia hija, teniendo así la propia madre un
comportamiento que hoy en día calificaríamos de machista, aunque esto último
también lo podríamos interpretar como una preocupación ciega de una madre por
su hija. En cambio, El burlador de Sevilla nos ofrece una sororidad clara, alejada
de mentalidades machistas, por parte de los personajes femeninos que deciden
unirse para conseguir su objetivo común.
Todo esto nos lleva al siguiente tema a tratar en este artículo, la visión que
los diferentes personajes masculinos que nos encontramos en este teatro tienen de
las mujeres. Como bien dice Mª Ángeles Hernández Bermejo en su estudio sobre
la imagen de la mujer en la literatura de los siglos XVI y XVII, la mujer estaba
vista como un ser débil y dependiente que debe estar sometido siempre al hombre
(176). El primer personaje en el que vamos a centrarnos es Don Juan Tenorio, el
protagonista, en el cual se ve claramente reflejado este tipo de pensamiento del
que acabamos de hablar. Don Juan Tenorio es un joven atractivo, pero también
muy arrogante y que siente fascinación por el físico de las mujeres, sintiendo así
el deseo de engañarlas y encontrando satisfacción en el reto de conseguir a tantas
mujeres como fuera posible. Además, esto es algo de lo que el protagonista se
siente orgulloso y así lo expresa en su propia voz: “Sevilla a voces me llama / el
Burlador, y el mayor / gusto que en mí puede haber / es burlar una mujer / y
dejarla sin honor” (2: 1395 - 99). (Lo expresa también con todos los malos actos
que comete a lo largo de toda la obra). Pero no todos los personajes de la historias
son así. El rey de Nápoles, por ejemplo, manda castigar tanto a Don Juan como a
Isabela cuando los descubre solos en la habitación. Aunque está claro que esto no
lo hace como un signo de que piense que hombres y mujeres son iguales, sino
simplemente porque tiene un cargo importante y quiere acallar lo más rápido
posible cualquier escándalo que pueda surgir antes de que esto repercuta en su
reputación, podemos ver como para este quedar bien con la sociedad no es
castigar a la mujer y perdonar al hombre, sino que prefiere castigar a los dos y así
evitarse problemas.
En esta obra también nos encontramos con otros pocos personajes
masculinos que también tienen esta moralidad dudosa. Un ejemplo de esto sería el
tío de Don Juan, Don Pedro. Este ayuda a su sobrino a escapar y engaña al resto
diciendo que se ha tirado por el balcón, aunque lo hace porque Don Juan le dice
que está enamorado y porque es de su familia. A pesar de ayudarle a escapar, lo
primero que hace Don Pedro es reprender la mala acción de Don Juan: “¡Traidor!
/ ¡Alevoso! No imagino / que eres Don Juan mi sobrino, / porque no tienes honor.
/ ¡Tú con dama en el palacio / del Rey! ¡Y en ofensa mía / haces tal alevosía!” (1:
34

98 - 103). Al igual que pasa con el rey, sin embargo este parece que lo hace para
proteger su propio estatus más que por defender a la mujer. Otro personaje con la
forma de pensar parecida es Octavio, el prometido de Isabela al empezar el drama,
el cual pertenece a la nobleza y es también víctima de las burlas del Don Juan.
Este estaba muy enamorado de Isabela, hasta el punto de que ni siquiera dudaba
de que ese amor era mutuo. Cuando le dan la noticia de que se la han encontrado
con un hombre, al principio no cree que sea verdad. Con todo esto, una vez que se
da cuenta de que lo que le cuentan es verdad, Octavio deja salir ese estereotipo
impuesto por la sociedad de que todas las mujeres son malas: “ya no hay cosa que
me espante, / que la mujer más constante / es, en efecto, mujer” (1: 423 -25).
También cabe destacar que de la persona de quien quiere vengarse es Don Juan,
por lo que, a pesar de tener esa mentalidad que vemos que la mayoría de los
personajes masculinos de esta obra tienen, Octavio es consciente de que no toda la
culpa es de Isabela, y de que ella también ha sido burlada. Muy ligado a este
personaje, nos encontramos con Ripio, su criado y la voz de la razón en la
conversación que tienen los dos, sobre Octavio y su relación con Isabela. Ripio es
un personaje que no aparece en muchas ocasiones y por lo general suele pasar
desapercibido, pero fijándonos bien en sus pocas apariciones en el teatro, nos
damos cuenta cómo este en ningún momento insulta a las mujeres ni ensalza a los
hombres por encima de ellas; en todo momento es imparcial, y cuando habla con
Octavio le dice los hechos como son, sin intentar agradar a nadie. Ripio es el
primer personaje en este drama que podemos decir que es totalmente imparcial y
desinteresado, ya que no gana nada no posicionándose en ningún lugar.
Todo esto nos lleva nuevamente a hablar del otro criado que aparece en
este drama, el criado de Don Juan, Catalinón. Este personaje está continuamente
condenando las acciones de su amo y compadeciendo a todos los que son burlados
por él, tanto mujeres como hombres. Incluso le deja saber a Don Juan en distintas
ocasiones que sus acciones tendrán malas consecuencias y se condena a él mismo
por haber sido partícipe de las malas acciones de su amo: “De los que privan /
suele Dios tomar venganza / si delitos no castigan, / y se suelen en el juego /
perder también los que miran” (3: 2087 - 90). Siguiendo en esta línea de
personajes con una mentalidad un tanto diferente a la de la época, nos
encontramos con los personajes de Coridón y Anfriso, dos pescadores muy
humildes. Estos dos, junto con otros pescadores, obedecen todo el tiempo las
órdenes de Tisbea. Esto es algo extraño, ya que, según nos dice Hernández
Bermejo, las mujeres de la época debían seguir el ideal femenino impuesto por la
sociedad, modelo en el que se marcan los pasos que las mujeres deben seguir para
encajar en la sociedad (177), y en los cuales el personaje de Tisbea no encaja.
Pero a estos hombres les da igual y se ponen a su total disposición, “Pues aquí
todos estamos, / manda que en tu gusto hagamos / lo que pensado no fue” (1: 753
- 55). Si bien es cierto que Anfriso está enamorado de Tisbea y podríamos llegar a
pensar que es esto lo que le hace estar a su total disposición, como bien podemos
leer en la cita no es este el único que la obedece; todos lo hacen. Estos dos
personajes son muy importantes ya que presentan una mentalidad totalmente
diferente a la que predominaba en la época.
A continuación, vamos a introducir a otros dos personajes que también
tienen una mentalidad parecida a los anteriores, la cual tampoco se encuentra del
todo dentro de lo normal para la época. Uno de estos dos personajes es Don
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Gonzalo de Ulloa, padre de Doña Ana, una de las mujeres burladas por Don Juan,
y víctima de Don Juan, el cual lo asesina. El otro personaje que aquí queremos
mencionar es el rey de Castilla, el cual representa la máxima autoridad en la obra
y se podría decir que intenta restablecer el orden en la historia. Ambos cuentan
con una forma de pensar parecida; por lo que se muestra en la obra, estos sí
parecen estar de acuerdo con las ideas tradicionales de cómo debe ser una mujer,
pero aún siendo controladores, en ningún momento hacen de menos a las mujeres
por acciones que no son su culpa. De hecho, al principio de la primera jornada,
cuando el rey se entera de la desdicha de Isabela, podemos ver cómo el rey
pregunta directamente si se ha castigado al hombre; es decir, no le echa la culpa
directamente a la mujer, sino que entiende que ha sido el hombre el que se ha
aprovechado de ella. Por otro lado, Don Gonzalo defiende también durante todo
momento a su hija y no duda en que la culpa de la burla es de Don Juan, y no de
ella: “La barbacana caída / de la torre de ese honor / que has combatido, traidor, /
donde era alcaide la vida” (2: 1163 - 66). Defender a su hija incluso le cuesta la
vida a Don Gonzalo, aunque no debemos olvidar que sus ganas de vengar el honor
que le ha quitado Don Juan a su hija son tantas que este vuelve del mundo de los
muertos y consigue llevarse a Don Juan al infierno. Amigo de estos dos
personajes es Don Diego Tenorio, padre de Don Juan. A pesar de no expresar
claramente cuál es su opinión sobre las mujeres, Don Diego sí cree en la inocencia
de las mujeres de las cuales se ha aprovechado su hijo: “y la dama, inocente de
este agravio, / agresor hizo de esto al Duque Octavio...” (2: 1142 - 43).
Posteriormente, Don Diego expresa que no está en absoluto de acuerdo con las
acciones de Don Juan: “Traidor, Dios te dé el castigo / que pide delito igual” (2:
1522 - 23), lo cual ya nos da a entender que para él las mujeres no eran las
culpables de las burlas de los hombres, en contraste con el pensamiento general en
la época según Hernández Bermejo (177).
De todos modos, aunque hasta ahora hemos visto que todos los personajes
allegados a Don Juan condenaban su actitud, vamos a pasar ahora a hablar de la
única figura que, siendo cercana a Don Juan, no solo no condena sus actitudes
sino que a él también le gusta burlarse de las mujeres. Este personaje es el
Marqués de Mota. Aquí nos gustaría citar una parte de su conversación con Don
Juan, de la cual podemos deducir lo dicho anteriormente: que al igual que Don
Juan, el Marqués ve a las mujeres como trofeos: “Marqués, ¿Qué hay de perros
muertos? / Yo y Don Pedro de Esquivel / dimos anoche un cruel, / y esta noche
tengo ciertos / otros dos. / Iré con vos, / que también recorreré / ciertos nidos que
dejé / en huevos para los dos” (2: 1331 - 38). A pesar de esto, creemos que es
importante decir que el propio autor del teatro se encarga de que este personaje
sea castigado, haciendo que, a pesar de creerse muy listo, sea engañado fácilmente
por su propio amigo. Y continuando con esta línea de personajes masculinos que
son de alguna manera engañados por Don Juan, vamos a pasar a hablar de
Batricio, prometido de Arminta y el cual no llega a casarse con ella ya que Don
Juan irrumpe en la boda y consigue aprovecharse de la novia. En un principio este
parece ser de los que no hacen de menos a la mujer; sin embargo, cuando Don
Juan le dice que ha gozado de Arminta, este le cree de inmediato y en seguida,
debido a los celos, sale a relucir su verdadero yo; es decir, muestra cómo piensa
que las mujeres no son buenas: “Si tú en mi elección lo pones, / tu gusto pretendo
hacer, / que el honor y la mujer / son malos en opiniones” (3: 2001 - 04). Por
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último, relacionado con esta historia, queremos presentar de forma muy breve a
un personaje que también suele pasar desapercibido pero que al analizarlo nos
podemos dar cuenta de que es un simple hombre que lo único que quiere es el
bien para su hija. Este personaje es Gazeno, el padre de Arminta. Gazeno, incluso
después de enterarse de que su hija ha intimado con Don Juan, nunca trata a su
hija de débil por esto, sino que, como quiere lo mejor para su hija, ve la parte
positiva de ello y, al final, también es víctima de los engaños de Don Juan.
Una vez que ya hemos visto cuál es la imagen que tiene cada uno de los
personajes de la obra sobre la mujer, vamos a pasar a analizar la figura de la que
consideramos el personaje femenino más importante de esta obra, el personaje de
Tisbea. Para ponernos en contexto, Tisbea es una humilde y atractiva pescadora
que vive en la costa de España. Esta es representada en el drama como una mujer
ruda que utiliza su belleza e inteligencia para que los hombres de su alrededor
hagan lo que ella quiera; sin embargo, es la segunda mujer de la que Don Juan
consigue aprovecharse en la obra. Como acabamos de decir, al igual que el resto
de personajes femeninos de la obra, Tisbea es engañada por Don Juan, algo muy
típico en el teatro de esta época. Según Gustavo Correa, es el conquistador de
mujeres el que tiene que tener asegurado el éxito Por lo tanto, en una obra de esta
época el protagonista debía conquistar a todas las mujeres y privarlas a ellas de
sus virtudes (103). Por este motivo el público esperaba que Don Juan se
aprovechase de Tisbea, tal como acaba sucediendo. Pero a pesar de esta similitud
que vemos en todos los personajes femeninos, existen algunas otras cosas más
escondidas que son las que diferencian a Tisbea del resto. Primeramente, como
bien dice Luis M. González, la actitud que la mujer toma ante el problema de
mantener el honor es muy importante en las obras de teatro de este siglo (41), y es
aquí donde podemos ver la primera diferencia que existe entre Tisbea y el resto de
mujeres de la obra. Para Isabela y Ana sobre todo, la deshonra que les había hecho
vivir Don Juan era muy importante, ya que las dejaba mal de cara a la sociedad.
Sin embargo, para Tisbea esto no era así; a ella no le importaba tanto lo que el
resto del mundo pensara, sino que ella sentía que se había traicionado a ella
misma y a sus propios valores. Cuando decide ir a vengarse, es en todo momento
por ella misma, porque se siente tonta por haberse dejado engañar, pero en ningún
momento por el qué dirán. De hecho, es en su propio discurso en el que se puede
notar que, aparte de la rabia hacia Don Juan, Tisbea siente también rabia hacia ella
misma: “...Yo soy la que hacía siempre / de los hombres burla tanta, / que siempre
las que hacen burla / vienen a quedar burladas...” (1: 1104 - 07). Pero aún así, la
gran diferencia no se encuentra aquí. Como podemos leer en el artículo de Paola
Baglietto Jacquemin, lo masculino y lo femenino están muy bien separados en
todo momento en la obra de Molina (307), pero esto no es así en el caso del
personaje de Tisbea. Ella es la única mujer de la obra cuyo fin principal no es
encontrar un hombre al que satisfacer. También es la única que se vale por ella
misma: ella misma se cuida sin necesidad de nadie, y esto la hace diferente. Según
Baglietto Jacquemin, Tisbea es una mujer independiente, guapa y orgullosa de
ella misma (309), y así lo expresa ella en su discurso: “De cuantos pescadores /
con fuego Tarragona / de piratas defiende / en la argentada costa, / desprecio soy,
encanto, / a sus suspiros, sorda; / a sus ruegos, terrible; / a sus promesas, roca” (1:
495 - 501).
Como conclusión final, nos gustaría decir que después de haber analizado
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la obra de Tirso de Molina más a fondo y haber investigado sobre la realidad de la
época, nos hemos dado cuenta de que la imagen que el autor nos muestra sobre las
mujeres en este siglo se corresponde totalmente con la realidad. Además, hemos
comprobado también el gran espíritu crítico que Molina tiene, así como su ingenio
a la hora de introducir esta crítica social dentro de una obra creada en pleno Siglo
de Oro. Esto último es además lo que probablemente le permitió sacar esta obra a
la luz en una época en la que, como ya hemos dicho, las mujeres eran vistas como
seres débiles, e introducir un personaje como Tisbea podía ser arriesgado.
También nos gustaría remarcar que en la obra existen diferentes personajes con
características y formas de pensar totalmente diferentes, y esto puede que también
ayude a que todo tipo de público se interese por la obra. Sin embargo, creemos
importante decir que la mentalidad que más parece predominar entre los
personajes es aquella en que la mujer es un ser inferior. Como ya hemos
explicado, esto forma parte de la crítica encubierta que encontramos en la obra.
Para concluir, nos gustaría puntualizar que consideramos que esta obra no debe
leerse como una obra feminista del siglo XXI, pues no se puede pretender que
hace cuatrocientos años este movimiento estuviera en el mismo punto que
actualmente, cuando ni siquiera existía tal término o movimiento como tal, sino
que es una obra muy interesante para conocer la realidad de las mujeres en el siglo
XVII en España y darnos cuenta cómo algunos autores de la sociedad eran
conscientes de la problemática social relacionada con la discriminación hacia la
mujer.
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A Sublime Death: Shock and Awe
By Olivia L. Moskot
Abstract: Death has the almost paradoxical capacity to appear larger than life. It chills with its
permanence and astonishes as it stands before us—great, terrible, and vast beyond
comprehension. The obscurity of death cries out for grief to answer, and it is that very
sensation of astonishment that triggers and also lingers over the process of grief that has
gone unexamined for too long. I believe there is a familiar name to put to that sensation
that will aid future research. That is, we may be justified in calling that sensation awe. In
this paper, I thoroughly examine the relationship between death, grief, and the experience
of awe and ultimately argue that understanding the power of death to leave the living
struck with awe has the potential to change how we respond to our own grief as well as
the grief of others. Rather than perceiving grief as a disease or infliction that we fear we
will never recover from, or some kind of proof of irrationality leaving us feeling horribly
unqualified to revive ourselves, grief becomes a call to expand the mind and turn
outward. When one comes to accept and appreciate the role of awe as a natural response
to the large, obscure, powerful nature of death, and the subsequent grieving process as a
process of accommodation, it becomes evident that healthy, rational grief does not
demand that we forsake our loved ones, but rather it invites us to broaden the conception
of our loved ones as well as ourselves.

40

Death has the almost paradoxical capacity to appear larger than life. It chills with its
permanence and astonishes as it stands before us—great, terrible, and vast beyond
comprehension. The obscurity of death cries out for grief to answer. It is that very
sensation of astonishment that triggers and also lingers over the process of grief that
I believe has gone unexamined for too long. I believe there is a familiar name to put
to that sensation that will aid future research. That is, we may be justified in calling
that sensation awe. The phenomenon of awe is surprisingly under researched, its
study usually confined to aesthetic and religious scholarship. Even psychological
research pertaining to awe is lamentably sparse. Dacher Keltner, however, has been
involved in publishing psychological research pertaining to awe since 2003, and I
find his work is indispensable when examining the complexity of awe.
Keltner describes awe as an emotion triggered by a stimulus so vast that it
requires accommodation.1From this, we understand, first, that awe is an emotion
triggered by encountering something vast. Later, I will suggest that this vastness
can be either physical (like a towering mountain) or conceptual (like the idea of
infinity). Second, we come to understand that the vastness triggering the
experience of awe must be profound enough to require processing. In other words,
the triggering stimulus the subject encounters will (and must) require her to adjust
her frame of mind in order to make room for the reality of its existence. This
adjustment period is what Keltner refers to as accommodation. Altogether, a vast
stimulus that requires accommodation is the impetus for awe. In this essay, I will
argue that death, particularly the death of a loved one, is a stimulus vast enough to
require the accommodation process that is grief.
I will not be the first to consider grief a form of accommodation—Berislav
Marušić and George A. Bonanno use the concept of accommodation to explore
grief as well. Marušić describes grief as a rejection of death, which lessens as one
comes to accept the loss of a significant other. According to his account, it is
through grief that a person accommodates, or makes room for, the reality of
death.2 And Bonanno suggests that “our reactions to grief seem designed to help
us accept and accommodate losses. . . so that we can continue to live productive
lives.” 3 These strike me as particularly apt insights, but neither Marušić nor
Bonanno considers that a large portion of grief’s process is our overcoming the
shock and lingering awe into which death casts us. This is precisely what I will be
investigating through this essay: the role of death as a vast stimulus that propels
affected individuals into a state of awe, which grief attempts to accommodate. In
the coming sections, I will show how and why death can be considered a vast
stimulus and also how understanding grief as doing the work of ‘awe
management’ changes our understanding of the grieving process as a whole. I will
then examine two first hand accounts of death and grief that demonstrate how this
new insight into the interplay of grief and awe could influence the ways in which
we talk about death. I do not, of course, mean to suggest that awe is the only
1
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emotion at work within the grieving process, but I am directing attention toward
its integral role in grief and proposing that paying heed to such will lead to a more
well-rounded understanding of grief.
If one is to accept that a person becomes awe-struck when encountering a
vast enough stimulus, she ought to first know what is meant by the term ‘vast.’
What does it mean, in this context, for a stimulus to be vast? And what, more
specifically, makes the death of a loved one a vast stimulus? Colloquially, one
tends to understand vastness in terms of physical broadness or largeness, and
these qualities transfer fairly directly to the awe-specific usage of the word.
Keltner and Haidt state that vastness “refers to anything that is experienced as
being much larger than the self, or the self’s ordinary level of experience or frame
of reference.” In these words, vastness reads like Edmund Burke’s notion of the
sublime, which is widely recognized as the “most systematic early treatment of an
awe-like aesthetic emotion.”4 Thinking of vastness in terms of the sublime comes
with benefits. For example, if vastness and Burkean sublimity are, for all intents
and purposes, synonymous concepts, then we can use what we know about
Burke’s sublime to inform our notion of vastness. When Keltner and Haidt note
that power and obscurity are particularly important to Burke’s idea of the sublime
in that they “endow stimuli with the capacity to produce the sublime experience,” 5
we can take that to mean power and obscurity are also facets of that which we
consider to be vast.
It is also worth considering whether people, generally speaking, might
associate other less obvious facets of the Burkean sublime with awe provoking
stimuli. That is, what goes into making something feel vast may not have anything
to do with largeness at all. For instance, Burke also asserts that nature, literature,
and art are the types of stimuli that most often arouse awe. And this suggestion
seems to be consistent with current research that suggests that awe is “relatively
asocial” and most often “elicited by information-rich stimuli, particularly
panoramic nature views and novel art and music.”6 This means that awe-inspiring
stimuli can often be aesthetically provocative rather than simply tall or wide. As
mentioned in the introduction of this piece, something can be physically vast and
incite awe, but something can be conceptually vast and produce the same effect.
To better understand how something conceptual can produce feelings of
vastness, one can turn to a philosophical distinction made by Immanuel Kant and
expounded upon by Friedrich Schiller. Kant proposes two distinct types of
sublimity that Schiller characterizes in terms of the theoretical and the practical:
The theoretical sublime presents nature as an object of knowledge and
indicates that we “can think more than we know”; it describes for
instance the mixture of fear and awe we experience when conceptualizing
infinity… The practically sublime, by contrast, concerns nature as an
object of feeling, specifically as a source of danger and fear.7
Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, “Approaching Awe, pp. 300.
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From this, and various passages in Schiller’s essay “Of the Sublime,” readers can
gather that that which is theoretically sublime provokes the feeling that something
is a conceptual threat while that which is practically sublime evokes the feeling
that something is a physical threat. But sublimity, which we are considering
synonymous with the type of vastness that inspires awe, cannot be conjured by
something that simply poses a threat to us. No, we must be able to experience the
threatening stimulus from a place of safety. As Schiller puts it, “Inner mental
freedom is absolutely required in order to find the fearful sublime and to have
pleasure in it…we must consider ourselves secure, if the fearful is to please us.”8
Thus we see, sublimity is distinct from terror in that one is able to preserve a
sense of mental freedom and, therefore, security in the face of an otherwise fearinducing stimulus in the case of the former but not the latter. Again, from
investigating and employing Schiller's work in this section, we remember that
there are two types of things that can produce the sublime: physical and
conceptual threats. When considering these ideas in terms of vastness, the
language shifts only slightly. That which is vast enough to inspire awe must be
physically or conceptually ‘large’ enough to pose a threat while still being
conquerable by one’s mental faculties.
With this focus on terror, it may be even more complicated to truly
comprehend conceptual vastness, particularly in terms of art, music, and
literature. Perhaps it may help to bring the example of infinity back into the
picture. Infinity feels threatening as a concept that is unconquerable by the human
mind. Art, music, and literature can contain similar unconquerable, mind-blowing
characteristics. From the chills induced by a simple chord progression to a
painting that brings us to tears,9 the aesthetic world has a strong foothold in that
which is strangely, beautifully vast. On this note, René Descartes said “When our
first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel—i.e. very
different from what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it should be—
this brings it about that we wonder… and are astonished at it.” 10 Conceptual
vastness such as this can be just as difficult, if not more difficult, to reckon with
than physical vastness. Even if something can be overcome by one’s mental
faculties it does not necessarily follow that the conquest will be simple or easy.
Hence the need for an accommodation process.
Without accommodating for the initial shock of the vast stimulus one has
encountered, it is possible for an experience to remain fearful or confused in the
mind of the beholder and never fully transform into something worthwhile or
awesome. Consider walking from one end of a wide canyon to the other on a
tempered glass bridge. For some, the experience would be simply terrifying. For
others, the experience would be thrilling. One of the many causes of the disparity
in reactions, even in the face of the same stimulus, is the different mental states of
8
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the individuals. Those unable to overcome their feelings of fear may feel that they
have no control or security in the face of what they perceive to be a great physical
threat. Those who can lean into their mental faculties and ascertain the likelihood
of their safety in the presence of the threat will likely be more able to negotiate
their way beyond the fear toward a more holistic interpretation of the situation
both emotionally and menatlly. From all of this, we better understand how an
experience can be sublime or vast, and even how individual responses to vast
stimuli can vary. But what, more specifically, makes death a vast stimulus?
Death, while ordinary enough as a concept, could not be further from
ordinary experientially. While it’s true that many people are informed at a
relatively early age that all living things eventually die, the actual experience of
death (particularly facing the reality of one’s own impending death or facing the
actual death of a loved one) carries with it an enormous emotional and existential
toll. And while most everyone encounters death regularly enough through news
clippings, literature, and film—here again, it is the concept of death that one
encounters, rather than the experience. Even as one cries real, sympathy-laden
tears over the pages of a Nicholas Sparks novel, one need only turn back to the
book’s beginning to find the heroine restored to perfect health. If the obituaries
generate feelings of sadness, one can always find the comics nearby. However,
when one has experienced the real laughter and hugs of a loved one before the
occurrence of their death, there is no comic relief powerful enough to wipe their
name from memory nor any pages one can return to that contain the loving touch
of their hand. So, while the concept of death may lurk casually enough among
humankind, a real-life, personal encounter with death forces all to acknowledge
its true power—a power which is absolutely vast enough to inspire awe in even
the most callous of us. Thus, our need to mentally accommodate for the vast
stimulus that is death—in other words, the need to grieve.
This brings us to what is entailed within the concept of accommodation.
The word ‘accommodate,’ as it is used in awe theory, “refers to the Piagetian
process of adjusting mental structures that cannot assimilate a new experience.”11
This appears in descriptions of awe when one is confronted with something that is
just too much for her to comprehend. Yet, there it is. And so, she must find a way
to take in or comprehend it. This powerful, obscure thing, whatever it might be,
“triggers the sense that one’s default schema needs to be updated.” 12 How one
goes about updating this schema is not likely to look the same for any two
individuals, but, regardless of the approach, it will require increasing one’s
openness to new positions or possibilities. For example, Piercarlo Valdesolo and
Jesse Graham’s empirical research on awe show that those who were confronted
with an awe-eliciting stimulus experienced a “decreased tolerance for uncertainty,
which, in turn, increased [their] tendency to believe in nonhuman agents and to
perceive human agency in random events.” 13 This research may explain why
Michelle N. Shiota, Dacher Keltner, and Amanda Mossman, “The Nature of Awe: Elicitors,
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religion is one of the two areas that have produced the most scholarship on awe as
well as research on why grief, as an accommodation process for a specific aweinducing stimulus, seems as complicated and ambiguous as it does. Altogether,
we gather that accommodation is about making room for ideas and emotions that
are too much for us when we initially encounter them. How one goes about
making that room, or expanding one’s self, will vary from person to person and
from situation to situation. But, whatever the specifics end up being,
accommodation will involve reaching out for some sort of answer to bridge the
gap between one’s current state of mind and the vast stimulus challenging that
state. When a person succeeds in making room for a vast stimulus, the feeling of
shock and awe begins to wane.
It may be true, however, that a person sometimes will not appropriately
accommodate for a vast stimulus and instead will just gradually acquire enough
distance between themselves and the stimulus that they are able to distract
themselves or forget about the triggering stimulus for some time. This may
account for why some people experience grief in what is so often referred to as
‘waves.’ In this case, the accommodation necessary to make room for the shock
and devastation of death did not take place completely. Thus, when one reencounters the memories of a loved one who has passed, for example, they also
re-encounter the shock and awe of that person’s death because they have not yet
mentally and/or emotionally made room for the magnitude of that experience.
This process of experiencing grief in waves may repeat itself until some sort of
accommodation has been made. Once a person has accommodated for the shock
and awe of a loss, they will likely still experience a diversity of emotions at the
memory of their lost loved one, but I argue that they will also likely feel that the
grieving process does have some sort of conclusion—personal and messy though
it may be.
Up until this point of the essay, I have set up one of the more prominent
psychological discussions of ‘awe’ and have proposed how death and grief might
fit into that framework. And, after this, it may seem plain to the point of
uninteresting that awe plays a significant role within the phenomenon of death
and grief. Nevertheless, it remains true that the relationship between awe, death
and grief has gone unexamined until now, not only within scholarship but also
within death and grief narratives. However, the latter may only be true in name as,
through my own narrative readings on death and grief, I have seen the presence of
awe time and again appear prominently. Though these narrative authors do not
call what they are experiencing by its name, what they are describing often fits
into the definition of awe. To demonstrate my findings, I will take readers through
passages from the personal accounts of grief written by C. S. Lewis and Simone
de Beauvoir. First, showing how these authors, even if unintentionally, portray
death as vast, and, then, second, how they describe grief as a sort of
accommodation. To be vast in this particular use of the word, readers will
remember, is to be large, powerful, and obscure enough to require
accommodation.
In the very first line of C.S. Lewis’ reflections on the loss of his wife in A
Grief Observed, there appear descriptive words one might associate with the
experience of the vast or sublime. There, Lewis writes, “No one ever told me that
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grief felt so like fear. I am not afraid, but the sensation is like being afraid.”14 The
language in this line indicates that Lewis is feeling a sense of submissiveness to
death—its vastness has made him afraid or at least something like afraid. The
ambiguity of what exactly he is feeling points to the obscurity of grief, as well.
So, here, in the very first line of the account, readers already see Lewis
associating the stimulus of his wife’s death with the power and confusion inherent
to that which generates awe and requires accommodation.
Furthermore, Lewis not only describes experiences with his wife’s death
in terms commensurate with vastness, but also compares them to stimuli more
commonly reported to induce awe, such as those found in nature or art. Lewis
writes “I look up at the night sky. Is anything more certain than that in all those
vast times and spaces, if I were allowed to search them, I should nowhere find her
face, her voice, her touch?”15 Here, Lewis not only actually uses the word vast to
describe the emotional response he had to the loss of his wife, but he also directly
points to feelings of obscurity and mystery contained within that loss through the
imagery of the night sky (which implicitly includes the vastness of
eternity/infinity). He uses nature imagery to convey the darkness and endlessness
provoked by the death of his wife, clearly demonstrating the state of
dumbfoundedness in which the vast stimulus of death has left him. And,
remembering that people “typically experience awe in response to asocial stimuli
like natural wonders, panoramic views, and beautiful art,”16 one can clearly see
Lewis illustrating the phenomenon of awe through the above passage even
without naming it. And this is not the only passage in which Lewis describes grief
through metaphors that take readers to a traditional Burkean expression of the
sublime. Lewis states that grief is “like a long valley, a winding valley where any
bend may reveal a totally new landscape.”17 And, evoking within his readers the
feelings of shock and confusion that his wife’s death has caused him to feel
through reference to the arts, he writes, “we think of [death] as love cut short; like
a dance stopped in mid-career or a flower with its head unluckily snapped off—
something truncated and therefore, lacking its due shape.”18 With a reminder from
Kelter and Haidt that “the most common experience of awe for contemporary
Westerners in egalitarian societies is the response to natural and human-made
objects,”19 it is no wonder that Lewis represents the vastness of death through
such images as these.
Simone de Beauvoir also alludes to the vastness of death through her
narrative depicting the difficult and emotional end of her mother’s life. Consider,
for instance, the following passage:
[I]t was when I was at her bedside that I saw Death, the Death of the
dance of death, with its bantering grin, the Death of fireside tales that
14
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knocks on the door, a scythe in its hand, the Death that comes from
elsewhere, strange and inhuman: it had the very face of Maman when
she showed her gums in a wide smile of unknowingness.20

Here, Beauvoir not only portrays death as a figure who dances and tells stories—
both actions being references to the arts—but she also capitalizes the first letter of
‘Death.’ This act of deification simply and swiftly adds power, obscurity, and
religiosity to her portrayal of death. All of this together creates an overall
characterization of a sublime death—artistic, animate, obscure, and powerful.
What’s more, in describing her mother’s relationship to death before its
eventuality, Beauvoir states:
She clung ferociously to this world, and she had an animal dread of
death. She had told my sister of a nightmare that she often had. ‘I
am being chased: I run, I run, and I come up against a wall; I had
to jump over this wall, and I do not know what there is behind it; it
terrifies me.’21

Beauvoir brings in nature imagery again in this passage, describing her mother as
having an animalistic fear of death and a ferocious cling[ing] to life. And, through
the imagery of the wall, her mother’s nightmare reveals how terribly large death
seems to her, the other side of death left completely obscure. Through these
passages, and those from C.S. Lewis, readers see death characterized as sublime
and vast enough that it inevitably calls for mental accommodation. Again, this
accommodation is necessary because the death of the loved one is such a massive
happening that one cannot possibly comprehend it with their current mental
apparatus.
As mentioned previously, accommodation can be a rigorous and
complicated ordeal. Imagine, for instance, when a child attempts to put a square
peg into a triangular hole. When the square doesn’t fit, the child might believe
that the peg is somehow broken, that the peg is simply at the wrong angle, that he
isn’t applying enough pressure on the peg, that he needs a different set of holes
altogether, or that the peg was never meant to go into a hole at all… the list could
go on. This is not unlike the accommodation process that a vast, awe-inspiring
stimulus requires a person to undergo. The often clumsy nature of this process is
evident in the following passage from Lewis in which he refers to his late wife by
the initial H.
‘Where is she now?’ That is, in what place is she at the present time? …if
H. is not a body—and the body I loved is certainly no longer she—she is
in no place at all. And ‘the present time’ is a date or point in our time
series… If the dead are not in time, or not in our sort of time, is there any
clear difference, when we speak of them, between was and is and will be?
Kind people have said to me, ‘She is with God.’ In one sense that is most
certain. She is, like God, incomprehensible and unimaginable.22

Here, it is clear that Lewis is attempting to accommodate for the discrepancy
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between his late wife’s existence and her new absence, but the accommodation
does not come easily or immediately. One might even argue that it does not occur
at all. Nevertheless, effort toward accommodation, whether successful or not, is
necessary, for H. no longer exists in time as she had before death. To understand
H. and time as they relate to each other now requires accommodation.
Furthermore, Lewis’ own experience with time has also changed as a result of the
death. He says, “Up till this I always had too little time. Now there is nothing but
time. Almost pure time, empty successiveness.” 23 Both Lewis’ thoughts on his
wife’s timelessness as well as his own new relationship with time seem
demonstrative of a state of shock and symptomatic of a state of awe. To this point,
empirical research by Melanie Rudd, Kathleen D. Vohs, and Jennifer Aaker
shows that “awe offset[s] the feeling that time is limited.”24 And this is extremely
evident in this particular passage of Lewis. After all, between Lewis and his wife,
one with all of the time in the world and the other without time entirely, how is
accommodation ever to occur?
Time is not the only concept that becomes obscured by the astonished,
hazy state in which H.’s death has left Lewis. In fact, Lewis goes as far as to
question humanity itself as he struggles toward accommodation:
If H. ‘is not,’ then she never was. I mistook a cloud of atoms for a
person. There aren’t, and never were, any people. Death only reveals the
vacuity that was always there. What we call the living are simply those
who have not yet been unmasked. All equally bankrupt, but some not yet
declared. But this must be nonsense; vacuity revealed to whom?
Bankruptcy declared to whom? To other boxes of fireworks or clouds of
atoms. I will never believe… that one set of physical events could be, or
make, a mistake about other sets.25

Readers see here that Lewis begins again with a struggle to accommodate, or the
sense of timelessness death has caused him to experience, with the negotiation of
present and past tense—her absence in the present erases her presence in the past.
This frustration with accommodating for the disruption of time, thus leads to an
upset in the very fabric of his universe. Lewis doubts the reality, or at least the
substantive nature, of all living beings. And then, just as swiftly, he doubts his
carefully constructed doubts. Lewis even goes as far as to re-evaluate that which
is most fundamental to his sense of being, in his quest to accommodate the death
of his wife, writing: “Sooner or later I must face the question in plain language.
What reason have we, except our own desperate wishes, to believe that God is, by
any standard we can conceive, ‘good’? Doesn’t all the prima facie evidence
suggest exactly the opposite?”26 Those familiar with the works of C.S. Lewis are
also familiar with his deep religious convictions, making the pervasive,
permeating nature of the accommodation process that much more striking. One
might read and wonder, what does it take for a person going through grief to
achieve transformative or fruitful accommodation? Or, for that matter, what does
23
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it take for a person to accommodate for the death of a loved one at all?
To this, both Simone de Beauvoir and C.S. Lewis offer what seem to be
optimistic passages that suggest accommodation (at least of some sort) is possible.
Beauvoir writes:
With my father I had stayed by him until the time he became a mere
thing for me: I tamed the transition between presence and the void. With
Maman I went away almost immediately after having kissed her, and
that was why it seemed to me that it was still her that was lying, all
alone, in the cold of the mortuary.27

Accommodating for the death of her father may have been easier for
Beauvoir than accommodating for the death of her mother because she had more
information and experience with her father’s death by means of her presence and
time. Studies show that those who encounter awe elicitors (such as the death of a
loved one, in this case) may experience increased motivation to take in new
information so as to better update their mental frameworks.28 Thus, it may be the
case that the more information one has, the more likely she will be to successfully
accommodate for the awe-triggering stimulus. Another method of accommodating
for grief may be turning outward. We see what this might look like in the
following passage:
…comparatively speaking, her death was an easy one. ‘Don’t leave
me in the power of the brutes.’ I thought of all those who have no
one to make that appeal to: what agony it must be to feel oneself a
defenceless thing, utterly at the mercy of indifferent doctors and
overly worked nurses. No hand on the forehead when terror seizes
them; no sedative as soon as pain begins to tear them; no lying
prattle to fill the silence of the void.29
Here, we see Beauvoir sympathizing with others, people with whom she does not
even have a personal connection. She turns her grief outward to those she knows
exist in the world alongside her and suffer a somehow worse death than her
mother. Paul K. Piff et al. state that “by diminishing the emphasis on the
individual self, awe may encourage people to forego strict self-interest to improve
the welfare of others.” 30 And when they do, it may be that they achieve
accommodation through a broadening of their perspective. Their pain is only a
small percentage of the pain in the world. Their loss is only one of many losses.
And, thus, through this realization, their mental framework expands and there is
room to perceive the loss they have experienced—at least in some small way.
After all, it is not possible that any one of us should ever entirely
understand death—at least, not on this side of mortality. This does not mean,
however, that accommodation is a lost cause. Take into consideration how Lewis
27

Simone de Beauvoir, A Very Easy Death, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1964): 97.
28
Paul K. Piff et al., “Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 108, no. 6 (2015): pp. 896.
29
Simone de Beauvoir, A Very Easy Death, trans. Patrick O'Brian (New York, NY: Pantheon
Books, 1964): 94.
30
Paul K. Piff et al., “Awe, the Small Self, and Prosocial Behavior,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 108, no. 6 (2015): pp. 897.

49

ends his own narrative on grief as he imagines wherever his wife might be. He
imagines her in a sort of heaven with a comforting religious figure and writes:
“She said not to me but to the chaplain, ‘I am at peace with God.’ She smiled, but
not at me. Poi si torno all’ eterna fontana.” 31 This is a beautiful, touching
example of the kind of accommodation that is possible when confronted with the
aweful, sublime death of a loved one. If full knowledge about the stimuli that
triggered the awe process is necessary for full accommodation to occur, then the
accommodation process of grief may be doomed to fail. But it doesn’t seem that
this is at all what is required. After all, what Lewis offers in this final passage of
his book is not full knowledge, but evidence that a transition has occurred even in
the absence of full knowledge. He makes peace with his God. He grants his wife
the independence in her death that she would very likely wish for him in his
continued life on Earth. And, above all, Lewis has turned outward in his grief as
Beauvoir turned outward in her own. Lewis imagined that his wife was smiling a
smile that was no longer for him, but for herself and the other inhabitants of
heaven. Even his imaginings were turning outward. Thus, he ends his narrative
with a quote from Dante’s Divine Comedy: “‘Then she turned herself back toward
the eternal fountain.’”32 Lewis never turns away from his wife, but allows her to
turn away from him and toward whatever it is that eternity might be.
Understanding the power of death to leave the living struck with awe has
the potential to change how we respond to our own grief as well as the grief of
others. We can understand the shock as a natural response to the large, obscure,
powerful nature of death. And we can understand the grieving process as a
process of accommodation. Rather than grief being a disease that we fear we will
never recover from, or some kind of proof of irrationality leaving us feeling
horribly unqualified to revive ourselves, grief becomes a call to expand the mind
and turn outward. It does not demand that we forsake our loved ones, but rather it
invites us to broaden our conception of our loved ones as well as ourselves. While
the implications of awe being an ever-present part of the death and grieving
experience require far more insight and research than what I have begun to do
through this article, it appears to me that awe promises to illuminate grief
scholarship in promising new ways and offer new hope where hope otherwise
seemed lost.
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The Volition of Faith and
Appreciation of Pragmatism and
Existential Contributions
By Sterling Courtney
Abstract: Propositions of belief depend on some degree of factual basis. Philosophical
arguments vary as to whether certainty is necessary to form beliefs which can
lead to compelling faith. Furthermore, if faith is a criteria for salvation, the
volition of faith would be fundamental in ones’ culpability for having faith.
Idealism represents the antithetical position of pragmatism and involves factual
accounts in which to base beliefs, however, this paper intends to provide various
considerations for pragmatic and existential philosophies by examining concerns
of William James, Blaise Pascal, Soren Kierkegaard, and others. I.e., “Pascal’s
Wager” is a philosophical idea used to demonstrate a practical argument that
faith is better, and more reasonable, than unbelief. Kierkegaard measures faith’s
virtue to the contrary of dependency on fact and reason, expressing that the
obligation of Christianity is not to affirm the existence of God, but to love God.
A utility of existential thought and pragmatism concerns self-transformation.
Although the voluntary nature of belief may remain ambiguous, a willing
commitment to faith is certain.
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Introduction
Although many theologians and philosophers have adequately reasoned
and are content in their position, upon a cursory review of literature, one may find
controversy and contemplative dissatisfaction inferring the volition of faith. The
topic is regarded repeatedly by references sharing familiar existential
philosophers, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and James. The argument may lie somewhere
in the varied interpretations of their works. In respect of this, references to
Pascal’s Wager, James’s Will to Believe, and James’ The Variety of Religious
Experiences will be included.
Pragmatism and existentialism can collaborate in some respects: the
existence of relative "working" truths for the sake of a successful, prosperous, and
deep life, whatever truth may be otherwise, can blend with a strong contempt for
rationalism. The intent of collaborating these three philosophers is to collate the
commonalities of pragmatism and existentialism for considering the nature of
belief and faith. Another philosopher of existentialism, Karl Jaspers, expressed
truth through four aspects: Usefulness (pragmatism), scientific evidence, moral
conviction, and existential faith… faith is the necessary basis of all meaningful
human existence (Seyppel, 1953, pp. 229, 230).
It is conceivable that the three philosophers mentioned above had a similar
audience in mind. It is said that James’ was less concerned with the institution of
religion (Johnson, 2003, pp. 101, 109) and more with reasoned belief and faith for
ones’ self-transformation (Koopman, 2017, p. 494). Kierkegaard criticized
Christendom in favor of a Christianity manifest through personal subjective truth
(Wisdo, 1987). Although a devout Catholic, Pascal certainly wasn’t targeting
church patrons expressing religiosity when he proposed the wager saying, “Men
despise religion. They hate it and are afraid it may be true” (Pascal, 2019, p. 52).
Whether or not we can settle the volition of faith, we can find convincing impetus
for consideration.
Belief Versus Faith
Christian tradition has generally affirmed that one’s faith in God is
purposeful, albeit with the dynamics of faith containing an element of ‘belief.’
There is the argument as to whether ‘belief’ is voluntary and discretional or
contingent and dependent on evidence. If belief is truly involuntary and
determined by evidential conditions, and the nature of Christian faith is dependent
on certain beliefs, how can faith be a voluntary matter? Furthermore, if faith is not
voluntary, how can someone be culpable according to whether or not they have
the requisite beliefs of the atonement as the reconciliation of God and humanity
through Jesus Christ?
Although various references regard belief and faith interchangeably, it may
help parse the two concepts. Merriam-Webster Dictionary cites the “essential
meaning” of faith as ‘belief in the existence of God’ and ‘a system of religious
beliefs’ yet “fully defines” faith as a ‘firm belief in something for which there is
no proof’ and ‘belief and trust in God’ (Merriam-Webster, 2021).
A definition of belief is ‘something that is accepted, considered to be true,
or held as an opinion.’ Furthermore, belief ‘may or may not imply certitude in the
believer.’ Faith ‘almost always implies certitude even where there is no evidence
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or proof’ (Merriam-Webster, 2021). So, our beliefs are concepts, ideas, and
opinions of which we are convinced through experience and learning. Our beliefs
can change over time depending on acquiring more knowledge and experience
throughout our lives. The dictionary entry for faith, ‘belief and trust in God,’
favors an equation where faith is a product of belief and trust (Marti, 1946, p. 30).
Adding to this equation, in James 2:17 from the New Living Translation (NLT),
“So you see, faith by itself isn’t enough. Unless it produces good deeds, it is dead
and useless.” Therefore, faith becomes a product of belief, trust, and action. When
we believe with enough confidence to act, we exercise faith from William James
“The whole defense of religious faith hinges upon action” (James, The Will to
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1912, p. 24). Considering these
sources, belief refers to an agreement, and faith relates to commitment.

Free Will
A theme that has preoccupied theologians and philosophers from
Augustine to William James, historical ruminations regarding belief and will are
sufficient for relevant concern (Wisdo, 1987, p. 95). From the fourth century, one
may brood how Augustine reconciles his beliefs that humans are morally
responsible for their actions versus his view that one’s life is predestined. He
spent much of his life concerned with the unity between two fundamentally
divergent concepts; the grace of God and man’s original sin (Peterson, 2005-06, p.
11). In Augustine’s early writings, he expresses that man cannot choose to be
good without having the ability to choose (Peterson, 2005-06, p. 3). For Christian
history, 412 is the pivotal year when Augustine changed his theology, teaching
that the will to believe in Christ was predestined and that God is not the cause of
any evil. Still, that evil comes from humanity’s free will to sin (Wilson, 2018, p.
285). While the Catholic Church considers Augustine's teaching consistent with
free will (Portalié, 1913), predestination is a concept of Augustinian Calvinism
(McMahon, 2012, pp. 7-9). For Augustine, the two assertions, man’s free choice
to choose evil and reliance on God’s grace for salvation, are never at odds
(Peterson, 2005-06, p. 11). However, this contradiction fuels confusion.

Pragmatic Volition of Belief and Faith
To regard the volition of belief and faith with concern to pragmatism,
appraisal of contrasting philosophical positions may sufficiently offer opposing
views for consideration: Idealism will suffice. Pragmatism is a philosophical
approach that evaluates the practical consequence as the main component of
applied theories or beliefs. Idealism refers to a philosophy that asserts that reality
as we can know it is mentally constructed and immaterial, thoughts and ideas as
reality’s main component.
Twentieth-century philosopher, Fritz Marti, considered an expert in postKantian idealism (OSU Library, 1909-2009), asserts that we cannot embrace a
belief at will because all beliefs are conditionally supported by proof. Therefore,
no one can believe what he knows is not true (Marti, 1946, p. 34). In the chapter
Deciding to Believe, moral philosopher Bernard Williams 1929-2003, states that a
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belief necessarily aims at the truth, discrediting the ability to form a belief on a
known falsehood (Williams, 1976, pp. 136-151).
Perhaps commonly mistaken, William James’ pragmatism does not
succumb to belief in falsehoods; qualifying hypothetical options saying:
Well, of course, I agree as far as the facts will allow. Wherever the
option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous, we can
throw the chance of gaining truth away, and at any rate, save ourselves
from any chance of believing falsehood by not making up our minds at
all till objective evidence has come (James, The Will to Believe and
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1912, pp. 18, 19).

James’ famous philosophical viewpoint, pragmatism, was that freedom of the will
exists, but not as the freedom to create an idea. However, supporting credulity, the
will to believe suggests that perhaps evidential proof through scientific
investigation is not appropriate or relevant for deciding issues raised by religious
experience. James indicates that religious belief can be a personal decision made
from the heart with the conviction of as a passional nature influencing our
opinions; in essence, one’s conviction of objective evidence is a subjective matter
(James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1912, p.
15). James expresses that the element of faith is that Christian religion has
recognized despite philosophy’s tendency to avoid in its search for absolute
truths… “Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still
theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is a willingness to act, one may say
that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not
certified to us in advance” (James, The Sentiment of Rationality, 1912, p. 90)
Reiterating the likeness of pragmatism and existentialism, “working’ truth
reasoned as existential reality is more than mere intellectual truth. Pascal
expressed this position by saying, “The heart has its reasons which reason knows
nothing of... We know the truth not only by the reason but by the heart." In The
Little Prince, Antoine de Saint-Exupery echoes this thought with, “What is
essential is invisible to the eye” (Saint-Exupery, 1943, p. 73). James hinges
volition of belief on our passional nature, influencing our opinions to the point of
inevitability (James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,
1912, p. 18). Kierkegaard explains belief as an act of will that negates uncertainty
and doubt, arguing that belief is ultimately a resolution of the will by stating,
"belief is not a form of knowledge, but a free act, an expression of the will”
(Wisdo, 1987, p. 107).
Influenced by Kierkegaard and in a like manner rejecting
authoritarian and dogmatic religion, Karl Jaspers developed a version of
existentialism in which the effort to understand our existence comes from selfanalysis leading to a personal crusade for truthfulness concerning the
transcendent. With truth as a common theme for Jaspers, the correlation between
pragmatism and existentialism is apparent for consideration of four elements of
truth: Practical usefulness, scientific evidence, moral conviction, and existential
faith. As understood above, James’ pragmatic belief is defined by practical use
and confidence of will. For Jaspers, faith is the necessary foundation of all
meaningful existence (Seyppel, 1953, p. 230).
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The Proposition of Faith with Diminishing Belief
As mentioned earlier, belief and faith differ, including action through trust
and commitment. James uses belief and faith interchangeably in The Will to
Believe. Known for his work in applied ethics and philosophy of religion,
American philosopher Louis Pojman (1935 – 2005) supported the claim that
propositional belief in the existence of God is not necessary for authentic religious
faith. Given this view, genuine faith can be established in a "profound hope" that
Christianity is true together with a passionate orthopraxy as if Christianity is true.
As with the previous dictionary entry, if faith as a product of belief and trust can
be analyzed in terms of a disposition or a commitment to act, then it follows that
we do not need to believe that x exists to believe in or sincerely hope in the
existence of x. Therefore, according to Pojman, someone who assigns a
probability of less than .50 to Christianity’s central principles can embody an
authentic Christian faith and thereby receive the benefits of religion (Himma,
2006, pp. 65, 66).
Considering Kierkegaard's understanding of belief and faith, we can
examine the extent to which the will can be said to contribute to the acquisition of
religious faith as more introspective, stressing the priority of Christian praxis over
theory. Faith involves living Christianity, not just theorizing about it (Paulsen,
2008, p. 61). Kierkegaard believes that although one can explain the acquisition of
our shared beliefs by appealing to the will, this analysis cannot help us understand
the Christian faith. To attain eternal truth, one must pursue and develop faith.
Faith is a condition that reflects ones’ subjective passion. The element of risk is
central to this view of faith (Emmanuel, 1991, p. 280). Given the earlier dictionary
definition, faith implies certitude with no evidence (Merriam-Webster, 2021).
For Kierkegaard, the strength of faith is inversely proportional to objective
proof. With certitude, there is no faith, and the greater the uncertainty, the greater
the faith: “The more objective security, the less inwardness (for inwardness is
precisely subjectivity), and the less objective security, the more profound the
possible inwardness" (Kierkegaard S. , 2009, p. 188). The greater the
improbability that a proposition such as “Christianity” is true, the greater the
volitional effort required to accept it. The degree to which the truth of Christianity
is objectively uncertain is a desire that it is logically impossible to the extent that
there is no possibility that it could turn out to be true (Emmanuel, 1991, p. 281).
Kierkegaard reasons that if the scriptures could be authenticated, they would be
knowledge, not confused with faith. Therefore he rejects any objective
explanation which purports to explain the acquisition of faith but relies on
personal subjective spirituality by saying, “Christianity is spirit, the spirit is
inwardness, inwardness is subjectivity, subjectivity is essentially passion, and in
its maximum an infinite personal, passionate interest in one’s eternal happiness”
(Kierkegaard S. , 1941, p. 33). For Kierkegaard, ‘faith’ is a miracle so far removed
from ‘belief’ that he would not support any attempts to explain it by an appeal to
the will (Wisdo, 1987, p. 110). Moreover, Kierkegaard concludes that "an
‘objective’ acceptance of Christianity is paganism” (Kierkegaard S. , 1941, p.
116). Consider James’ remark in Pragmatism that expresses his will to believe
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doctrine to justify his religious beliefs; “…in the end, it is our faith and not our
logic that decides such (religious) questions, and I deny the right of any pretended
logic to veto my own faith” (James, Pragmatism. A New Name for Some Old
Ways of Thinking, 1907, p. 140). The pragmatist state makes minor claims on
having ultimate knowledge about anything, so knowledge is always based on
probability. The question lies in the sense of whether something is true enough to
elicit a particular action.
Significance of Pascal’s Wager & Pragmatism
The wager takes its name from Blaise Pascal (1623–1662). He had studied
many of the traditional arguments for the existence of God but did not find the
arguments persuasive. Living in an era when gambling was popular among
society, Pascal’s work was intended to facilitate the conversion of religious
skeptics in secular society and perhaps the restoration of apathetic Christians
based on chance (Pecorino, 2001). For this writing, exploring objections to the
wager is not necessary to reason for the sake of spirituality.
Based on the aforethought concerning the varied probability that God
exists, suppose that you are unsure, but you do think the existence of God is a real
possibility. Then despite your uncertainty, you should commit to living a devout
religious life because there is so much to gain and comparatively little to lose. The
more traditional arguments for the existence of God, such as the cosmological
argument, the design argument, the moral argument, and the argument from
religious experience, are arguments for a theoretical conclusion (e.g., “God
exists”). “Pascal's Wager” is a pragmatic argument urging us to adopt a spiritual
way of life, concluding not that God exists but that one should live as if God
exists. The wager aims for a “practical” conclusion (“You should wager on God's
existence”). Pascal's thoughts on conversion included that God's grace sometimes
works by helping a person see the available evidence as convincing (Rota M. ,
2017, p. 4). Once we no longer demand certainty, the available evidence is
sufficient to make Christian commitment reasonable. Simply stated, if one
considers that the net good that would come from committing to God if
Christianity is true is much greater than the net cost of commitment if Christianity
is false.
William James’ view was that “Religion also includes the following
psychological characteristics: A new zest which adds itself like a gift to life, and
takes the form either of lyrical enchantment or appeals to earnestness and
heroism;” as well as “An assurance of safety and a temper of peace, and, in
relation to others, a preponderance of loving affections” (James, The Varieties of
Religious Experience, 2012, p. 355).
Again, controversy concerning grace and free will are relevant objections to
the wager. Numerous passages in the New Testament maintain that salvation
depends on individuals’ actions through faith. However, other scriptural texts
imply that salvation is dependent on God and destiny, such as seen in Calvinism
(Rota M. , 2016, p. 70). Further consideration of James’ contribution to American
Psychology via pragmatism enables either conviction. Understanding the
limitations of objective truth versus what pragmatic truth offers makes possible
either perspective. In comparison, objective reality means that something exists
independent of subjectivity; pragmatic truths answer what we need to know in
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interacting with objective reality, i.e., knowledge is validated by its practical
consequences (Johnson, 2003, p. 105). James’ pragmatic approach accounts for
the certainty that in search of truth, there will be fallacies. James can be credited
with establishing that, under certain passional conditions, it may be morally
permissible to accept a truth claim beyond what the evidence supports (Bishop,
1994, p. 29).
If the function of the religious claim is to secure a basis for moral
commitment, then James's conditions for pragmatic acceptance of such a claim
appear to be met. Frequently cited, from The Will to Believe, James expresses the
genuine option (For James, when a decision is based on the medley of life, forced,
and momentous preferences) most compelling which he thinks religion presents as
follows:
Religion says essentially two things: First, she says that the best things are
the more eternal things, the overlapping things, the things in the universe
that throw the last stone, so to speak, and say the final word ...an affirmation
which obviously cannot yet be verified scientifically at all… [and] the
second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we
believe her first affirmation to be true (James, The Will to Believe and
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1912, pp. 4, 24).

This statement does not refer to God; the Jamesian formulation of the wager
reduces religious claims to ethics: religion is about the ultimate values (Bishop,
1994, p. 26).

Pragmatism and Jamesian Self-Transformation
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, James recommends discounting
institutional religion and concentrating on personal and psychological factors, his
reason being that the institutional aspect focuses on the routine orthopraxy (Gavin,
1984, p. 146).
Worship and sacrifice, procedures for working on the dispositions of the
deity, theology, and ceremony, and ecclesiastical organization are the
essentials of religion in the institutional branch… In the more personal
branch of religion, it is, on the contrary, the inner dispositions of the man
himself which form the center of interest, his conscience, his deserts, his
helplessness, his incompleteness (James, The Varieties of Religious
Experience, 2012, pp. 20, 21).

By focusing upon personal religion, i.e., the religious feelings and experiences of
individuals and not on institutional religion (Dein, 2010, p. 527), James made
experience central to his definition of religion, “the feelings, acts, and experiences
of individual men in their solitude . . . concerning whatever they may consider
divine” (James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 2012, pp. 31-32).
Furthermore, spiritual transformation often occurs during and after a period of
stress, emotional upheaval, or despair. Therefore, James felt that religious
experience was most often beneficial through resolving psychological distress and
thus was transformative (Dein, 2010, p. 529). The message of “The Will to
Believe” can be summarized as Jamesian self-transformation; writing of faith in
oneself can facilitate the work of freely transforming oneself (Koopman, 2017, p.
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505). Evidence of the benefits of religion and spirituality on well-being are well
documented and accumulating in the research of Duke University’s Harold
Koenig and collaborators, with an updated edition of the Handbook of Religion
and Health available in 2022 (Koenig, 2021).
In The Psychology of Religion: An Empirical Approach, the authors
provide criteria that differentiate spiritual transformation from other types of
religious experiences, including a process (sudden or gradual) by which the
transformed self is achieved, radical in its consequences, and indicated by such
things as a new centering of concern, interest, and behaviors. This process occurs
within a social context; specifically, spiritual transformation is recognized by
others within a religious frame of reference. If behaviors from these new ideals
and changed habits have no permanence, there has been no transformation (Dein,
2010, p. 532).
An example of the utility of the substance of William James’ pragmatism
is credited by Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) founder Bill Wilson as the essence of
the program’s spirituality. Viewed simply, the sole purpose of AA is to help
people stop addiction, i.e., drinking. By assimilating James, a broader sense of
exploring spiritual growth on an individual basis is facilitated by allowing all
members, including atheists and agnostics, the opportunity of pursuing spirituality
and self-transformation. James suggested the consistent finding that the unique
experience of spirituality was just as valid and reliable as the tenets of institutional
religion. James defended the mind-cure movement emphasizing the healing power
of positive emotions and beliefs. The foundation of AA’s spirituality is directly
traced to James’ individualized “mind-cure” methods in The Varieties of
Religious Experience (Kirkland, 2018, pp. 2-4). James uses the term “the sick
soul” as he applies the need for self-surrender and subsequent conversion for the
goal of “healthy mindedness.” Transformation involves the process, gradual or
sudden, by which a divided self is “… consciously wrong, inferior, and unhappy,
becomes unified and consciously right, superior, and happy” (James, The
Varieties of Religious Experience, 2012, pp. 59-153).
Charity and benevolence, AA’s twelfth step, after one has a spiritual
awakening that came as a result of completing the previous eleven steps, carries
the message of AA to other alcoholics and the practice of these principles in all
our affairs. James felt that a person could not commit one’s life to being optimistic
and “healthy-minded” about life without paying careful attention to the call to
reduce suffering in the world. The emphasis on spiritual and long-term personal
growth is an ever-present theme through service to others (Kirkland, 2018, p. 5).

Conclusion
Although the volition of belief has contradicting support from meritorious
philosophies, theistic religious tradition concerning faith does not depend on what
a person believes. In terms of proselytization, rather than evangelizing for belief,
i.e., for Christians to believe in the gospel message without evidential certainty,
perhaps it would be prudent enough to suggest hope that the gospel message is
genuine. Even though belief may or may not be voluntary, a commitment to faith
is. Pragmatism claims freedom to act on ideas that present themselves in ways
beyond our conscious control and that we have the freedom to select and reject
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which information to focus on. A person thus can direct the stream of
consciousness. To James, it is therefore that people who can develop this ability
can exercise more control over their minds, resulting in a more profound sense of
empowerment. William James’ doctrine of pragmatism maintains that we can be
justified under certain conditions in holding beliefs for which there is insufficient
evidence, but which are of fundamental importance for how we live and how we
make sense of the world. James’s doctrine of pragmatism also valued religion for
its practical value for life as a primary agent for acquiring happiness and wellbeing. James referred to pessimism as “an essentially religious disease” (James, Is
Life Worth Living?, 1912, p. 31).
Our faculties of belief were not primarily given us to make orthodoxies
and heresies withal; they were given us to live by. And to trust our
religious demands means, first of all, to live in the light of them and act
as if the invisible world they suggest were real. It is a fact of human
nature that men can live and die by the help of a sort of faith that goes
without a single dogma or definition (James, Is Life Worth Living?,
1912, p. 41).
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Challenging Colonialism through
Religion: Connections Between
Colonialism, Power, and Religion
in Colonial Uganda
By Ruth Aardsma Benton
Abstract: In the late nineteenth century, Christian beliefs and European ideas spread
among the people of present-day Uganda through increasing British involvement
in this region and the work of Christian missionaries. However, some Ugandan
people also used these ideas to challenge and critique European society and the
colonial system itself. This paper explores two ways that this happened. In the
case of the Malakites and Bayudaya, a stricter interpretation of the Bible and
Christian beliefs led them to see European Christians as hypocritical and to
question parts of the colonial system such as European medical care. As
demonstrated by Ignatius K. Musazi and Reverend Reuben Spartas Mukasa,
both of whom had connections to the group Abazzukulu ba Kinta, or the
Descendants of Kintu, another way blended elements of Christianity with other
ideas and worked within the existing systems to challenge colonialism. Both
approached used Christian concepts to question British colonialism.
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British involvement in the area now known as Uganda began in the second
half of the 19th century. Although there were economic reasons for British
involvement in the region, the British claimed that their involvement in East
Africa was for humanitarian purposes, including ending the slave trade in that
region.1 Christian missionaries from different denominations began their work in
Uganda starting in the late 1870s, and their missionary compounds became
centers for social resources such as medical care and education. 2 As Christian
beliefs and knowledge of the Bible, as well as other European ideas, began to
permeate Ugandan society, these beliefs were used by some Ugandans to critique
European society and the existing political systems. As Jason Bruner put it,
“throughout the colonial era, African Christians and non-Christians alike
negotiated and debated Western notions of progress while they selectively
adopted and adapted modern European technologies, practices, and modes of
healing in their pursuit of health and well-being.”3 From the literature consulted
for this essay, two approaches to the use of Christian religious beliefs to challenge
the colonial system can be observed. Some groups, such as the Malakites and
Bayudaya, adopted a stricter interpretation of scripture which led these groups to
reject aspects of European culture. In the case of the Malakites, there was even a
sense of superiority to European Christians who were seen as not following the
faith that they were teaching in Uganda. In essence, the closer adherence to certain
elements of the Christian message brought by missionaries was also a rejection of
parts of the colonial system and its established religion. A second approach that
was used originated from a blending of global history and influences with biblical
exegesis. Two examples of this approach can be seen by examining the
philosophies of Ignatius K. Musazi and Reverend Reuben Spartas Mukasa and the
groups associated with them. Compared to the Malakites and Bayudaya, this
approach took elements of Christianity and blended it with other ideas to
challenge the existing system from within.4 After briefly outlining colonial and
missionary history in modern-day Uganda, both of these approaches to Christian
missionary work and colonialism will be analyzed.
When Richard Burton and John Hanning Speke were exploring the region
now known as Tanzania, they learned about kingdoms that were to the north of
Lake Victoria, including the kingdom of Buganda.5 The explorers learned about
1

Jonas Fossli Gjersø, 833. Gjersø, Jonas Fossli. “The Scramble for East Africa: British Motives
Reconsidered, 1884-95,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 43, no. 5 (2015): 833.
2
Richard J. Reid, A History of Modern Uganda (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 2125, 244-248.
3
Jason Bruner, “ʽWhat is a European hospital but a pagan shrine? ’ Missionaries, Progress, and the
Problem of Materiality in Colonial Uganda. Material Religion 14, vol. 3 (2018): 317.
4
To put this another way, Musazi and Spartas take more of a “Christianity and” approach compared
to the rejection of elements that led to the creation of the Malakite sect and the founding of the
Bayudaya community.
5
In the Bantu language, prefixes are used to indicate if the root word is singular personal, plural
personal, or a neuter adjective. Words that being with “Mu-” indicate the term is singular plural, “Ba” or “A-” indicate the term is plural personal, and a neuter adjective begins with the “Ki-” prefix. This
is important to keep in mind while reading scholarship on this region as this convention is followed
by some scholars. See Frederick Burkewood Welbourn, East African Rebels: A Study of Some
Independent Churches (London: SCM Press LTD, 1961), x.
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the history and people in the southern part of Uganda and brought these stories
back to Britain, but they did not explore the region. 6 It was not explored until
Speke returned in 1862 on a trip that proved that Lake Victoria was the source of
the Nile.7 Speke was the first European to spend time among the Buganda people
and one of their neighbors, the Bunyoro, and his accounts from his expedition laid
the foundation of European understanding of this region. 8 During the 1880s,
British involvement in East Africa increased because they saw this region as being
more relevant to their foreign policy than West Africa.9 In addition to its strategic
location for protecting British interests in the Indian subcontinent, it was believed
that there were extensive economic opportunities in Uganda once they ended the
region’s slave trade.10 Germany also had interests in East Africa, and in 1886, the
Anglo-German Boundary solidified national spheres of influence.11 Modern-day
Uganda became a protectorate of the British empire in August of 1894.12
British involvement in the protectorate was uneven and tended to favor the
kingdom of Bugunda. When Speke reported about the kingdom of Buganda, he
claimed it was more advanced than others in the area, which he attributed to “the
arrival from the north of lighter-skinned, and therefore more intelligent and
culturally advanced, invaders in the distant past.” 13 Historian Richard J. Reid
argues that the European’s continued belief that Buganda was a “comparatively
advanced civilised state, vis-à-vis the surrounding states and societies” explains
why the kingdom of Buganda was the focus of European interest “at the expense
of others in the area.”14 Although racist beliefs shaped how the British saw all
Africans in the region, they believed Buganda was somewhat unique in that it was
more receptive and willing to develop than the surrounding people. 15 Changing
geopolitics among the kingdoms of Buganda and the neighboring kingdom of
Bunyoro also played a role in shaping British involvement in the region. 16
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In his discussion of Uganda’s precolonial and early colonial history, Reid examines the
intertwined history of Buganda and other groups in the area, in particular the Bunyoro. While it is
not the focus of this essay, some familiarity with the history of this region helps to shed light onto
British colonial efforts in Uganda and illustrates that the fact that the colonial system was not built
on a blank slate. In 1869, the ruler of Bunyoro died, and young son, Kabalega, fought to inherit the
throne. During this struggle, which helped to craft Kabalega’s image among the British as a skilled
warrior, Kabalega sought assistance from the Buganda king to defeat his competitors. Reid, 141.
After Kabalega secured the throne, Bunyoro entered a more prosperous period. Building off of the
military policies of his father, Kabalega was able to expand Bunyoro territory and “take full
advantage of the rapidly expanding commerce in slaves and ivory which was driving the region’s
economic transformation.” Reid, 142-143; quote from 143. Although Bunyoro benefitted from
these economic ties to the north, it also placed them into conflict with other groups, including
some with ties to the Sudanese. Through a series of events that included a rejection of the offer to
becomes an Egyptian protectorate, Bunyoro emerged as a military power in the region. This also
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According to Reid, the “new class of younger chiefs [in Buganda that] was
emerging by the 1880s” continued to be “politically ambitious but less interested”
achieving in these goals through “military prowess.” 17 Instead, they used “the
opportunities offered by new religions, clothing and…guns.”18 During this period,
while Buganda faced some internal turmoil, the kingdom of Bunyoro grew in
military strength which led the British to see them as “savage obstacles to
progress” compared “to the semi-enlightened and cooperative” people of
Buganda.19 The increased military presence of Bunyoro also meant that the less
favorable northern route to this region was not accessible to Europeans, which
meant reliance on the southern route which was dominated by Buganda. 20 Thus,
Buganda functioned as a sort of “gatekeeper” to the region. 21 Thus, the British
were more closely aligned with the Buganda than with other kingdoms or groups
in the region that later formed the protectorate. 22 Bruner also identifies the
willingness of different groups to accept Christianity, along with other missionary
practices, as another way that the British imposed a “racialized hierarchy” on the
people of Uganda.23 All of this forms the backdrop for understanding missionary
work in Uganda.
Christian missionary work in modern-day Uganda began in the late 1870s,
prior to the establishment of the region as a British protectorate. When Henry
Morton Stanley visited Buganda, he claimed he was able to convert the king of
Buganda to Christianity in 1875. 24 According to Stanley, the king appealed to
Europeans to come teach the people of Buganda.25 British Anglicans, who were
connected to the Christian Missionary Society (CMS), were the first group of

meant that the northern route, albeit the less favorable option, into the region was blocked off to
Europeans. Reid, 143-145. In contrast, Buganda had entered a period of decline after it helped to
secure the throne for Kabalega. Although Buganda had also been implementing military reforms,
the benefits were not very apparent until the 1890s. Thus, while Bunyoro grew in military might,
Buganda’s was declining. Reid, 145. During this time, some of the other regional states were able
to preserve some autonomy during this time. Reid, 149. Additionally, Buganda was facing internal
political struggles and social changes, including the emergence of elite women in politics and
changing attitudes among the younger tribal chiefs. Reid, 147-149. As Reid notes, there is an
element in irony that after helping Kabalega gain control of Bunyoro, the fortunes of Buganda
declined. Reid, 141. Yet, it is this same change in power dynamics that led to Buganda’s
dominance during the colonial period. Reid, 141-150.
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The favoritism that can be seen throughout the colonial period is an important factor in the
legacy of violence and unrest in this region. This issue was raised repeatedly in the scholarship
read for this essay.
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Prior to the introduction of Christianity to the region, there had been a Muslim presence.
According to Reid, after Stanley’s visit, the king “experimented” with Christianity, which
ultimately upset the more devout Muslims in his kingdom, After some protests by Muslims that
challenged the king’s authority, the king “was furious, and he rounded up some seventy Muslim
converts and had them burnt to death at Namugongo.” Reid, 175. Reid goes on to note that this
massacre has been “overshadowed by the story of the Christian martyrs a decade later.” Reid, 175.
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missionaries to this region.26 Approximately two years later, in 1879, a group of
French Catholic missionaries, who had been based in Algiers, also began ministry
in this region.27 According to Reid, “the souls that each would win in the decade
that followed were, in political terms, critical to the balance of colonial interests
and the very nature of the territory itself.” 28 During this period, both Christian
groups grew quickly.29 However, the French Catholics, who were also known as
the White Fathers, became more powerful in the region, in spite of their fewer
numbers, due to the White Fathers’ ability to attract the chief’s children to their
missionary compounds. 30 The Anglican missionaries were able to exert more
influence when the White Fathers left Buganda for three years, beginning in 1882,
due to tensions in the region.31 The fact that the CMS missionaries remained in
Uganda was viewed as showing greater dedication to the people, and the
missionaries also attracted converts through their reading and carpentry
programs.32 The king of Buganda felt threatened by the missionaries, their work,
and the Christian converts, and “in 1866 he had several dozen burnt to death…at
Namugongo.”33 Because of the internal unrest that had been developing, as well
as the divisions caused by the introduction of outside religions, there was a period
of war in the early 1890s in which religion played a role. 34 Additionally, the
Imperial British East African Company, which was unprofitable at this time,
discussed pulling out of Uganda. The idea of the company leaving Uganda
concerned CMS, as it feared this would result in another massacre of Christian
converts. Thus, CMS appealed to its donors to help raise the necessary funds to
keep the company in Uganda.35 Jonas Fossli Gjersø, in his article, “The Scramble
for East Africa: British Motives Reconsidered, 1884-95,” discusses the role CMS
played in helping to keep the British presence in Uganda, which ultimately lead to
the establishment of the British protectorate.36 Although Gjersø does not address
any motive that CMS may have had beyond concern for mission work and efforts
to end slavery in East Africa, the role that CMS played does illustrate the complex
connections between mission work and British colonization in Uganda. Not only
was there a link between colonialism and religion from the British perspective, but
some Ugandans used the theology and religious works brought to the region by
missionaries to critique the colonial social and political order.
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One way that the Christian influence and scripture that the missionaries
brought to Uganda could be used to challenge the colonial system can be seen by
examining the groups known as the Malakites and the Bayudaya. 37 Both
movements can be connected to Joswa Kate Mugema, who began to study with
missionaries around 1878. Mugema, a friend of the king of Buganda, became an
Anglican chief and was dedicated to his religious studies and desired to help
spread the Gospel.38 According to Welbourn, Mugema became quite fascinated
with the story of God saving Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego from death in the
fiery furnace after they refused to worship an golden idol erected by
Nebuchadnezzar. 39 From this story, and from other biblical passages, Mugema
came to believe that one needed to trust God alone for healing. 40 An early
example of this belief can be seen from an encounter Mugema had with CMS
missionaries when they visited him in 1891. In spite of being known as a powerful
chief who owned a lot of property, one of the missionaries who wrote about this
visit describes Mugema as an “old man quite crippled” with an “ulcer very foul
being just covered with a piece of banana leaf.”41 The missionaries reported that
Mugema refused their offer to treat his leg, and there is not any evidence that
Mugema received medical care from this date until his death in 1942. 42 This
rejection of European medicine is one of the defining characteristics of the
Malakites, but it seems that the sect itself may not have been formed until later.
Both Welbourn and Bruner date the origins of the Malakites to the1910s. Citing
letters written in both 1912 and 1914, Welbourn argues that the sect emerged at
some point between these two letters.43 Bruner states that the sect’s denouncement
of medicine began in the early 1910s, that membership hit a peak of
approximately 90,000 baptized members during the 1920s, and that by the 1970s,
the sect was spoken of as if it had disappeared.44
The Malakites can be viewed as being anticolonial through their
interpretation of the Bible, their rejection of European medical care, and their
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contention that European Christianity had not advanced as far as they had.45 In
general, it seems that the Malakites took a more literal or strict interpretation of
some Biblical passages to defend their stance on both baptism and medicine.46 In
the case of baptism, they argued that it was not necessary to go through the long
process that Anglicans and Catholics required before being baptized. Malakites
contended that only “a simple profession of faith” was needed prior to baptism.47
From passages such as Mark 16:16 and Matthew 28:19, Malakites claimed that
the Bible did not require a lengthy educational process. As Bruner notes, not only
did this claim about baptism make sense to “literate adherents who formed the
earliest converts,” but it may have “appealed to those who had been left out of
European missionaries’ educational structures.”48 Medical treatment was another
area of contention between the Malakites and Europeans. From the perspective of
the Malakites, the Bible banned all forms of medical treatment, regardless if they
were of European or African in origin. 49 For them, “the matter was simple:
missionaries flouted the clear commandments of the God they preached” because
they “condemned African methods of healing while they themselves practiced
witchcraft and distributed ʽamulets’ (nsiriba) and ʽfetishes’ (or jjembe, which
worked kulogo, which missionaries translated as ʽmagic’) in the form of Western
biomedicines, implying that God was not, in fact, almighty to heal as he chose.”50
In essence, the use of medicine by missionaries was seen as being just as pagan as
African healing practices. According to historian Michael Twaddle, it should be
recognized that the Malakites were not merely being resistant to European
thought. Rather, he notes that the movement included educated Ugandans, some
of whom worked for the protectorate, and who based their argument on their
interpretation of the Bible.51
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The rejection of European medicine may not seem like a policy that
challenges the colonial system at first. Yet, when one looks at some of the
implications of this stance, it becomes more obvious that even the rejection of
medicine can be seen as anti-colonial. By refusing European medical treatment for
themselves and veterinary care for their livestock, the Malakites could be seen a
threat to social order. For example, during an outbreak of smallpox in 1915, their
refusal to be vaccinated caused problems for the British. There was concern that
by refusing the vaccine, public health, not to mention the health of British troops,
was endangered.52 At the time, the Principle Medical Officer recommended that
the government consider instituting martial law. Similarly, the governor, while
acknowledging that people should be allowed to hold their own religious beliefs,
argued that, in this case, acting on this belief was breaking a law that was
designed for the public good and that those who resisted should be punished
accordingly.53 Although “the Government as a whole persisted in regarding the
movement as harmless,” both Welbourn and Bruner mention other times that
Malakites refused to cooperate with health policies. There was resistance to the
treatment for syphilis, in part because the medicine was referred to as “606,”
which was too close “666,” the sign of the beast in Revelation.54 Bruner states that
this refusal of treatment was “appalling” to missionaries and officials because they
mistakenly believed that there was “a 50% or greater incidence rate of venereal
syphilis.” 55 Sleeping sickness was also a concern in the region, and there was
resistance to quarantine measures the British attempted to implement. 56 With
respect to veterinary medicine, Welbourn describes a series of outbreaks of
rinderpest among cattle owned by members of the sect between 1918 through
1923, and Malakites opposed various anti-plague measures instituted by the
British.57 Violence also broke out in 1929 when a group of 20 to 30 Malakites
were asked to follow some anti-plague measures. According to Welbourn, “the
crowd became hostile and, on the unexpected arrival of a European Sanitary
Inspector, a riot occurred in which the latter lost his left hand, five [Malakites]
were killed and the villagers [who supported the chief that initially confronted the
Malakites] burnt down the [Malakite] church.”58 Although the Malakites were not
the only group that objected to European medical treatment, they have been
described as the “most vociferous and obnoxious in their refusal to partake in any
medicine” and their actions challenged colonial policies and raised concerns about
public health.59
Through their challenge of the colonial system by rejecting European
medical care, the Malakites seem to have posed an ideological challenge to the
early Uganda protectorate.” However, beyond noting that Semei Kaakungulu, “one notable early
convert,” was “embroiled in land disputes with the protectorate government for much of the 1910s
and 1920s, Bruner does not seem to elaborate on this point.
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colonial system itself. As stated before, the fact that Europeans, including
missionaries, relied on medicine rather than on God for healing, was seen as a
hypocritical use of other types of pagan healing practices. 60 This idea of hypocrisy
was compounded by European efforts to preserve aspects of traditional Ugandan
culture.61 From the perspective of Europeans involved, museums and exhibitions
were meant to demonstrate the progress of the Ugandan people towards
modernity. Europeans saw the “[removal of] objects from their original contexts
and networks” as showing the “impotence of the items, as they then stood as mere
signifiers of spiritual, cultural, and political progress.” 62 However, Ugandan
converts “wondered what missionaries were up to when they preserved the very
objects they had exhorted Africans to abandon and destroy, even outlawing
certain practices associated with them.” 63 Although the Malakites agreed with
missionaries that some objects and rituals were pagan, the fact that the
missionaries still preserved some of these objects seemed a bit too much like
paganism itself.64 It was seen as “contradictory and dangerous.”65 Because of their
stance on preserving pagan objects and their reliance on God alone for healing,
the Malakites saw themselves as moving beyond the Europeans and as obeying
the Bible more devoutly. 66 Bruner, in fact, contends that the Malakites were
attempting to critique the European concept of modernity itself and argues that
they believed that they had “progressed into a truer, purer modernity” than the
missionaries around them.67 In this sense, the Malakites were also challenging the
very idea of which society was truly civilized.
Another religious group that believed missionaries were not living in
accordance to the doctrine they brought to Uganda is the Bayudaya community.
Their founder, Semei Lwakilenzi Kakungulu, originally split from the church due
to “a personal quarrel with the British,” but over time, his interpretation of the Old
Testament led him and his followers to convert to Judaism.68 Before founding the
Bayudaya, Kakungulu was a prominent political and military official in Buganda
who served first the Buganda King and later worked with British officials.
Kakungulu, who became a protestant in the 1880s, fought against Muslims and
played a significant role in “routing the Muslims” from Buganda in 1891. He then
served in the religious wars between protestants and Catholics that began soon
thereafter and ended in January 1892.69 Through marriage, Kakungulu was also
closely connected to the royal family. According to Arye Oded, the British came
to value Kakugulu’s military ability. After the British protectorate was formed in
1894, the British “gave him a free hand in his battles against the tribes,” and he
“led the spearhead of the army which, at the end of the nineteenth century, paved
60
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the way for the British rule over wide areas of Uganda.”70 He was later appointed
as the military governor of an eastern province of Uganda. 71 Kakungulu, however,
hoped to be appointed as a king, and at one point, he erroneously believed that the
British would do this.72 According to Kakungulu, in 1901, he had been promised
by Sir Harry Johnston, the British Special Commissioner to Uganda, that he
would be appointed as a king in exchange for service in the Lango region and for
helping to fight Sudanese soldiers who had rebelled against their British officers.73
Over the course of the next decade, Kakungulu “realized that in spite of all his
efforts he would not achieve recognition as ruler of his own kingdom and that in
fact he had merely been used as a tool to facilitate the establishment of British rule
in Uganda.”74 After leaving his military post, Kakungulu joined the Malakites and
helped to spread their beliefs.75
After becoming a member of the Malakites, Kakungulu studied the Old
Testament extensively and advocated for closer adherence to Mosaic law. 76 In
1919, when Kakungulu insisted on following the practice of circumcision, he was
told that this was a Jewish practice rather than a Christian one, and Kakungulu
declared that he would now be a Jew.77 According to a relative, Kakungulu began
to go through the Bible and selected passages that he thought were important. This
became the foundation for a 1922 book of prayers and rules that his followers
were supposed to adhere to.78 Although Kakungulu claimed that he was Jewish,
he continued to accept the New Testament as scripture and believed in Jesus.79
After meeting and befriending a Jewish trader, Kakungulu asked to be instructed
in Judaism, in part to clear up his misconceptions about Judaism. 80 From this
Jewish trader, Kakungulu and those who followed him learned about Jewish
customs and beliefs, including observing the Sabbath, wearing head coverings,
and following rules about how to prepare meat.81 According to Oded, Kakungulu
did not force his family, servants, or those who lived in his lands to convert.
However, he did grant some benefits for those who were part of the Bayudaya
community. 82 Upon Kankungulu’s death in 1928, Bayudaya membership
declined, but they have since received support from other Jewish communities in
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the United States and Israel.83
Although the emergence of the Bayudaya community may not seem very
anti-colonial in comparison to the Malakites, the Bayudaya demonstrate the idea
of rejecting components of Christian faith brought to Uganda by missionaries.
Like the Malakites, their religious differences emerged through a closer reading
and interpretation of scripture. In the case of Kakungulu and the Bayudaya,
Kakungulu’s careful study of the Old Testament and his insistence on obeying all
of Mosaic law led him to breaking away from the Malakites, who had themselves
broken from European Christianity.84 In both cases, there is, at its core, a critique
of European influence through the way these groups interpreted scripture and
broke away from the message of European missionaries.
In contrast to the Malakites and Bayudaya, another way that Ugandans
could challenge the colonial system is by working through the church itself. This
is illustrated by the work of two men associated with Abazzukulu ba Kinta,
Ignatius K. Musazi and Reverend Reuben Spartas Mukasa. Abazzukulu ba Kintu,
or the Descendants of Kintu, emerged during a time of political activism from the
1920s through the 1940s. Some Ganda political activists were concerned with
how land was being distributed and privatized and were involved in events that
became known as the Bataka controversies during the 1920s. 85 There was also
unrest among rural farmers whose “growing economic grievances” were
“exacerbated by colonial cotton regulations” as Uganda became a major producer
of cotton for the British empire.86 According to Jonathon L. Earle, the colonial
officials themselves were concerned over how the Buganda cotton inspectors
treated the rural farmers.87 Tensions were also growing due to other controversies
within Uganda, including the Nnamasole affair, the expulsion of students from
Bishop Tucker Memorial College in Mukono, and the assassination of Prime
Minister Martin Luther Nsibirwa.88 Unlike Bataka activists who thought that more
83
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political power should be given to the clan heads rather than concentrated in the
monarchy, the Abazzukulu ba Kintu wanted to power to be held by a just and
moral monarch. They considered themselves the “political heirs of Buganda’s
proto-mythical” king, whom they pointed to as an example of such a king. 89 In
their argument, they used a combination of “global history and biblical exegesis to
rethink [the region’s] royalist past” and the political critique raised by Bataka
activists.90
Musazi was an important figure in the history of Uganda due to his
involvement with Abazzukulu ba Kintu, the Uganda African Farmers’ Union, and
later the Uganda National Congress. 91 As the son of a chief in the region of
Buganda known as Bulemeezi, Musazi grew up in an area that had a strong
military culture, supported the monarchy, and was heavily protestant. 92 Musazi
felt a call to missionary service as a child, and he later studied for ministry in the
Anglican church.93 This included spending some years attending school in Great
Britain. His training as an ordinand required knowledge of ancient languages,
including Greek and Hebrew, and assignments that required careful and extensive
study of biblical passages.94 According to Earle, Musazi’s studies led him to think
about the connections between religious faith and politics, and he looked to the
early Christian church as a model of this.95 From his studies on the book of Acts,
he saw the early church as being “a subversive political community that used
conversion to undermine empire and entrenched religious elites, a moral language
that he could easily translate to conceptualise Protestant dissent in Bulemeezi.”96
There were also secular influences that shaped Musazi’s beliefs, including the
1926 United Kingdom General Strike, his study of 19th century history of French
peasants and the 17th century English Civil War, and the writings of individuals
such as Émile Zola. From these, Musazi developed his ideas about political
activism and the importance of unions. 97 Upon his completion of ordinand
requirements, Musazi was informed that he would not receive an appointment to a
church in the UK and was told to return to Uganda to serve in local parish
ministry for six months. Earle quotes an American economist, George Shepherd,
as saying that Musazi stated “that ʽhe could not accept ordination because of the
discrimination against Africans by the Church of England’”.98 His reaction may
have been “further exacerbated by the circumstances surrounding an engagement
he had with an English woman.”99 A few years after his return to Uganda, Musazi
ended his efforts to work in ministry upon learning that one of his homilies had
not been well-received by the Bishop of Uganda.100 At this point, Musazi turned
89
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his attention towards politics.101
Although Musazi was influenced by intellectuals and events outside of his
religious training, he drew on his training in the Anglican church and arguments
based on biblical passages to make his argument. 102 In Earle’s study of a
significant portion of Musazi’s remaining library, he notes that Musazi’s most
annotated books were “an English Authorized Bible” and a copy of the English
Book of Common Prayer.103 Earle juxtaposes Musazi’s use of these books with
annotations and underlined passages from Harold Laski’s Reflections on the
Revolution of our Time, which reflects a Marxist influence.104 Although Musazi
was influenced by Laski’s writing and saw similarities to the situation in Uganda,
Musazi turned to the Bible in order to formulate his critique of the colonial
government and the desire of chiefs to gain more power. 105 He used Biblical
passages to show “the interdependence of political justice and the necessity of
morally robust monarchies” and to “imagine Buganda as a place where just kings
held corrupt” individuals and practices “accountable.”106 His annotations indicate
that he made connections between passages such as Isaiah 58:6-7, which focuses
on aspects of social justice, and the book of Amos, in which the elite among the
Israelites are condemned for living well at the expense of those in need.107 Musazi
also notes passages where it is indicated that God removed or punished monarchs
who did not live up to their responsibilities to maintain a just and moral
kingdom.108 Using passages that condemned corrupt and inequitable kingdoms, he
argued for the establishment of a Buganda kingdom based on Biblical principles
of social justice. From the New Testament, Musazi used interactions between
John the Baptist and King Herod, passages about Jesus’ confrontation with Judas,
and the narrative of Jesus’ trial before Pilate to demonstrate need to call out
corruption and, once again, articulate the role political leaders should play in
carrying out justice.109 For Musazi, “theology shaped the political and the political
informed the theological- neither was epiphenomenal.”110 This appears to reflect
the critique raised by Abazzukulu ba Kintu.
Another person associated with Abazzukulu ba Kintu was Reverend
Reuben Spartas Mukasa, who was also involved with the formation of the African
Greek Orthodox Church in Uganda.111 Spartas, as he is often referred to, had also
trained to serve in the Anglican church before his religious journey led him away
from the Anglican church and towards the Orthodox church. 112 Spartas’s
explanation for this conversion was his realization that the Anglican church was
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another branch of Christianity compared to the Orthodox church, which he saw as
being closer to the “true Church,” as Spartas phrased it.113 Born in the late 1800s,
Spartas served in the African Native Medical Corps during World War I and later
in the King’s African Rifles (KAR). During his time in the KAR, Spartas was
introduced to Marcus Garvey and the African Orthodox Church in America.114
An important feature of this religious movement, as noted by Frederick
Burkewood Welbourn, is the fact that people of African heritage were allowed to
serve in religious offices that the Protestant Episcopal Church of America banned
them from.115 Welbourn also quotes a passage of Nationalism in Colonial Africa,
written by T.L. Hodgkin, which states that “Garvey…was successful in spreading
the idea of independent African churches as an instrument of African
liberation.”116 In 1929, “Spartas publicly announced that he had broken with the
Anglican Church and formed a new church called ʽthe African Orthodox Church
[AOC]—a church established for all right-thinking Africans, men who wish to be
free in their own house, not always being thought of as boys.’” 117 In a letter
Spartas wrote in 1933 to a former mentor, Spartas appears to connect his religious
conversion with this idea of being treated like a man rather than a boy: “inside
Anglicanism I was speaking with the voice of an insolent child who presumes to
teach his grandmother to suck eggs.” 118 Spartas also “used the history of
Orthodoxy – a more ancient faith – to critique the colonial state and Anglican
paternalism.”119 Because of the importance for Orthodox churches to be seen as
both valid and legitimate, AOC was later accepted as part of the Greek Orthodox
Church.120
Like Musazi, Spartas seems to have become more political over time.
According to Turner, Spartas was involved in riots in Uganda in 1949, and
Welbourn states that Spartas was imprisoned from 1949-1957.121 In fact, in his
chapter on Spartas, Welbourn contends that after Spartas’ ordination in 1932, the
“story” shifts more towards the church. 122 Regardless, Welbourn insists that
Spartas was instrumental to its founding of the AOC and that Spartas was clear
about “the explicit nationalism, if not pan-Africanism” in his efforts to establish
this church. 123 In “The Place of Independent Religious Movements in the
Modernization of Africa,” Turner, a contemporary of these men, makes an
important observation about the connections between religion and politics for
leaders such as Spartas. He observes that it is logical that there is a marriage of
politics and religion in these movements because many “leaders of anti-colonial
political movements had so often received their educational equipment and even
113
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their radical ideas from Christian schools.”124 Although the focus of this critique
of the colonialism from within Christian beliefs has focused on Musazi and
Spartas, they appear to represent the groups that were associated with them.
In 1962, Uganda became an independent nation. 125 Over the course of
nearly a century, Uganda was exposed to European culture, first through
missionaries and explorers and then as a British protectorate. Yet, the beliefs
Christian missionaries brought with them also contained elements that were later
used to challenge the British colonial system. As demonstrated by the Bayudaya
and Malakites, some groups questioned what missionaries had taught them and
challenged the political and social structure through rejecting elements of these
imported religions. There were also challenges from within through the formation
of groups like the AOC that wed global history and secular thought with Biblical
concepts. The development of these critiques emerged in situations where racism
is apparent, and the leaders of these movements generally had some sort of
personal frustration or harm caused by the colonial system. While highlighting
some specific movements, a full discussion of other groups, sects, and cults that
used Christianity in some form to protest colonialism is beyond the scope of this
essay. Looking at the ways the groups and individuals discussed in the essay
resisted existing social and political structures, however, provides some insight
into ways that the people of Uganda fought against colonialism.
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All For The Glory of God:
Reconstructing the Jesuit
Perception of Odawa Female
Identity in New France, 1660-1675
By Eric Morningstar
Abstract: The relationship between the French and the Odawa was a tumultuous one
when compared to other Native-French relationships. This can be largely
attributed to the European misperception of Odawa cultures and fierce
independence. This was especially true in their dealings with women. When the
French Jesuits arrived as missionaries to the Odawa, they found little
cooperation with their mission to convert the “savages” to Christianity.
Eventually, they came to view the vulnerable women, primarily mothers and
widows, as their doorway into influencing the larger Odawa population. They
could play on the desperation of these women, then use them as examples of
Christian virtue to influence, subjugate, and eventually convert the “sinful,
sexual” women and the men who were seeking wives and gain a strong foothold
in the Native population.
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Introduction: A Brief Overview of the Historiography of the Odawa’s
Relations with the French and the Importance of Jesuit Relations
Much of what is known about indigenous relations with the settlers of
New France comes from the history of the fur trade, but the economic enrichment
of the motherland and the establishment of a new colony only made up a part of
the French-Native experience. French traders and missionaries developed
relationships with various tribal groups including the Ojibwe, the Huron, the
Potawatomi, and the Odawa. Of the many groups that dealt with the French,
comparatively little has been written concerning the Odawa, including their
experiences with the Jesuits who sought the conversion of native souls. While
many scholars, such as Richard White, have discussed the Native-French relations
as a sort of “Middle Ground”—a relationship founded on respectful reciprocity—
relations with the Odawa proved more difficult 1 . As a group of nations, they
tended to maintain their own ambitions and were certainly unreceptive to the
religious message of Christianity and to the Jesuits who preached it to them.
French impressions of the Odawa were frequently negative, however this
was largely due to failings of European perception to recognize the culturally
formed identities of native peoples. These impressions of the Odawa, and indeed
many Native American groups, persist even today. Susan Sleeper-Smith has
written extensively on the mischaracterization of Indigenous peoples in the Great
Lakes region. In her book Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural
Encounter in the Western Great Lakes, Sleeper-Smith criticized historians and lay
people alike for continuing to favor the popular conceptions of Indians as
primitive people clad in animal skins who have since disappeared from the land.
In her estimation, historians are guilty of perpetuating this image by being
skeptical of new studies emerging that describe the agency of Indigenous groups
even as they faced cultural change as a result of contact with Europeans. Indeed,
she wrote, “…Indians have existed as viable, distinct people from the earliest
times to the present and [I] contend that, while encounter changed indigenous
communities, it also encouraged the evolution of strategic behaviors that ensured
cultural continuity.” 2 For Sleeper-Smith, these misconceptions started with
Europeans’ first impressions of natives. In her 2018 book, Indigenous Prosperity
and American Conquest: Indian Women of the Ohio River Valley, 1690-1792,
Sleeper-Smith noted that Frenchmen such as Jacques-Charles de Sabrevois, who
was commandant at Detroit at the beginning of the 18th century, considered the
Odawa “…’not so neat or so well made.’” They were also far too engaged in the
games and sports of their own culture. These included lacrosse and dish. 3 Despite
1
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these negative generalizations, Sleeper-Smith lauded Sabrevois’ observations of
Indian women and their roles in native society. He described their agricultural
efforts as “’very industrious,’” and Sleeper-Smith promoted the use of more
historical sources that were sensitive to gendered roles to allow for a more
accurate representation of native agency and identity.4
The Odawa also may not have been as compliant in dealing in the French
fur trade. During the 17th century, they were willing to undermine French
economic networks by working alongside the English who wished to trade
illegally at Michilimackinac. English canoes began appearing there by 1685, and
the Odawa encouraged them to return so that they could trade their furs for British
goods instead, especially cloth.5 Sabrevois noted just how industrious the Odawa
proved to be, as were the Miami and Illinois, but it’s not certain he recognized
how focused they were on furthering their own inter ests. Near Montreal where
there was a lack of forest runners, or coureurs de bois, who operated as
independent fur traders, the Odawa became middlemen, gathering beaver pelts
from the north to trade with the English.6
Odawa-French relations also fell short of the popular narrative of
harmonious friendship and kinship with the French that characterized what is
known as the Middle Ground in terms of warfare. Richard White commented in
his book on the Middle Ground that the Odawa were not the greatest allies in the
French confrontation with the Iroquois throughout their expedition in New
France. The Odawa experienced many failures. On one occasion the Odawa
attempted to poison the Iroquois with cornbread. The plot failed because a Huron
woman who had been married to an Iroquois informed her son of the danger and
he informed the rest of the Iroquois so that the mass assassination never took
place.7 In choosing poison as a weapon, the Odawa appeared less capable of more
familiar forms of direct warfare with hatchet and firearm. That the plan was so
easily foiled also possibly spoiled the image of the Odawa as expert warriors.
During the winter of 1661-1662, the French labeled the Odawa as
woefully unprepared for the harsh weather conditions. The French saw the lack of
preparation as amounting to cowardice, adding on to their negative perception of
the Odawa regarding their lack of military prowess. White argued this using the
observations of the famous French fur trader and explorer, Pierre-Esprit Radisson.
Radisson, along with his brother in law, Médard Chouart des Groseilliers, lived
among the Native tribes in New France, including the Ojibwe, Sioux, Huron, and
the Odawa in the middle to late 17th century. The pair also helped start the
Hudson’s Bay Company by aligning with the English businessmen in Boston.8
According to White, Radisson described the Odawa as the, “’cursedest, unablest,
the unfamous, and cowardliest people I have ever seen among four score
game of a chance involving six black and white colored stones placed into a bowl. Each player
would shake the bowl to see how the stones would land. If all six stones were the same color, the
player would receive six points. One point was awarded if only one stone was a different color.
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nations.’”9 He accused them of eating the dogs they had domesticated because the
150 Odawa families possessed very little food. They were so desperate according
to Radisson that they scavenged the carcasses of animals that had been killed
much earlier in order to consume bones and entrails. The men were so depleted
by the end of winter that they even consumed their own bowstrings. They also
consumed used beaver-skin diapers.10
Still, Radisson’s estimation largely missed the intricate strategies and
intelligence utilized among the Odawa to preserve themselves. The Odawa, like
others of the Algonquin language group, engaged in the practice of exogamy. It
wasn’t appropriate for men to marry women who belonged to the same clan.11
White noted, “The Ottawas…depended on kinship to obtain aid from the peoples
of Green Bay against the Sioux…it would not be Algonquians who would bear
primary responsibility for creating a larger alliance of all the refugee centers.”12
So, to the French explorers it seemed that the Algonquins existed in a state of
dependency upon others, but this is a misconception. It was through Odawa
exogamy that the Odawa kept an eye on their own ambitions by expanding their
kinship groups, and this included marriages to the French. They formed extended
kin networks for the purpose of prosperity more so than for preserving peaceful
relations with the French. Such misconceptions of native identity and societal
roles were not uncommon and they further illuminate how negative impressions
were formed due to native reality not meeting European gendered expectations.
For example, during the winter of 1659-60, Radisson and des Groseilliers offered
presents to an unclear Algonquin group which comprised items like kettles,
hatches, and knives for the men and items like vermillion paint (for makeup),
combs, and needles for the women. The Frenchmen were disappointed when
Algonquin women were as interested in using kettles and Algonquin men also
desired the red paint.13
Odawa resistance to French encroachment can especially be seen in their
relations with the Jesuits who represented an extension of the empire and its
church, which were inextricably linked. Cornelius J. Jaenen is a professor at the
University of Ottawa who has focused his career on French-Native relations in
New France as well as the history of the church in New France. In his The Role of
the Church in New France, he wrote the following:
Religion was seen as the basis of civil society. Therefore, the state was
religious…As for the New World, it was to be brought under Christian
dominion…The French could not conceive of a church which was
independent of state authority. The role of the church was to develop the
civic and social conscience as well as the spiritual life of the colonists.14
The role of the church in New France thus served multiple purposes. On the one
9
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hand, the Jesuits served the French government in its aims to develop an
hospitable colony that could enrich the empire. They also, more foundationally,
served the Catholic Church and its mission to spread the Gospel throughout the
world for the conversion of souls. The Odawa were aware that the French had
their limits when it came to religious tolerance, and they reacted by treating the
missionaries harshly.15
Among the Algonquin groups they dealt with, the Odawa were particularly
reluctant to embrace the Christian message, preferring retain their own culture.
References to these difficulties appear in Father Jacques Marquette’s letter to the
Father Superior of the missions in the Relation of 1669-71. Of the Sinagaux
Odawa he wrote,
The Nation of the Sinagaux Outaouaks is very far from the Kingdom of
God, because of its extreme attachment, above all the other Nations, to
indecencies, sacrifices, and jugglery. They turn Prayer to ridicule, and
scarcely will they hear us speak of Christianity; they are proud and without
intelligence, so that I think there is so little to be accomplished with this
Nation that I have not even been willing to baptize the children who were
well, or those who seemed able to escape disease,--contenting myself with
being on the watch for the sick.16
Marquette’s reluctance to even baptize healthy children speaks to the trouble of
developing spiritual relations with the Odawa. As referenced earlier, the Jesuits
perceived the glory of God’s mission for them to convert the world even in the
torture of the Iroquois and the deaths of their religious brothers. Marquette
considered the Odawa behavior as blasphemy, making fun of prayer and refusing
to listen to the word. Instead, they favored their own ways. Marquette described
the Keinouché Nation in a similar way. He wrote,
The people of the Nation of Keinouché declare themselves boldly, saying
that it is not yet time…one of whom, who is rather old, is looked upon as a
wonder among the Savages…The Outaouaks, superstitious to an
extraordinary degree in their feasts and their juggleries, seem to harden
themselves to the teachings that are given them.17
The examples of the Sinagaux and Keinouché Odawa suffice to suggest that even
among the Alongquins, the Odawa caused frustration among the Jesuits. They
frustrated them so much that the same Jesuits who lauded the death of René
Menard (who too suffered frustration for his efforts to convert the Odawa) as
proof of God’s will that they convert the savages. It was through this frustration
that the Jesuits pursued a different strategy for their mission. Throughout the era
of French presence, the Odawa struggled to maintain their culture and identities,
and the Jesuits proved to be a strong opposing force to this aim. They sought to
remake the “savages” in the Christian image and essentially erase centuries’ worth
15
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of history and custom. Further, the Jesuits, in their difficulty in establishing a
Christian following among the Odawa, focused on women as points of entry to
spiritual salvation. In so doing they exploited women and sought to provide a
model of the perfect convert.
The Jesuits in New France from 1660 to 1675 paid attention to the concept
of female gender among the Odawa as it pertained to the conversion process.
Gender, and basically all societal roles were seen through the psychological lens
of the Christian mission. Prior to conversion, women were treated like other
savages devoid of Christian learning and salvation. The Jesuits did acknowledge
some sense of Odawa gender roles, however, especially that of the mother. They
used this role to manipulate women and to further their goals of conversion. If a
female member converted, she was immediately adopted as a Christian, and she
was perceived like other Christian women. This meant the Jesuits saw converted
Odawa women as inferior to men and more susceptible to giving into temptation
and sin. They of course rationalized this patriarchy through the traditional
understanding of original sin and man’s expulsion from the Garden of Eden.
Extensive use of Jesuit writing may be criticized when writing their
history, and this is because of the presumed bias and hyperbole in the documents.
It is an unnecessary concern for the present paper because any bias and hyperbole
would only penetrate deeper into the Jesuit perception. That Father Hierosme
Lalement described earthquakes in 1662 and 1663 as supernatural phenomena that
were accompanied by such marvels as flying serpents, balls of fire in the night
sky, and meteors thunderously issuing forth from the Moon, 18 should not
discourage the inclusion of his voice. The religious believed that God could
control the Earth and all within it to reveal His will, just as Christ could calm the
seas.
The Primacy of Conversion
In analyzing how the Jesuits in New France perceived and used gender
conceptions in their relations with the Odawa, it is first necessary to ground this
analysis in the reality that the Jesuits basically saw all societal roles and action in
terms of their Christian mission: the conversion of the natives. They prefaced
many of their reports with notes that conversion was their primary goal in all
things. They described their own hardships as a way to glorify their mission, and
they also framed nearly all reports of events in this fashion, including death,
torture, and warfare.
From the first of their compiled relations in 1610, the Jesuits
communicated their primary mission was the conversion of natives. Marc
Lescarbot was a parliamentary advocate and lawyer who spent the winter of 16067 at Port Royal, and the following spring he explored the harbor of St. John and
the River St. Croix.19 Writing to the queen in 1607, Lescarbot highlighted the
spread of Christianity as of the utmost importance to the glory of the nation. He
wrote,
18
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God having created me a lover of my country and zealous for its glory, I
cannot do less than impart to it whatever affects its interests; and so
doubtless it will be greatly encouraged by the tidings that the name of
Jesus Christ has been proclaimed in the lands beyond the sea, which bear
the name of France.20
Still, from the first Jesuit narratives from New France, the spread of Christianity
was not soley for national glory. The Jesuit mission was a spiritual mission first
and foremost. The first true narrative of the relations is titled, “La Conversion des
Sauvages qui ont esté baptisez en la Nouelle-France, cette annee 1610,” and
Lescarbot wasted no time informing his reader of the severity of the religious
mission. Alluding to the book of St. Matthew, he stated at the beginning of the
narrative, “…This Gospel of the kingdom, shall be preached in the whole world,
for a testimony to all nations, and then shall the consummation come.” 21
Immediately one notes that the Jesuits could not conceive of themselves as only
French. They were Christians serving the “whole world” and “all nations.” This
general preface to the conversion process was followed by a scolding and
admonition over the failure to adhere to Christian duty to spread the gospel. He
stated, “…I have complained enough in my History of the cowardice of these later
times, and of our lack of zeal either in reclaiming these poor erring ones, or in
making known, exalted, and glorified, the name of God in the lands beyond the
seas, where it never has been proclaimed.”22 The failure to make the New World
a Christian world was seen as the Jesuits’ responsibility, and that world could not
even begin to form an appendage of France’s empire until conversion was
complete. Lescarbot added, “And yet we wish that country to bear the name of
France, a name so august and venerable that we cannot, without a feeling of
shame, glory in an un-Christianized France.”23 There was no glory in a pagan
world, and it is clear from this early report that the Jesuits really only possessed a
rudimentary but binary conception of identity in New France at the beginning of
the 17th century. There were only Christians and “savages” that must be saved.
From a Christian missionary perspective, the world could not be conceived of in
another fashion, and this ideology would frame the many experiences of the
Jesuits in New France, including their own hardships, deaths, and warfare.
The divide between the Christians and “savages” persisted in the Jesuit
perception and continued to be of singular importance, even as the French
engaged the Iroquois in their many wars. Hierosme Lalemont, who became a
Jesuit at the age of 17 in 1610, served as a missionary in New France nearly
continuously until his death in 1638. He served as a superior in Huron missions
and became general superior at Quebec in 1645. He left in 1656 when he was
called back to France to take a university position, but he returned in 1659 to
become Vicar-General of Quebec. 24 Writing to the Reverand Father André
Castillon in 1663, Lalemont stated, “The Iroquois, hitherto invincible, have met
20
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with defeat on all sides at the hands of the Savage Nations allied to us, and of our
Christian Algonquins, who have been victorious by the aid of the most Holy
Virgin.” 25 Lalemont revealed several elements of the Jesuit perception of the
other during their mission in New France. The Jesuits perceived others in terms
of their status in the conversion process. The French may have possessed native
allies, but if they had not converted, the Jesuits could only consider them part of
the “Savage Nations.” Meanwhile for those who had converted, members of the
Algonquin tribal group (of which the Odawa are a part), they could be counted
among the flock and even worthy of the intercession of Mary. They were not seen
as Algonquins but as Christian Algonquins. Unconverted Odawa had been
victorious in battle through another, lesser, natural mechanism.
Regardless of the environment of war, the Jesuits continued to write of
their experiences in terms of their Christian mission of conversion. Members of
the allied nations settled within the vicinity of Quebec in 1663 continued to
receive baptism, and generating new converts proved more important than many
horrors. Lalemont commented,
Despite the raids of the Iroquois, God has been able to choose his Elect, not
only from among the remote Nations…but also from among those dwelling
four and five hundred leagues from us, where more than two hundred
children, baptized before dying, have carried their innocence to Heaven.26
These words lead one to assume the Jesuits had begun making more personal
distinctions when it came to identity, beyond the Christian/savage divide. This
was simply not the case, even though the Iroquois were named specifically, with
allied and enemy lines clearly delineated. This suggests the Jesuits may have
acknowledged the French national causes, but Christian conversion remained the
primary concern. Lalemont stated as much when describing the Jesuit outreach
efforts to the Iroquois. He wrote, “Even among the Iroquois, our enemies, more
than three hundred children have received this favor [baptism] at the hands of our
Frenchmen who were captives in their country—God using our afflictions and
losses to secure the happiness of his Elect.”27 Enemies and allies in the French
war simply didn’t matter as much in the Jesuit worldview compared to the
creation of new Christians in a land that must be Christian. Hardships,
“afflictions and losses,” were only important as revelation of God’s will that the
natives be converted. Lalemont left no room for doubt how dominant this view
was. Even after reflecting on French suffering he stated, “The past makes us hope
everything for the future, Canada being a work of God, and the conversion of the
Savages having been the chief motive for the establishment of the Colonies there
planted.”28
To the modern reader, Lalemont’s words are troubling. Here is a Jesuit
proclaiming the Good News to France, and this news included the death of 200
children. Had they not been baptized, one wonders skeptically whether or not
their departure would have even been worthy of reporting. Nevertheless, they
were, and in receiving the sacrament they became evidence in a report of how
God continued to bless the Christian mission being carried out by the French
25
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Jesuits. That Frenchmen were captured by the enemy Iroquois was secondary to
the “chief motive” as well. As prisoners, they were able to continue the Jesuit
mission of conversion, and their suffering was worth it. Even enemy children had
been able to receive the baptism, and this must be understood as God’s will. All
of this is significant in understanding Jesuit perceptions of native identity in New
France. Whatever sense of horror one has, spreading the word meant winning
souls for God, creator of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible.
Nothing was more important in their perception.
The Jesuits even rationalized the torturing and killing of French enemies
as means to the end of salvation for New France. An important author of these
accounts was the Jesuit missionary René Menard. Menard was known to be fluent
in both the Odawa and Huron languages, in addition to four other native
languages. 29 In the Relation of 1659-1661, René Menard described how the
Jesuits passively observed the judgment and execution of a male member of the
Iroquois by their Algonquin allies. Throughout the process, the glory of God in
securing conversion was the only concern. Menard wrote,
The Algonkins, who were the Judges and executioners of this criminal, did
not use much formality in the matter. They were Algonkins and he
professed himself an Iroquois; that was sufficient to prove him deserving
of death by fire…he prepared himself for receiving holy Baptism, and did
receive it a little before ascending the scaffold…Is it not a marvel to see a
Wolf changed all at once into a lamb, and enter the fold of Jesus Christ,
which he came to ravage?30
The Algonquins escaped any judgment or even commentary for their actions.
They were justified. The Iroquois captive’s death only became significant when
he was baptized, transformed from a minion against Christ’s fold into one of the
elect. The glory of successful conversion was what the Jesuits deemed important,
far more so than the treatment of human life.
A final example of Jesuit writing must be examined to emphasize just how
dominant the conversion mission was in determining how the Jesuits perceived
identity of the other in New France. This example also speaks to the concern of
using Jesuit writing in reconstructing their history. The glory of their Christian
mission was the primary factor influencing Jesuit perception, even as they wrote
of losses among their own ranks. This is especially evident in the report
concerning the death of Father René Menard in 1660. The elder Jesuit had been
staying with a small company among the Odawa. With little in the way of
provisions and making negligible process in converting them, the father made his
way through the wilderness, getting lost frequently, on the way to preach to
Hurons who had been attacked by the Iroquois.31 He finally met his end in the
forest, feeble and exposed to the elements and mosquito bites. Two companions
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were with him but could not help. One of them described Menard’s last moments:
“While he lingered alive, hunger and the other hardships drained his strength, and
made that blessed soul leave its body, and go to enjoy the fruits of so many labors
undergone by him for the Conversion of the Barbarians.” 32 The Odawa had
resisted his efforts. He was old and sickly, and yet Menard pushed on, driven by
his holy mission only to die without achieving his last goals. To anyone else, the
priest’s death might be considered a foolish waste. Heading to preach to the
Hurons, Menard relied on emotional gestures in his conversations with
“savages.”33 It is hardly surprising the man and his small company got lost, and
yet the critical commentary on the priest’s death is that he was able to go to
Heaven because of his efforts to convert the unbelievers.
A certain Jean Guerin was Menard’s companion on this expedition, and
his fate also reveals just what the Jesuits were willing to celebrate as God’s
rewards for their efforts of conversion. Lalemont wrote of his death:
…having devoted himself to us for the purpose of cooperating by his
services in the conversion of the Savages…he met his death in that glorious
calling, following his good Father to Heaven after following him so far on
earth. For as soon as he learned of his death, he thought of nothing but
quitting the Outaouax [Ottawa/Odawa], among whom he had been left, in
order to go in search of the Father’s body; but God had other plans for him
and constituted him the Missionary-in-chief of that poor Church, which
could not enjoy its Pastor’s ministrations.34
Guerin was esteemed by his Jesuit brethren for supporting their conversion
efforts, and Lalemont surely believed it as he described how God selected this
man to be the chief missionary among the Odawa. It is a surprising way to
interpret this situation, given that Geurin was accidentally shot in the side by
Frenchmen and died almost instantly after uttering the name of Jesus and
dropping to the ground. He was only one year into his ministry, though Lalemont
was careful to point out that he did manage to baptize more than 200 children.35
These examples demonstrate just how much conversion dominated Jesuit thought
in New France in the 17th century. It did not matter what hardships the Jesuits
faced, be they raids from the Iroquois, earthquakes, the death of children, or even
their own fates. The primacy of conversion controlled their perception of others
and of themselves. Only after the Jesuits formed a perception of a group in terms
of conversion did they begin to consider their personal identities. These
conceptions as well, however, were subservient to the status of unconverted
savage, and the Jesuits utilized manipulation of gender roles and expectations to
gain new female converts.
Jesuit Recognition of the Odawa as Others and Their Manipulation of Gender
To begin, the Jesuits’ relations with the Odawa as a whole were not
favorable.
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They recognized traditional gender roles among the Indians, especially
that of the mother caring for her babies, widows, and young women in general
who engaged in what Jesuits considered sinful behaviors. They resolved to
manipulate native women and mothers for the cause of conversion, and it is
through this manipulation that one can see how the Jesuits recognized traditional
female gender roles among them—at least in so far as they opened doors to
conversion.
Evidence comes again from Father Menard, this time from a letter to
Hierosme Lalement at Quebec in 1661. Menard began with the usual affirmation
of the Christian mission. All that he saw was instructive in his conversion efforts,
even the slander against Christianity among the Odawa. Despite all this, Menard
concluded, “…God’s kindness, which has guided me, has shown me that it was
not without design that Paradise was to be peopled with these poor folk who,
although they seem to be of the lowest degree, are men as well as the Europeans
and the other nations of the earth.”36 Again, the Jesuit perception of the natives as
people could only move beyond the Christian/Savage divide if the neophytes truly
converted. When Menard discussed God’s design, the notion that Paradise was
destined to be populated by all peoples of the earth was dependent upon Christian
conversion. Before conversion, the native were sufferers in iniquity that should
be pitied, and Odawa women were often seen as in need of saving.
Menard offered an example of such a poor unfortunate in his description
of an abandoned Odawa woman with two small children and described her in a
way that framed her situation as an opportunity to inspire conversion. Of her he
wrote,
I entered almost on all fours, and under that tree I found a treasure. It was
a woman, abandoned by her Husband and her daughter, who had left her
two little children, and they were dying…she expressed in these words:
‘My brother,’ she said to me, ‘I know well enough that my people do not
approve their discourses; but, for my part, I relish them very much, and
what thou sayest is full of consolation.’37
It is almost sickening to read that Menard’s first thought upon seeing this woman
left in a hovel with toddlers was that she was a “treasure.” She was so because
Menard recognized that she was a mother about to lose her children, a condition
even among the hardened Odawa that made her susceptible to hearing the
promises of the Christian faith. What’s worse is that Menard was not even mostly
concerned with saving her soul but that of her dying children who possessed no
ability to resist or assert their identity. He wrote of their deaths:
But I prized much more highly the opportunity that God gave me for
assuring myself of the salvation of the 2 little Innocents, by administering
baptism to them. I returned some days afterward to see that good creature,
and I found her fully resolved to serve God…she never failed to do so, no
matter what affairs she had on hand or how pressed she Was to obtain her
wretched livelihood.38
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an appropriate target of conversion in her desperation. This is why she listened to
his words, for the sake of her dying children, and the father was only too happy to
offer their eternal salvation. They were prizes of the holy mission, innocent and
secure in their departure to heaven. The woman gave up attachment to her own
culture’s ideology, but in her new devotion she was still considered a “creature”
who must earn her “wretched livelihood.” There is no mention of the woman
having received baptism in the letter, and Menard made no further mention of her
in the narrative. She proved useful as an example of how the Jesuits could fulfill
God’s promise of salvation in the new world—a process that accepted the
manipulation of a mother’s weakness to sway even the spiteful Odawa. It is
worth noting here as well that in relating this information to Lalemont, Menard
offered information that could be used to arm other priests engaged in this
spiritual work. Menard embellished the narrative to show the potential of
targeting sick mothers to win converts. He described one of the Odawa woman’s
children, not even 2 years old by his estimation, observing his mother in prayer
before eating and raising his hand to his forehead as if to make the sign of the
cross. This attribution of complicated abstract thought by a dying child made for
an inspiring tale for Jesuits seeking to find a way to penetrate difficult and
unreceptive cultures.39
Another example of how the Jesuits recognized traditional gender roles
among the Odawa women can be seen in their manipulation of widows. Menard,
again writing to Lalement, counted two widows among those saved in New
France as worthy exemplars of conversion work. The first was an older woman
with 5 children who was concerned for the life of her 16-year-old daughter.
Menard wrote that she approached him and begged that, “…God might have pity
on her and restore her [the daughter’s] health, which she had lost some months
ago. She was suffering from a chronic catarrh…I made her pray, and then had her
bled…This induced the Mother to come with all her family and ask that they also
might pray to God.”40 Menard again set an example of how the Jesuits can gain
ground with the Odawa for the sake of conversion. Widows with older children
whose illnesses could be treated successfully opened the possibility of winning
converts. The other widow of note was much younger but no less vulnerable.
Her husband had been killed by an Iroquois six years prior, and she spent most of
her time with her mother. She also sought out the promise of the Jesuits and
became a convert. So ardent was her faith that Menard wrote that, “It seems as if
God chose her in the place of some Christian women of 3 Rivers…For she began
to serve God so fervently that the others left her; and she heeded my words and
the impulses of grace more than anything that deranged persons could say in their
ill humor.”41 Again, the Jesuits saw the potential in the manipulation of women in
vulnerable positions. Desperation led them to seek out salvation in this world and
the next, even if it meant renouncing their own culture and embracing the Catholic
faith. The desire for the Christian promise and the aid of the Jesuits could create
lasting devotion, and this was a reality that the Jesuits willingly exploited to
further their efforts—all for the glory of God.
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Conversion Leads to Subjugation for Odawa Women
Once the Jesuits in New France found that manipulation of mothers and
widows offered them an opportunity to win over the Odawa, their perception of
those women who converted changed dramatically. The Jesuit perception of the
natives began with seeing them simply as savages to be converted. Their fates
were unimportant as long as ground could be gained for their heavenly purpose.
In approaching the Odawa nations, the Jesuits in New France encountered a
fiercely proud people who enjoyed their way of life and wished to continue doing
so. This created great disdain among the Jesuits for groups such as the Sinagaux
Odawa. Seeing vulnerable women, such as abandoned mothers and widows, the
Jesuits seized an opportunity to add numbers to the Christian populace. Without
being Christian, they were merely sinful and savage women who could pose
threats to men’s virtue. However, once conversion had been completed
satisfactorily with the Jesuits, another shift in their perception of Odawa women
took place. They became Christian women separated from their former identities.
They were proper Daughters of Eve, dangerously susceptible to the sins of the
New World and in need of protection.
To begin examining how this step in the evolution of Jesuit perception of
the Odawa took place, attention should be paid to a letter written by Jacques
Marquette. Marquette made it known just how determined the Odawa were to
maintain their culture, highlighting their use of “juggleries.” Jugglers were
medicine men, and Marquette wrote of an instance when a sick Kiskakonk Odawa
woman desired their assistance to cure her ailment. She asked for a specific
dance. This was a heathen act and entirely unacceptable in the presence of those
who had converted and become proper Christians. Marquette wrote, “I pointed
out to them this woman’s impiety as well as the juggler’s…An old Christian
immediately took the word, and told the Nation that the young people’s dissolute
conduct must be stopped, and that the Christian girls must never be permitted to
be present at those dances.” 42 Marquette’s preoccupation with the presence of
Christian girls being present as the medicine men performed their dance for the
ailing woman deserves attention. He was not concerned for this sick Odawa
woman. She was demanding a pagan ritual instead of seeking the healing powers
of God or his Jesuits. The whole scene must be made an example of sin, and it
was not the savages who put an end to it. It was an “old Christian” (presumably
an Odawa convert) who demanded the medicine men stop their ritual and let it be
known that Christian girls should never be exposed. Here again we see the old
divide between Christian and savage. Interestingly, though, there are members
among the Odawa who have converted and are no longer considered “creatures”
like the abandoned woman. The Jesuits won over Odawa female youth and
accepted them into the Christian fold. Their native identities were replaced with
Christian ones, and as Christian women, they were recognized to be more
susceptible to sin because of Eve’s sin in the Garden of Eden.
It is unfortunate that much of the commentary on Odawa women as
Christian women largely came from the reports of men speaking about women
with painfully limited insight tainted by religious sexism. Nevertheless, the
Jesuits’ documents were replete with examples of projecting Christian morality on
42
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women whose culture had always been reluctant to embrace the religion.
Nevertheless, the priests in their writing set up examples of the ideal converted
woman, and in many ways the criticisms of the sinful woman centered around
their sexual lives. In many instances, these two conceptions were often discussed
together, as if to make the agenda of conversion clearer. Examples of this
exaggerated holy woman do offer insight to how the Jesuits thought of Odawa
women in the 17th century. They revealed the religious lifestyle they were ordered
to impose on these native women, a lifestyle they should relish if they ever hoped
to be saved by God. For example, in speaking with a male neophyte that would
later completely convert, Father Menard noted a seemingly dangerous flaw. He
was unmarried. This surprisingly earned him respect after the Odawa male, later
baptized Louis, let his motivations for bachelorhood be known—He needed a
virtuous woman. Menard wrote of this man:
But I heard that he was not married, and I persuaded myself that he was
worse than those who were settled. I found here, however, that in fact he
was not so; and, what is more, that although he was sought after because
he was clever and belonged to a great family, he nevertheless rejected the
advances of all the girls or women who lived with him, and that they could
never draw any licentious or indecent word from him—so much so that
none amused themselves by importuning him in that direction.43
Louis was a particularly interesting neophyte in Menard’s eyes. He possessed the
spiritual strength to resist the sexual relations sinful women and girls wanted to
share with him, and he did it seemingly with enough ease that no one pushed the
matter on him. In Menard’s estimation, resisting the sexual advances of sinful
women could’ve also inspired the natives to convert. He stated of Louis, “…[He]
has excited the admiration of our savages by resisting, with a constancy unknown
among them, all the temptations of the spirit of impurity, which are probably as
frequent here as in any other place in the world.”44
When Menard questioned Louis as to why he has remained single, he was
equally impressed with his answer that he wished to marry a virtuous and
intelligent woman. He was especially pleased because Louis said he certainly did
not want to marry the kind of typical Odawa woman in that area. He related to
Menard:
’No, my Brother,’ he said; ‘but what I am resolved to do is not to live in
the fashion of my people, or to unite myself with any woman who has a
coarse mind, such as I find very common here in that sex. I will never
marry unless I find a chaste woman, who is not abandoned like those of
this country.45
Menard revealed here two specific details of the Jesuit perception of the Odawa
woman, perfected by Christian conversion, by including details of everything she
was not as a “savage.” The unconverted women and girls lacked intelligence and
practiced sexual debauchery. Only a “chaste woman,” a good Christian woman
43
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without sexual proclivities, could be considered a worthy wife.
Another discussion of ideal virtuous Odawa women, if they were ever
baptized, comes from Father Lalemont’s relation of 1662-64. The story told of a
more virtuous man being revered above the sinful-seeming unconverted Odawa
women. This virtuous man was none other than Jean Guerin, the companion to
Father Menard when he died, who became the missionary-in-chief. Lalemont
reported that while he lived among the Odawa, he engaged in solitary prayer
every morning, and the natives marveled at his ability to pray even during his
sleep in a mysterious fashion.46 Perhaps his greatest quality, however, was his
refusal to be tempted by the female natives. Lalemont stated,
“So reserved was he with women that he would not look them in the face.
When he tried to persuade his Companions to follow his example, they
used to answer him laughingly…wishing to reproach him with having let
the Savage women rob him of many things because of his unwillingness
to look at them.”47
Jean Guerin, who was not even a proper Jesuit or priest, provided an important
lesson in virtue to his companions. The Odawa and the French who lived among
them must have been aware the temptation of women.
Still, the unconverted were primarily seen as savages. The Jesuits in their
time in New France did not hesitate to prop up the virtuous Christian female
converts as prime models for other Odawa women to follow. This is perhaps best
seen in the report on an Algonquin woman named Tegahkouita, who was captured
by the Iroquois, otherwise known as Catherine, the Iroquois Saint. The Jesuits
touted Tegahkouita as the saintly model of the converted Odawa (and really, of all
Algonquin groups) woman. According to the report, she even embodied the spirit
of Christian duty in her captivity. For example, it is written that Tegahkouita had
a dislike for “all this finery which was appropriate to her sex.”48 Further, she
looked back on the times she obeyed her Iroquois parents (in wearing finery) and
considered it a sin. Upon conversion it is said that she willingly sought out
extreme penance and “almost continual tears.” 49 The fathers noted that even
during times when the rest of the natives would regularly engage in debauchery,
Tegahkouita saw an opportunity to know “early those of whom God wished to
make use, to conduct her to the highest degree of perfection.” Instead of engaging
with the other natives, she conducted herself with “modesty and sweetness” as she
assisted the missionaries.50 The story of Tegahkouita, in persevering in captivity
among the enemy, provided the sinful, savage, and uncoverted Odawa woman a
guidebook to proper Christian behavior and identity. It is ironic that Catherine
had to struggle to maintain her Algonquin identity among the Iroquois, only to
have the Jesuits exploit her and still manage to rob her of her cultural identity.
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Conclusion
The Jesuit relations with the natives in New France represented a key
portion of Native-French relations, and their religious imperialistic zeal has not
figured as much in the general historiography. Among native groups, the Odawa
have received considerably less scholarly attention, most likely because they
proved difficult partners in their relationship with the French. While most
histories of New France have painted these relationships as being more
harmonious compared to those with other European colonizers, the Jesuit
perception of native identity reveals a much more sinister reality. For the Odawa,
the Jesuits could not even conceive of them as proper humans while they
remained “savages” unreceptive to Christian teaching. This was so much the case
that Jesuits such as Jacques Marquette considered not even preaching to groups
like the Sinagaux Odawa. Odawa women opened the opportunity for the Jesuits
as they found them in vulnerable positions that could be exploited. Only with the
promise of conversion did they eventually recognize the women as women, and
immediately their attention turned back to their original purpose—conversion for
the salvation of souls and setting examples of proper female Christian conduct.
Despite the modern reader’s reaction, the Jesuits in New France in the 17th
century would claim these exploitations of culture and identity were worth it, even
if it meant disregarding Odawa identity—all for the glory of God.
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Bumblebee on Pink Milkweed
By Stephanie Leaver
Abstract: This photograph is a part of my photographic series called "Hive
Mind", which intimately explores the diminishing life of pollinators and
what would happen if they were to vanish from existence, as well as
accentuating the importance of pollinators, the pollinated, and their
relationship to each other. “Hive Mind” is not only directly related to
the term ‘hive’ (meaning a physical nest for bees), but also to the
concept of ‘hive mentality’—where all minds are linked into a single
collective consciousness and can feel and think the same. By having this
‘hive mentality’, it drives the idea of how this body of work is
influential into causing a uniform reaction from callousness to
compassion when it comes to acknowledging the importance of both
pollinators and the pollinated.
These photographs are displayed in a diptych sort of fashion, with
pollinator on top, and the pollinated on bottom. Each photograph can
also be used as stand alone works as well.
Although I am not a graduate student, environmental activism has been
my focus throughout my college experience in the art school. I am
incredibly blessed that I have been able to create this cohesive large
scale body of work at my time at Western Michigan University.
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Hoverfly on Bull Thistle
By Stephanie Leaver
Abstract: This photograph is a part of my photographic series called "Hive
Mind", which intimately explores the diminishing life of pollinators and
what would happen if they were to vanish from existence, as well as
accentuating the importance of pollinators, the pollinated, and their
relationship to each other. “Hive Mind” is not only directly related to
the term ‘hive’ (meaning a physical nest for bees), but also to the
concept of ‘hive mentality’—where all minds are linked into a single
collective consciousness and can feel and think the same. By having this
‘hive mentality’, it drives the idea of how this body of work is
influential into causing a uniform reaction from callousness to
compassion when it comes to acknowledging the importance of both
pollinators and the pollinated.
These photographs are displayed in a diptych sort of fashion, with
pollinator on top, and the pollinated on bottom. Each photograph can
also be used as stand alone works as well.
Although I am not a graduate student, environmental activism has been
my focus throughout my college experience in the art school. I am
incredibly blessed that I have been able to create this cohesive large
scale body of work at my time at Western Michigan University.
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Pink Milkweed
By Stephanie Leaver
Abstract: This photograph is a part of my photographic series called "Hive Mind",
which intimately explores the diminishing life of pollinators and what would
happen if they were to vanish from existence, as well as accentuating the
importance of pollinators, the pollinated, and their relationship to each other.
“Hive Mind” is not only directly related to the term ‘hive’ (meaning a physical
nest for bees), but also to the concept of ‘hive mentality’—where all minds are
linked into a single collective consciousness and can feel and think the same. By
having this ‘hive mentality’, it drives the idea of how this body of work is
influential into causing a uniform reaction from callousness to compassion when
it comes to acknowledging the importance of both pollinators and the pollinated.
These photographs are displayed in a diptych sort of fashion, with pollinator on
top, and the pollinated on bottom. Each photograph can also be used as stand
alone works as well. Although I am not a graduate student, environmental
activism has been my focus throughout my college experience in the art school.
I am incredibly blessed that I have been able to create this cohesive large scale
body of work at my time at Western Michigan University
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How to Make Cemetery Tea
By Lauren Coyne
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How to Make Cemetery Tea

This is the perfect recipe to make on sunny, summer, Saturday mornings when
you have a few hours to spare. September mornings when the fog starts rolling
in, but before the temperatures get too cold, are also a great time to make it if
you want a stereotypical spooky ambiance to help enhance the recipe.
Ingredients
1 formerly abandoned cemetery full of tombstones
3 gallons of distilled water*
6 soft-bristled toothbrushes*
1 heart full of compassion and patience
*Depending on the state of the cemetery and how many residents it holds, this
amount might need to be adjusted.
Time needed
As much as you are willing to give considering this is a weekend morning when
you could have just slept in instead.
Instructions
1. Enter the cemetery and locate a suitable tombstone. These can be
distinguished as having indecipherable inscriptions due to factors such as
coverings of dirt, moss, or bird droppings, rather than age.
2. Pour a small amount of distilled water over the tombstone, making sure to
concentrate most of the flow over the parts with inscriptions. Brush the stone
with the toothbrush using similar motions to how you would brush your own
teeth.
3. Contemplate what would happen if you actually brushed your teeth with the
now dirty toothbrush. Decide that it would probably turn your teeth that same
shade of green from the weird Shrek-themed ketchup you saw once from a
movie promotion for Shrek 2. Shudder at the mental image.
4. When the toothbrush bristles are completely coated green, dip the brush into
the opening of the water gallon and swirl it around until the bristles are clean
again.
5. Remove the brush and swirl the water itself, admiring how it looks like what
you assume green tea would look like if you actually drank tea. Contemplate
drinking from the gallon, and decide it isn’t worth the probable consequences.
Especially if it does, indeed, taste like tea.
6. Repeat steps 2 through 4 until the tombstone looks legible and mostly clean,
except this time try to determine whether that is the letter “O” or “D” on the
name part of the inscription. Decide it is probably the letter “D,” because
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“Oamien Oanielson” doesn’t actually sound like a real name—even accounting
for the fact that people used to be named some really weird things in the past.
Things like “Prudence,” “Agamemnon,” and “Fanny.”
7. Pour the remainder of the first gallon of water over the tombstone and give
yourself a satisfied nod and metaphorical pat on the back at how clean it now
looks.
8. Shuffle a few feet to the right so that you find yourself kneeling in front of
the next tombstone.
9. Huff in disgust at the blatant disrespect for the dead when you find that the
tombstone is knocked over, probably by some hooligans, and decide to set it
back upright. Grip the tombstone in both hands. Start wiggling it and trying to
prise it from where it has sunk slightly into the ground, much like how you
would wiggle a loose tooth you were trying to prise from its spot in your gums.
Give your past self a thank-you at having the foresight to trim your nails the
prior evening, because otherwise these actions would get a lot of dirt under your
fingernails, and that stuff is not fun trying to clean out.
10. Go back to step 8 when you hear hissing and see beady eyes and flicking
tongues peeking out from beneath the stone and realize that you are in the
process of taking the roof off a snake nest. Never speak or think of step 9 again,
and vow to skip that step in all subsequent attempts to make cemetery tea.
Except for the part about the nails, because you are still immeasurably proud of
your past self for thinking ahead like that.
11. Repeat steps 6 through 8 until you run out of either ingredients or
tombstones, changing the contemplations from step 6 to subjects such as:
-Why is the black moss so much more difficult to clean off than the green moss?
-Is that little statuette missing its head supposed to be a cat, or a lamb? (Decide
it is a lamb, since after the inscriptions on the stone it is attached to are fully
legible you realize that the person it belongs to was less than three years old
when they died.)
-Is the person buried here related to your fourth-grade bully, since they have the
same last name? If they are related, then does this count as more proof that your
bully was a terrible person, since they’ve left maintenance of their family
member’s final resting place up to a volunteer? Or would the relationship be so
distant that it doesn’t really count?
-Why are these epitaphs so much cooler sounding than any poetry you could
possibly write yourself?
-Where should you get lunch after this?
-Is that a dug-up skull over there, or just a very round and white rock?
-If your roommate hasn’t cleaned their dishes from the sink by the time you get
home, should you eat their last pudding cup as a form of revenge?
-Can you count all these steps your Fitbit is giving you because of your moving
arms as part of your actual exercise for the day, or should you just suck it up
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and go on an actual walk later?
-Why were tombstones so much cooler looking back in the day than they are
now?
12. Wipe your brow and sigh in satisfaction of a job well done before gathering
up all your refuse, since littering is bad. Especially littering in a cemetery.
13. Swirl the two inches or so of green water left in your last gallon and
contemplate once more how much it looks like what you assume tea looks like.
Pour it on the ground in front of the last tombstone you worked on and pretend
that you’re pouring out libations for whoever is buried there. Some woman
named Bailey, apparently? At least, you think they’re a woman. Bailey is
technically gender-neutral, after all.
14. Walk out of the cemetery gate, intending to head for home, but pause at the
last second and look back. Contemplate your own mortality, and wonder if these
people, whoever they were and wherever their souls may be now, would be
upset that a total stranger was the one taking care of their earthly remains. Or
would they be happy that someone, anyone, still cared about them after all this
time?
15. Go home and wash your hands thoroughly in the thankfully dish-free sink,
and give your past self yet another pat on the back for their foresight with the
whole nails thing. As hard as it is right now to get all the mud and green stains
off, you know it would be ten times harder if your nails were as long as they
were last night.
Serving size
No one should ever actually drink cemetery tea, except for possibly the grateful
dead if that really did count as pouring libations. Hopefully if it did, then the
“it’s the thought that counts” principle was in full effect, because you can’t
imagine that cemetery tea would taste good. Not even to the deceased.
Possibly it would taste worse than actual tea, which is gross enough on its own.
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Two Poems
By Lauren Coyne
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1. Painting the World Anew
time stopped in the airport terminal
just as I stepped in after you,
like a proper novice
after a master
(or so you claimed)
and when I turned around, I saw
a brush,
acrylic paints,
and a note that told me
Paint the world anew.
I took time to revel in the palette
of infinite choices
and colors once unseen
by human eyes.
then with smooth strokes I blended
unpolluted greens and blues
to shade Earth’s marbled sphere.
I stippled reds and browns
for higher, craggy mountains,
their peaks dabbed gray
with swirling storms.
I detailed with a white-tipped brush
the delicate strands of
spider webs,
wisps of smoke,
and veins of crisp leaves
curling like children’s fingers.
I did not age as I worked
nor did I grow hungry
or thirsty
or weary
or start to forget.
so I felt no guilt
when I painted the things
that were solely mine.
I painted Todd’s beard,
though it scratched me
when I nuzzled his cheek
and breathed in his spicy scent
that last time
when I kissed him
goodbye.
I painted Sam’s tattoo,
referencing a show I never watched,
the way it peeked from their sleeves
when they played piano
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and the notes tapered off
like their texts back to me.
I painted Alyssa
with her beautiful nails,
pink-tipped on our anniversary
when she confessed her infidelity,
red on her wedding day
where I witnessed as a bridesmaid.
I painted it all
admired it
and cleaned up my brush
once my task was through.
and this morning when I left that terminal,
I paused, only briefly,
to wonder
are you proud of my technique?
you, self-proclaimed master,
my unwanted critic,
who disguised condescension
as a compliment.
are you proud
of how I took your lessons to heart
on how coated primer can cover mistakes
and unwanted accidents
no matter how big they are?
(or would you be,
if I hadn’t practiced, first,
on you?)
but then the thought,
and the memories of painting
and of the note
(and of you)
washed away like the water
used to clean my brush
down the sink.
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2. Tsunami
The curtain is beautiful, and ancient, and cool to the touch
With its gradients of blues and greens
Edged in a gentle, foamy white.
The stage is sanded and the props set just so,
With chairs placed beneath umbrellas
With the coolers and balls in place
Easily accessible for the climax
Where you spike the ball
And toast your victory
With Coors.
But then you hear the overture begin to play, and
The roaring cheers from the gathered crowd.
You feel the noise in the soles of your feet
And your knees go weak
And you start to sway
And you see
The curtain
Rise.
You flee the set and don’t dare risk looking back,
So you miss your co-stars’ costume failures
As they lose their floppy hats,
And strappy sandals,
And the odd shoe.
You don’t stop, in your flight, to wonder about those fellow co-stars,
Who among them might be tangled in the rising curtain?
Or trying to salvage an expensive prop?
Or fleeing alongside you?
Or staying behind?
You’ll find out in tomorrow’s front-page headlines
And make a solemn vow to never, ever
Pursue a job in theatre again
Since your stage fright
Is so terrible.
And you’ll send off some quick emails
To concerned family and friends
And to the play’s director
And hope to God
It is enough
And that the director, his suit the darkest black,
His face, so grim and grinning,
Pale, and white
Like bones
Won’t come in person to persuade
Or try and call you back
Until you feel ready.
And you hope
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You won’t.
Not for many years to come.
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784 Grams
By Stephanie A. Kurzenhauser
Abstract: This poem elucidates my experience of grief and loss in response to breast
cancer and a bilateral mastectomy without reconstruction.
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784 Grams
I’ll try on the fuchsia one first.
My daughter has always told me I look so pretty
wearing it,the thin shoulder straps descending to a
flowered bodice with puckered stitching cradling
my breasts.
The liberation of a summer dressuncloaking skin
and body,
reflecting the beauty of womanhood in mirrorsor in
the beseeching eyes of a beloved.
Keeping my eyes pinched closed,
I ease the cotton fabric over my head and pull it
down.The dress is on.
Suddenly, I feel like I’m at a hair salon,
the chair about to be spun around for a climactic
reveal.Turning my body and opening my gaze,
I realize I’m stiffly holding the reservoir of my
breath.
I survey what I see before me,willing the breath’s
return.
My first inhalation is sharp and cold,followed by a
hot, long exhalation - a novella in each respiration.
I’ll need a big cardboard box.
I could ask my daughter if she’d like any of the
clothing.
She usually loves to wear my things
but maybe these would feel like prickly bursagainst
her skin,
or make her cry.
Donation is probably the best bet.
I raise my hands up to my chest,the emptiness
billowing out.
Pressing against bony sternum and upper ribs,my
palms compress
pockets of air
with whole universes of grief inside them.
My 329 gram left breast and 455 gram right breast
were fixed in formalin and delivered to the pathologist,
histologic type and tumor size
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carefully assessed and recorded with precision.
Were any words of solemnity or prayer uttered in
the lab that day?
My fingers trace the raised surfaces of the scars, and
I can see the pulsing of my heart.
The incision lines are a soft red in color, close to
Crayola’s “Madder Lake” hue that was retired from
the portfolio in 1935 and long since forgotten.
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Pollination
By Lauren Coyne
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Pollination
You do not love Ran. Not the way that stories say. In poetry that men and
women croon at the capitol during Founding Festivals, or in songs so syrupysweet and dripping with embellishments that even Ran refuses to dance to the
tunes. Songs where humans like her and dragons like you forsake their families
and deny their pasts just for a single night together, or charge their suitors with
impossible tasks in order to prove their love, or uproot entire gardens just to find
that single, perfect rose. Worst of all are those tales of Mallea’s founding, which
tell of the star-crossed love between the newly ascended goddess of plants and
god of animals. Of how the new goddess created that precious flower, and the
new god helped her Pollinate it, and her humanity mixed with his dragon to create
a hybrid: the first dragonskin who became the new country’s first king. Of how it
was only possible due to the great love the deities had for one another.
You do not love Ran that way.
But you do feel… something for her. You know Ran’s moods—when you
can get away with scuffing up her hardwood floors because you just can’t stand
confining your claws within shoes for one second more, and when it would be
better to just suck it up a bit longer unless you want to bear the disgrace of your
claws falling to her shears. When she will be delighted by the smell of petrichor
and drag you out to dance upon the dewy garden grass, or when it will make her
so sick for home that the only way to cure her is to warm a basin of sand with
your fire and bury her feet within it while you wrap her in a cotton cloak and hold
her until the tears stop.
You know Ran’s secrets—that she feigned a sprained ankle so she could
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get out of dancing in front of that egotistical ambassador from the neighboring
country without causing him insult and potentially starting a war. That she cannot,
for the life of her, get the perfect ratio of seasonings for roasting poultry despite
growing the best basil and garlic in the land. That she laced her village elder’s cup
with tasteless poison before she finally left her desert homeland and settled in
Mallea for good, and that she still, even so many years later, can’t decide which
motive mattered to her more; was it sheer pragmatism, the need for the villagers
to gain new perspective and fresh ideas since she refused to join her predecessors
in an early grave? Or was it the burning need for justice and revenge on the elder
who refused to open her mind to new solutions for the village’s survival back
when the situation was less dire and more resources were available?
You know Ran’s routines—that she spends the first day of the week is for
washing and mending the costumes and shoes she wore out dancing for the two
days before, so that she can spend the second day walking through the
marketplace to break them in while searching out good deals on new materials, or
on wholesale shoes if the mending was unsuccessful. That she won’t actually buy
anything until the third day of the week, after she’s gotten a good idea of the
prices and seen what the merchants have to offer, so she can buy supplies or fill in
gaps in the marketplace by selling her own seedlings, spices, and prized cuttings.
That she alternates her day of rest between the fourth and fifth day based on your
own indulging of the current king’s missions and plans, so she can, as she claims,
“be prepared for any nonsense or animal carcasses you drag in here, because I
don’t care how full of iron and nutrients it is, Den, I am not going to eat that thing
raw!”
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This is why yesterday, the fourth day of this week, you brought her a
fresh-killed goose. You even plucked it for her, and drained it of blood—which
you did not do by drinking it straight, because that is not and never has been a
thing that dragons do, thank you very much Ran. You left the feathers in the
offering basket, patterned in its riot of colors, and the goose in the plain one
slightly hidden behind the bush, so she would know it was from you. This gave
her the time she needed to pull up a double harvest of garlic and onions, to decide
whether basil or sage would complement it better, and to weigh whether lemons
or oranges would be more in demand on the morrow. Then this morning she
brought it all to market to try and convince someone else to dress and cook the
goose for her, claiming that of course she could do it herself, but that it was just
so time consuming when she still had so much to do in the marketplace that it
simply made more sense to offer someone else wanting a poultry dinner the use of
her extra, high-quality ingredients if they agreed to cook her bird along with
theirs. In the meantime, you entered the smaller, more personal garden behind her
home, intending to pull in the sun-dried laundry, sort it, and set the table to her
standards so that you could eat while the goose was still warm and the fat
sizzling—the flavor of the seasoning a fair compromise for not getting to eat the
goose raw and feel the slowing vibrations of its dying heart against your teeth.
But as you surveyed the garden, looking for where she put the new
clothesline after the old one finally broke, you couldn’t help but glance back into
the far corner where you’d helped her set up the memorial—the small shrine for
all those lost in the course of Mallea’s founding set in the midst of a small patch
of the flowers that made that founding possible—and all your plans rapidly
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changed when you saw one of the flowers glowing.
“You better not have used my good tablecloth,” Ran states the moment
she closes the door. Like the dancer she is, she removes her colorful, cotton cloak
with a twirl and flourish before hanging it on the hook beside your fur-trimmed
one. Wordlessly you take her empty bags to fold and put in their proper places by
the back door while she moves to place the plain basket, the mouth-watering scent
of the cooked goose emanating from within, onto the side table in the kitchen
where she usually has you carve the meat you bring her. When you join her after
putting her things away, it’s to the sight of her rummaging through her cutlery
drawers and huffing in annoyance. She spies you from the corner of her eyes as
you sit down at the other small table in the room, the one designated for eating,
and turns to give you a fierce glare.
“If you were going to come in here uninvited, Den, the least you could’ve
done was get things prepared for dinner!”
“I brought you the main course,” you say pointedly, gesturing toward the
goose.
“Yes, and left me to get it cooked! And don’t,” she turns on a heel to point
a menacing finger at you, “tell me that we could have just eaten it raw, because
you know that’s not an option for me.”
You lift your hands in surrender and her glare softens a bit as she turns
back around to continue her search. “The knives are by the sink,” you remind her
for the thousandth time, and she grunts out her thanks as she closes her current
drawer and saunters toward where you directed. But the clinking and clanking of
the cutlery resumes for only a moment before she stills, and a deadly silence
116

permeates the air. Slowly her gaze shifts to the side and her slim hand reaches for
the trowel you put in the sink. She draws it closer and studies the muddy tip, the
coating of dirt still clinging to the handle. Then she places it back down with a
calmness that belies the anger you knew would grow within her when she finally
noticed the tool, burning hotter than even your own fire.
“Den,” she demands. “Did you take a plant from my garden?”
“Yes,” is your simple answer, and she all but explodes in rage.
“How dare you!” she shrieks, stalking toward you. “You know what that
place means to me! What those plants mean to me! I give you permission to enter
those sacred grounds, and this is how you repay me? By uprooting something
from my garden?”
You meet her angry gaze steadily and answer with calmness, “Take a look
at just what plant it is.”
Her eyes quickly flick over, desperate to find any scrap of rationality to
your actions. And by the way she does a double-take and stares at the plant you
removed from the garden, you know that they, too, must have caught the glow
you did earlier.
“Oh,” she says in honest shock, taking in the sight of the glowing flower
sitting there so innocently in its new pot. Then, “…Oh,” she says again, as its
species finally registers, along with what it means for it to glow the way it is.
Slowly one hand reaches out to cup the smooth petals, while the other
weakly gropes around for the table’s second chair. When Ran finally finds it she
sinks down, near boneless.
There is debate, you know, over the proper name for the flower. Some call
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it a “peace-flower,” for the role it played in the country’s founding. Others say
that’s just a happy coincidence of pronunciation, and it is properly a “pieceflower,” after the common belief that everyone and everything is only a small
piece of a greater being, and that one day, when there is nothing else to learn, that
being will pull all those pieces together and reform itself again. Foreigners
typically call them “glass flowers,” due to how translucent the petals are before
Pollination, and that process is also why you’ve heard it jokingly referred to as
“Mallean Baby’s Breath.” But you’ve never cared that much what it is called; not
when you first heard the debates over the name, and even less now, as you watch
Ran fuss over the one you placed on her table.
You aren’t entirely sure what she’s looking for as she flattens out the
softly glowing petals with delicate fingers and gently lifts leaves to view their
undersides, but the familiar motions stir something inside you. The care she takes
with this flower, all the while knowing the potential it holds… but you quickly
quash the feeling down. It only makes sense for her to worry over the plant, in a
way that has nothing to do with its current status. Though she conceded your right
to remove it from her garden, as you did help her Pollinate it, you both know that
it was only with great reluctance, and that she won’t feel comfortable until she
ensures its general wellbeing.
“It seems all right,” Ran finally concludes, wiping her hands on her skirt
before sitting down again and folding them in front of her on the table. “But it
would have been better if you’d just left it in the garden to show me after we’d
eaten. I know I’ve told you before about the dangers of replanting.”
You briefly dip your head, acknowledging the point. It is a good one. You
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still don’t know all that much about plant care, but she has lectured you many a
time and made it abundantly clear that even if you have a good reason to move a
plant, the process still stresses them. And it isn’t like this specific flower would
have been in any danger for the duration of a meal. For one thing, it was growing
in Ran’s private garden. No one is allowed in there save you and her. The people
of the town consider it to be something akin to those temples that other deities
have in bigger cities—though you suspect they don’t realize Ran is so much more
than a mere priestess taking care of the garden as a way of paying homage to the
plant goddess—so not even the lowest thieves would dare enter without
permission. As for any opportunistic animals, it only took one incident of you
putting the fear of, well, yourself in them before they decided it was in their best
interests to stay away. But that aside, you are still fairly certain that this particular
flower would have been safe either way.
The result of the first Pollination was a flower whose once-clear and
glassy petals changed to glowing swirls of white and crimson, blending together
at times into the pale pink tones of a newborn’s delicate skin. The dragons who
saw it grinned, their blood-stained teeth gleaming with pleasure at the shade, sure
that the colors signified that the soul of their future monarch would be that of a
fierce warrior who could rend and tear and make their kingdom’s enemies bleed
even though they would have the dull, white teeth of a human. The humans shed
tears of hopeful relief, sure that, rather than blood, the red shades of the flower
meant that their future monarch would be gentle and kind, and would use fire like
a dragon’s to light the kingdom’s hearths. Humans and dragons both love to hoard
their beautiful things, and both groups wanted to touch it, and pluck its leaves and
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petals to keep for their own, selfishly basking in its glory. And while that would
have perhaps been an even more apt and ironic lesson, the ultimate proof that
humans and dragons were equally selfish and shortsighted and always had been, it
also would have been an impermanent one, as each side would have blamed the
other and continued the fighting and killing until only the deities who created and
helped Pollinate the ruined plant were left alive amidst the carnage. This is why
that flower did not leave the goddess’ grasp until the Clutch-Mother was prepared
for her human mate to feed it to her.
But no one would think to hoard this flower, or to even give it a second
glance. Where its sibling was striking, the colors adorning its petals in beautiful
contrast where they did not blend into a balanced shade, this one’s color speaks of
chaos incarnate. Too many hues to name, all mixing and melding together in a
way reminiscent to your last visit to the dyer’s hut, when Ran conscripted you to
help pull her cart piled with saffron and indigo to the market, and the two of you
watched the dye-master’s youngest son, a dragonskin like his mother, mix all the
different dye barrels together. Rather than the beautiful rainbow he’d hoped to
create, the result instead was a disgusting, muddy, greenish-brown color so dark it
was almost black. The boy’s mother scolded him for rendering the dye unusable,
but Ran had quickly turned back to the cart so she could hide a surreptitious
smile, pleased that the child had the desire and, more importantly, the opportunity
to experiment at all. Her hand lightly brushed yours as you handed her one of the
bundles of plants from the cart, and, once she was finally composed, she turned
back around and offered a slight discount if the dye-master bought the lot.
The two of you spent that evening in her more private garden, reminiscing
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in front of the memorial and its flowers. Remembering how long you’ve known
each other, and the journey it took to go from hating each other, to toleration
bordering on friendship, to what you have now. The good and bad, the hardships
and the triumphs. The way she laughed at your expression the first time you
forced yourself to wear a pair of shoes, and how you laughed at hers the first time
she tasted a lemon, before she realized they weren’t meant to be eaten whole. The
tears she shed when she realized that she’d outlived anyone who could have
known her from her old village, and the tears you shed yourself when it finally
sunk in just how awful your own people had been, and how badly you’d ravaged
the country whose remnants struggled together to form Mallea.
Looking back on that night now, you can’t help but wonder if that was the
moment when this flower’s Pollination began.
But you quickly banish these thoughts from your mind and offer Ran a
shrug. “What’s done is done.”
Ran studies you, taking in your impassive expression, before she rolls her
eyes and sighs. “So, what do you propose we do now, Den?”
When you tilt your head a silent query, she huffs and rolls her eyes again.
“It’s obvious you want to do something with it, otherwise you would have left it
alone. As I said earlier, I’ve already told you about the dangers of replanting. Not
only do you know better than to mess around with that sort of thing, you’ve also
never shown any real interest in gardening before.”
You glance at the glowing petals once more, before offering, “But this
isn’t exactly an ordinary flower, now, is it?”
“That’s a poor excuse, and you know it.”
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You say nothing.
Ran stares at your expression again, then looks to the flower. Her gaze
drops to her folded hands before she says, slowly, as if testing out the words, “We
could just… do nothing. Leave it be in the pot. Pollination doesn’t fade unless the
flower dies, after all, and it’s not like it can’t survive there just as well as outside,
not with me looking after it.”
“But you’ve said it yourself that sometimes even the most perfect
replanting can go awry,” you quickly point out. “Just because it looks
okay now doesn’t mean it will stay that way.”
You hear the tap of dull, human fingernails on wood and wince internally,
knowing that you’ve given something away. You glance at Ran’s slim, drumming
fingers and then back up to see the smirk growing on her face.
“Then who did you have in mind to eat it, and carry the child?”
You swallow roughly, looking to where your own hands have folded
themselves in your lap. “I… perhaps… the crown princess? Or her wife? It would
be good, I think, for this child to grow up with their kin.”
Ran’s smirk doesn’t fade, but her eyes do widen a bit in surprise, before
they soften and look back at the flower.
Neither of you like to talk about it much, the fact that part of why you both
hate those stories of the deities’ star-crossed love is because of just how false they
are. Back then, when the two of you finally realized that you were more than mere
human and dragon, you had barely moved from hatred to mere toleration. The
only opinion you shared was that the madness had to stop. The warring between
human and dragons on this continent was so bad and the casualties on both sides
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so high that the former kingdoms had collapsed, and neither of you wanted it to
spread or claim what family you had left. And if you had to do so by utilizing
your new rank as deities and hatching a crazy plan, then so be it. A child who held
claim to both species, was raised by both species, could act as a bridge and
rallying point to draw everyone together and keep a peace. And even though that
peace would likely be tenuous before the child grew up and could stand on their
own, no one would risk angering a deity by harming their offspring—even if said
offspring wasn’t actually raised by them. So Ran created the flower and you
helped her Pollinate it, and then the two of you handed it off to the chosen parents
who would bear the resulting child into the world and raise it as their own, despite
it not being related to them by blood.
That royal line remains unbroken to this day, and as long as it does so you
will be the however many greats-grandfather to the ruler and their heirs. Since the
child who is born from this flower—if, indeed, a child is born at all—will be the
blood sibling of that first king, they, too, would share kinship with the royal line,
however distant they may be this many generations apart and no matter who
consumes the petals.
“Also,” you finally continue, “The princess already has a dragonskin
child, and a flower-born one, at that. And even though Mallea is well-established
and at peace, it is always good to have another heir, especially one who could
remind the people of their heritage. Not to mention—”
“—That a placement like that would allow us to be able to see the child on
a regular basis, and to watch them grow up?” Ran cuts you off, though not
unkindly, her voice soft and knowing. “That would be nice,” she agrees.
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Your eyes flick back to hers—or, at least, they try to. The action is made
rather difficult by the fact that she’s still steadfastly looking at the flower. But
from what little you can glimpse, you can tell that behind her eyes she’s replaying
the memory you did, earlier, of that dragonskin child attempting to create a
rainbow, and the evening that followed. “But, if that’s the case, then why bother
with the middleman?” she asks, a slight tremble to her voice.
You give a start. “Ran?”
She takes a fortifying breath and looks straight into your eyes. “The world
is different now, Den. We’re different. That first time, what let us Pollinate that
flower was our shared resolve to keep our peoples safe, and ensure a better future
for everyone. Nothing more. But this time… this time I think what let us Pollinate
it was… well, us. Don’t you agree?”
She waits for you to think about it, and then, finally, “I don’t feel for you
the way the stories about us always say,” you warn her, your voice trembling and
your heart beating hard in your chest.
“I don’t either,” she admits, a wry smile on her lips.
You hold her gaze a few moments longer, wondering if your baby will
share those eyes, before you release a breath and tell her “Then… I think you’re
right.”
Ran stays silent, but her smile widens as she breaks your gaze and lifts one
hand to steady the flower in its pot. Her other hand she holds out to you,
demanding, and you take it in one of your own without hesitation. She studies the
flower, her eyes quickly flicking this way and that, before she finds what she’s
looking for and they settle. Only then does she drop your hand and meet your
124

gaze once more.
“Cut it here,” she orders, gently brushing the green stem at a point right
above the highest visible node beneath the glowing blossom.
You shift your gaze to the indicated spot. Your other hand moves to join
hers where she holds the pot, ensuring more stability while you perform this
delicate task. The newly-freed one, with only the barest unsheathing of your
claws, pinches the stem between your thumb and forefinger in the indicated spot,
cutting off the blossom from the stem. A line of warmth runs down to your palm
from the pooling sap between your fingers, and you swear you can feel a gentle
energy, the shared promise it holds for you and the woman whose hand you still
hold.
“Den.”
You shift your gaze away from the glowing petals and look into Ran’s
eyes—wide, soft, and hopeful, like your own—as you dutifully place the newlycut flower on her outstretched tongue. She pulls it within her mouth and chews
the petals once, twice, and swallows. Her eyes close and she gives a soft gasp as
the energy the flower contained disperses and resettles in the proper place,
making her shiver. A bit of sap leaks to the corner of her mouth, and you watch as
it slowly loses its glow. Her fingers come up to wipe it off, and then they trail
down until her hand rests over the place where her child now grows. Her other
hand remains warm in yours, despite having moved them away from the pot, as
the two of you sit, watching where she idly rubs her belly, almost as if you could
already see externally the changes happening within. You would be content to
stay like this until such things became a reality, if not for a sudden gurgling sound
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breaking the contented silence.
You look up at Ran’s face and your brow quirks in amusement with her
sudden blush at the audible sign of her hunger, and you quickly miss the warmth
when her hand finally pulls away from yours.
“Well don’t just sit there,” she says. “We would have already finished
eating by now if you weren’t so impatient, and now the goose is probably stonecold! Make yourself useful for once and go heat it back up while I set the table.”
“Of course.” You grin at her as you stand up, acquiescing to her demands.
“It is good I brought you a goose this time. They are full of proteins, fats, and
oils—all good things needed for a healthy gestation.”
Ran startles a bit, blushing again, and then gets an odd look on her face.
Her eyes widen at some internal realization, and then narrow at you in a glare. “If
one of my cravings turns out to be raw flesh, you’re getting a punch in the face.”
You throw back your head and bark out a laugh. “I look forward to it!”
You still do not love Ran. Not the ways the stories say, or the poets croon.
But only because what you do feel for her, and what you know is already growing
for your child, is so much better.
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World Upside Down
By Kevin Fitton
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World Upside Down
It was during our sophomore year at Michigan State when Kyleigh started
calling us the Crew. Not the most original name in the world, but to us it meant
something. The essence of the Crew was the Ethos—and this came from Kyleigh
as well. The first part of the Ethos was about being adventurous. We were up for
whatever shit was going down, and if nothing was going down, we made
something happen. The second part of the Ethos was that we took care of one
another, although I’ll be honest in saying that Kyleigh was the one who really
took care of everyone else.
By sophomore year, we had access to alcohol through Derek (a 22-yearold junior) and a party house. Kyleigh’s parents are loaded, and they bought her
an off-campus house, where she lived with her best friend, Sara, and a couple
other girls.
Out of all of us, Kyleigh had the least at stake. Her parents had money,
and I mean serious money. I think she felt guilty about that, which is at least part
of the reason she did the whole thing at Shain Park. But I’ll get to that in a minute.
Point is, she could have coasted. My dad is an auto mechanic, and I paid for my
own degree in construction management. Well, borrowed for my degree. But
Kyleigh was really into her classes. Sometimes, you could tell that she was deep
in thought, even while we were walking to the Quality Dairy to load up on booze.
She was a sociology major, and that was a different sort of education. It was about
learning to think, about understanding the world. She would go on these rants
about things, about everything that was wrong with our society: structural racism,
the corruption in our political system, all of the shit that women go through in our
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world.
Despite everything I knew about Kyleigh, though, I was shocked when I
saw her in the news.
It was two years since graduation, and we were still in touch, still hanging
out. It was summer, and we spent weekends at her parents’ place, lounging at the
pool and drinking White Claws. They have this ridiculous set-up with two pools
side by side: a four-lane lap pool and then another pool that’s even bigger, curved,
with a diving board on one end, and a big slide on the other (which is amazing
when you’re high—just saying).
There were a couple of things that seemed different about her that
summer. She was running a lot for one thing. She did a 10k, was signed up for a
half marathon, and was throwing around the idea of running a full. I don’t know
the right way of saying this without sounding like an ass, but she had always been
a little bit heavier. She wasn’t fat but she wasn’t thin either. Big boned. That’s
probably the less shitty way of saying it. So I just figured the exercise thing was a
gambit to lose a few pounds. And maybe it was. But she was also taking action.
And then there was what she was reading. I brought a novel to the pool
with me most of the time, usually a Brad Thor thriller. She had always been into
heavier stuff. I don’t remember most of the authors, but I remember Roxanne Gay
and some guy whose name sounded like Lip Shits. But now she was reading the
Bible. Poolside. When I asked her about it, she said Jesus was the greatest moral
philosopher in human history, that Gandhi and Martin Luther King were both
inspired by Jesus, and maybe I should get a copy. I do have one. I just don’t
consider the Bible a summer beach read.
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What bothered me is that she didn’t tell me about it. Clearly, she had been
thinking and planning. In the construction world, everything is about planning and
sequencing, and so I know that things like this take time. She got a permit from
the city of Birmingham, a swanky Detroit suburb where she was living with her
parents, and she built the huge sign and standing board. This was something she
had been thinking about, probably for months. And the whole time, not a peep,
not a word. I find out when my friend forwards me an article from the Oakland
Press, and I’m like, what the fuck?
I saw the article when I was at a job site. I was waiting for the electrician
to show. The homeowner wanted to add a couple of outlets. I was planning on
walking the electrician through the changes, but when I saw the article, I bolted.
The construction site was way out in Milford, following the city’s never-ending
movement to the north and west, so it was a good forty minutes before I parked
my truck, pulling within a foot of the Mercedes in front of me.
At first, I didn’t notice anything unusual. The park was clean. White
sidewalks contoured the green grass. The grass was lush, carefully trimmed, the
strange mixture of natural and unnatural in a perfect lawn. The bandstand was
empty, the park benches full.
Kyleigh was in front of the Freedom Sculpture. There was a small crowd
gathered around her, but I could still see her. She was standing on her head on one
of those blue wrestling matts. Her body leaned against the standing board, her
arms braced like trusses.
I lingered in the back of the crowd. I knew from the article that she was
standing on her head for five minutes out of every hour, and she was going for
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twelve hours every day. From eight to eight. For a couple of days, she left her
standing board up overnight, but kids vandalized it, leaving her spray-painted
messages: Blow Me (written upside down, which was kind of funny) and other
vulgarities, so she started bringing it home every night and setting it back up
every morning.
The standing board was eight feet by eight feet, two sheets of plywood
painted black and supported by some two-by-fours on the reverse. It was
positioned in front of the Freedom Sculpture at the center of the park, but it only
covered the bottom of the towering sculpture: two bronzed figures, male and
female, flying away. She would tell me later that it was intentional, juxtaposing
herself against the sculpture. While the two figures reached for the sky, backs
arched, as if they were about to take flight, she was stuck to the ground,
gravitationally fixed to this planet and its set of problems.
There was also a sign in front of the standing board. At the top, it said,
“World Upside Down.” Below was a chalkboard where people were writing
things that they wished were different about the world, and unlike the vandals,
people were taking this seriously. That first day I arrived on the scene it was
eleven in the morning, and it was already covered with words and phrases:
“people starving, war, living wage, racism, distorted food system, bad teachers.” I
loved the last one. I imagined some pissed-off third grader letting it rip.
Someone was counting down the time. Ninety seconds. Sixty seconds. I
moved closer, and it’s the weirdest thing, but when a person is upside down, you
can’t read their eyes. I didn’t know if she saw me until she was upright. She got
down from her standing board with a flip, stood up, and this guy who was
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counting her down held her shoulder while she steadied herself.
There was a line of admirers, and she dealt with each one while I waited
on the side. It was twenty minutes before I got her attention.
“Wow,” I said. I’ll admit, it was a little sarcastic.
“See? That’s why I didn’t tell you.”
“All that time, sitting at the pool, and not a word.”
While we were arguing, Shoulder-boy was still hanging around. He was
behind the standing board but visible, like a kid who’s terrible at hide-and-seek.
He was one of those guys with long hair who’s chronically tucking it behind their
ears.
Kyleigh took a breath. “I didn’t tell you, because I didn’t want you to talk
me out of it.”
“Why would you think that?”
“Because I know you.”
“Well,” I said. “Maybe you don’t.”

There was this thing that happened senior year, a couple of months before
graduation, and it was still hovering over our relationship. It was like when
moisture gets between two panes of glass and there’s no way to get it clean.
It had been brewing for a while, at least for me. The more I got to know
Kyleigh, the more attractive she became. She was pretty. And smart. And kind. If
you needed help with something, or if you were having a hard time, she was the
first person you called. And I know that kindness might not sound like the sexiest
thing in the world, but it kind of is.
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The thing is, I didn’t know how to tell her. With friends, the stakes are
higher, and I just kept putting it off, until one night when we were both drunk.
The sad part is, even then, I didn’t really say anything. I didn’t declare myself.
We were sitting next to one another on this old sagging couch, and we were
basically falling into one another, hip to hip, laughing, and drinking. It was a
warm day, and the crowded house kept getting hotter and hotter. Finally, I took
her hand, and we walked to the porch. She hopped onto the railing, so we were
face-to-face, and I leaned in and kissed her.
In the morning, I was hung over. My head ached. But that was nothing
compared with the awkwardness. Kyleigh was embarrassed. She got dressed
under the covers. She barely said a word.
Walking home, I started getting angry. I would have understood if she
would have said, “Hey, that was great, but I just want to be friends.” But she was
acting like it was the biggest mistake in the world—like I was the biggest mistake
in the world.
I don’t know why my reaction to her is to get angry, but with Kyleigh,
that’s where I go. So when I left Shain Park, I was pissed. I was mad that she
didn’t tell me what she was planning and mad that she was right—I would have
tried talking her out of it. And if I’m really going to bare my soul here, the truth is
I was jealous—jealous of Shoulder-boy and everyone else who was receiving her
attention. And I was mad at myself for being jealous.

The whole thing started really taking off the day I came to see her. Later, a
TV news crew came and interviewed her. They showed some video of her
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standing on her head and did a conversation piece.
She was articulate. She said that what she was trying to do was to get
people think about their lives. “More than anything else, World Upside Down is
about getting people’s attention,” she said. “I want to shake people up. I want
them to look at their lives differently—to take a different vantage point.” She
talked about how we so often follow the path of least resistance, like water
running downhill, but that she has felt challenged, from reading about Jesus, to
live a different kind of life.
Of course, they interviewed Shoulder-boy as well. Turns out his name is
Ash, and he carried on about Kyleigh and how he had found her when he was at
rock-bottom from a drug addiction. It was a great story, I guess, but I still wanted
to punch his stupid face.
Online, people did what they do. There were a lot of people praising
Kyleigh, but there are always haters. They said she was doing it for attention.
Some people attacked her because she said Jesus was a great moral teacher, and
they took offense. You’re wrong. He’s the Son of God. And then there were the
guys making their guy-comments. Either she was hot or fat. Or both.
And maybe this is why I didn’t vibe with what she was doing: because I
didn’t really think of people as fixable. Sure, there are people like Kyleigh, who
actually think about things and actively seek to live good and meaningful lives.
But those are few and far between. Most people simply don’t care. You can give
them all the information in the world, and they’re still going to shop at Amazon
and throw their plastic in the trash. They’re going to idle their car while they sit in
the drive-thru, pumping more and more carbon into the atmosphere as they wait
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for the burger and fries that will give them diabetes. Because the thing they want
more than anything else is comfort.
I couldn’t stay mad at Kyleigh. When I saw some of the things people
were saying about her online, I texted her and told her not to read the comments.
Things were busy at work, and I was driving all over the Detroit area, hitting job
sites from Dearborn to Dexter, but I still found time most days to stop by Shain
Park and bring her a cup of coffee. She was a total iced coffee addict, something
Shoulder-boy didn’t know about her.

That Saturday, when I showed up with coffee, she said I was a life saver.
She kept blinking while we talked. I could tell she wasn’t doing great. It was hot.
We were into the low nineties, and it was worse on the pavement where she was
still setting up for World Upside Down. It was mid-day, so her standing board
wasn’t offering any shade, and we hid under a nearby tree. A breeze kicked up,
which made it tolerable.
“How much longer are you going to do this?” I asked.
“As long as it takes.” She blew the damp hair out of her face.
“To accomplish what?”
“I don’t know. To feel like I’ve done something, like people have heard
me.”
She was wearing her standard Upside-Down outfit: three quarter length
leggings and a t-shirt tied in a ball at her waist. Her hair was a mess.
“I’m just worried about you,” I said. “And I don’t understand how this
ends.”
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She lectured me about how it wasn’t supposed to be easy. She had gone
into this project knowing that it was going to be uncomfortable, and she wasn’t
going to stop because it was hot. It was summer. It was supposed to be hot. I told
her to drink lots of water and not to push it too far. She said, “I am,” and we left it
there.
That afternoon, I had a shit-ton of work to do, so I stayed at a coffee shop
in Birmingham and banged out a bunch of emails. I was behind on everything,
partially because we were overcommitted, and my subcontractors were
overcommitted—and it didn’t help that I was zipping off to Shain Park every day
to watch my best friend stand on her head.
Anyway, afternoon turned into evening, and I walked over to this great
Mediterranean place for felafel. It was while I was eating my dinner that I got a
call from a local Birmingham number. I don’t normally answer calls from
numbers I don’t recognize, but I picked up. It was Kyleigh’s dad. He was worried.
“There’s this whole Upside Down thing,” he said, “And honestly, she was
acting different before that.”
“I did notice a few things,” I said. I had just finished eating, so I threw my
wrapper in the trash and started down the street, passing Birmingham’s line of
upscale restaurants, boutiques, and jewelry stores. Now that the sun was dropping
lower in the sky, it was almost pleasant to be out walking.
That’s when he started talking about how she had mental health issues.
“You know how she would sometimes disappear during college,” he said.
“Yeah. I did notice that.”
He said that she struggled with anxiety and depression. They had worked
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hard to keep it in check, but Kyleigh always had a mind of her own. “Do you
understand me, Ryan?”
“Sure,” I said. I had figured some of that out on my own—the depression
piece, for sure—but, of course, I didn’t know the extent of the issue.
Mr. Patterson asked me to talk to her. He said that he and Kyleigh’s mom
had tried having a conversation, but she shut them down.
“I mean, I’ll try,” I said.
“Thank you,” he said. “That’s all I ask.”
This next part of the story is a little embarrassing. I decided to wait and
follow her when she left the park. Creepy as hell, I know, but the call from her
dad made me feel like I had permission. Someone needed to figure out what was
going on, though I’ll admit, what I really wanted to know was whether she was
meeting Ash.
It wasn’t the easiest subterfuge to pull off. In Michigan, it stays light
forever in the summer, and I was driving my work truck with the name of the
company, VanDyke Builders, on both sides of the vehicle. I really had to keep my
distance, and right off the bat, I got caught at a traffic light while her white pickup
truck went sailing through. But then I got lucky. She hit the next red. Plus, with
her standing board strapped to the bed of the truck, she was pretty easy to see.
She pulled onto Woodward, the main highway through Birmingham, and I
thought we might be heading out of town, but then she turned into a strip mall and
walked into a Mexican restaurant. I was on lookout for Ash, but soon she was
walking back to her truck with a bag of take-out. When she pulled out of the
parking lot, she headed back where she came from. She wasn’t leaving town. She
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was going back to her parents’ place—probably to eat her dinner and go to bed.
I drove home to my third-floor apartment in West Bloomfield. I was pretty
tired, but I decided to sit on my little balcony and watch the sunset. I poured
myself a couple fingers of bourbon. Neat because ice was for sissies.
I felt pathetic. Here she was doing something good, something she believed
in, and the best I could do was bring her a cup of coffee. And even that had an
ulterior motive. There was a party in one of the other units, and I heard the music
whenever the patio door opened and disappear when it shut. Eventually, the party
ended, and the crickets took over, chirping like mad, filling the empty space.

The second week of World Upside Down is when the protests started. It
started on Sunday, but I wasn’t there. I was visiting my family back in Vicksburg,
about an hour and a half away. Friends of my parents live on a lake down there,
and we spent the day on the boat. We drank some beers, cranked some classic
rock, and generally pretended like we were back in the Aughts. Living light. I got
home late. Probably shouldn’t have driven.
While I was wasting away at my parents, Kyleigh was at Shain Park. She
was counting down from her one o’clock stand when people from this super
conservative church showed up. She was getting down from her head stand, a
process that was increasingly laborious. Instead of flipping onto her feet, she
basically crumbled to the ground. Then she pulled herself up, climbing to her feet,
trying to collect herself. The church people were already getting into her face,
even though she was still dizzy, still leaning against the standing board. They
demanded she repent. They said that her outfit was lewd, and that she was stealing
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God’s glory, whatever that means. They were angry that she had called Jesus a
great moral teacher. She said that a woman had tears in her eyes when she called
it blasphemy.
Kyleigh tried explaining herself. She said she loved Jesus. She said she
didn’t know if Jesus was the son of God or not—that she hadn’t figured that out
for herself—but she wanted people to know about his life and teaching. But she
also said she had a mission, and she wasn’t going to back down.
On Monday, when I brought her coffee, there was a double protest going
on. The religious people were protesting Kyleigh, and now Kyleigh’s supporters
were protesting the protesters. Ash had joined Kyleigh at the standing board.
It turned out that the real issue for the church people was that they
couldn’t get permission from the city to set up a nativity in Shain Park, and here
was Kyleigh doing her thing right in front of the Freedom Sculpture. When I
arrived on the scene, a journalist was telling her that the church had filed a
complaint with the city and were threatening a lawsuit. They had a lawyer from
one of those religious law groups, the Alliance Defending Freedom. These are the
people who defend bakers who won’t make cakes for gay weddings.
“You’re going to want to lawyer up,” he said.
Kyleigh was tired. I could see it in her eyes. She was rolling her neck
around.
“I have a permit,” she said.
“Hey, you can do what you want,” he said, “but, personally, I wouldn’t
want to see these assholes win.”
When the journalist was gone, I moved closer. “I mean, your dad’s a
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lawyer,” I said.
“My dad isn’t going to help me,” she said. She looked past me when she
said it like she was talking to someone behind me.
I had to leave for work, but I came back later that day. It was seven in the
evening, her second-to-last stand of the day, and there was a big crowd. The
protestors had gone home, unwilling to keep pace with Kyleigh’s commitment,
but I was able to hide behind her group of supporters. I walked up to the
chalkboard. It was mostly empty, so I had plenty of room to write the words, I
believe in you. Then I found a space where I could see Kyleigh through the
crowd. They were counting down, as she struggled to the finish. Her hands were
spread wide against her wrestling mat, balancing her body, holding it against the
standing board. Her arms were shaking.

Most of the Crew was now out of state. Sara was down in Indianapolis, a
five-hour drive. Derek was still around, working for an investment firm
downtown, and doing pretty well for himself. He said he was busy, but he offered
to shift his schedule around and spend some time at the park. Between me, and
Derek, and Ash, we tried to make sure that one of us was hanging around Kyleigh
as much as possible.
We texted back and forth about our schedule and how Kyleigh was doing,
and it was a good thing, too, because the heat kept coming and the protestors did,
too. Each five-minute stand was an ordeal. Kyleigh needed help getting up and
down from her standing board. One time, there was no one there except an old
lady who was walking her dog, and Kyleigh later admitted that the whole scene
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was ridiculous with this poor lady trying to hold onto her feet while she flailed
and kicked.
In the mornings, she did okay, but in the evenings, after a long day in the
heat, working the standing board, it was an adventure. During her last couple of
stands, her arms would shake uncontrollably. She looked like she was fighting an
earthquake. I hated watching, but I needed to keep my eyes on her in case she fell.

The hardest part was calling her dad. But sometimes we have to make
compromises, even when we’re doing the right thing.
It was around ten that night when her dad texted me, letting me know that
she had gone to sleep. He left the garage door open. I had the tools I needed. After
all, I worked for a construction company.
I snuck into the garage and, as quietly as possible, loaded the standing
board onto the bed of my truck. I used a couple of tie-downs, cinching the board
tight, and then I drove back to the shop.
I unscrewed the legs, and I could feel the tension unwind in my body. It
was the right decision. There had been a death threat. Derek overheard the police
telling Kyleigh about it. The police weren’t too worried; the threat wasn’t
specific, just more screaming into the internet. But when Derek texted me and
Ash, I knew what I had to do. As I tore through the standing board with my skill
saw, I cut straight lines, ripping the plywood into long strips.
I threw the wood into the bed of my truck and brought it back to her
garage, so she would know. It was over.
Kyleigh was mad, and I can’t blame her. The next morning, she called me
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while I was driving to the office.
“Was it you?”
I had planned on just telling her straight up, but I hesitated. I was holding
on the bottom of the steering wheel, casual-like.
“Ryan?”
I sighed. “Yes.”
She hung up.
It was a month before she would communicate with me again, two months
before I saw her in the flesh. We missed the rest of the good pool weather, but I
was happy enough sitting on my balcony with a White Claw or a tumbler of
bourbon. On the rocks. It was a sudden inspiration one Saturday afternoon, and I
found that I liked it.
When she finally agreed to meet me, I suggested Shain Park of all places.
We picked up some shawarma from the Mediterranean place and walked over to
the park, found a bench, and sat in the autumn sun. Summer had taken its toll on
the perfect grass, turning patches brown. From where we were sitting, we could
see the Freedom Sculpture, though we were looking at the figures’ backs.
I told her why I did it. I said I was living by the Ethos. I gave her every
reason I could think of why it was time to stop: her health, the heat, the fact that
she was guzzling ibuprofen like candy. And, of course, there was a threat on her
life.
She was wearing a brace on her hand and wrist. Only the tips of her fingers
reached out through the brace, making it hard to handle her shawarma. “It was my
decision,” she said. “And you stole that from me.”
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“I guess even when I’m trying to be good, I mess things up,” I said.
She gave me a half smile. “Maybe you did the right thing—I don’t know.
But you did it the wrong way.”
I looked down at the cement. I knew what she was saying. She was talking
about the standing board, and she was talking about our night together, too. I
should have talked with her. And I shouldn’t have made my moved when we were
drunk.
She stood up. She was short, so she barely had to lean over to kiss me on
the cheek. Then she whispered in my ear: “I believe in you.” She said good-bye,
and I guess she meant it, because I haven’t really seen her since. A couple of
times in passing but we don’t hang out anymore. No more White Claws at the
pool. I guess her parents think I’m great, but I think they suck, so it doesn’t mean
a whole lot.

It’s been a couple of year now, but someone will still occasionally ask me
about Kyleigh and World Upside Down. They might have heard that I was friends
with Kyleigh, and they want to know what I think about it. And I suppose in one
sense they’re asking whether Kyleigh was legit—whether she was really trying to
make a difference or just stumping for attention. But there’s another aspect to the
question—whether it made a lick of difference. And that the part’s harder to
answer.
On the one hand, I don’t think much more of the humanity than I did. Most
people spend their lives hiding from themselves. People are cowards, they really
are. But every once in a while, I’ll be sitting on my little balcony, or I’ll be out on
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the lake in Vicksburg, and I’ll have a vision of Kyleigh at her standing board. Not
just a memory, but a vision, if you know what I mean—like it’s something I’m
supposed to see. I know it sounds weird, but it’s the truth as far as I can tell it. So
yeah, I still think about Kyleigh and her standing board, and I guess that answers
the question right there. Did it matter? Yeah. Sure, it did. At least for me.
I still act like an ass sometimes, don’t get me wrong. I’m not a
fundamentally different person. But I want to be. And that’s how people change,
right? They start wanting something different. Longing for something different.
That’s some powerful shit right there. It’s uncomfortable as hell, but I hope it
never goes away.
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And your eyes open
By Benjamin Yusen
Abstract: This piece explores the realties of dreams, and the blurring of dreams and
reality.
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Everything is dark.
You wake up, and everything is a blur. Your eyelids weigh like anchors in the
deep seas of sleep. You’re slow, lethargy so heavy that the world is a thick syrup
you wade through.
You struggle to rise, your body responds to your commands, but slowly, fighting
madly. Everything is fine.
You rise. Stumble slowly, dragging to the door. The knob is already in your hand,
turning, turning. The door already creaking, settling, opening.
Everything is wrong. The hallway is twists, spinning into the infinite void of the
night sky. Stars and comets swirl and shift without end. They are a blur, waltzing
through hallway, through the darkness, following a rhythm to which you are deaf.
It is dizzying, and disorienting. Your eyes water, and you feel as though you have
been staring at the sun. Your stomach wishes to personally greet the night. Suns
explode before you, and cosmic winds whisper of the music of the spheres, and it
is all so far from you. You are not in the sky, you are in the hall. And the hall is
the darkness between the stars, and you, you are deep in that darkness. The light is
colder than death, and oh, so far. You are still asleep. And you start, realizing that
this is not real. Everything goes dark.

You wake panting, sweating, sunken into your pillows. You are drenched in cold
sweat, and your body shivers and itches, that disgusting feeling you sometimes
get seeing other people with wet hair. Your teeth ache, and your hair screams to
be torn out by the roots. You breathe deeply, trying to hold on, trying to slow
down your veering, twisting thoughts. The dream was… vivid. Unsettling.
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Weird.
But now, you have awoken. Your mind is yet reeling, twisting folding in on itself.
Revolving. That hallway is still in your head, waltzing away to some lost lyric. It
is a dizzying spectacle of weird majesty. You struggle to tear your mind's eye
from it all, for some of the rooms in your head are still dark.
You are not yet fully awake.
Mouth dry, you move for the Nalgene that rests on the floor by your bed. But you
don’t. Your mind snaps back, like a rubber band. You think you will move, you
expect it. You want it, you will it to happen.
It does not happen.
It feels wrong. Like a sweet, loving dog snarling and biting you. No. Just, no.
But you are stuck; as though the gravity has been turned up to eleven. This is
unreal. It has to be a dream. It must be! And yet you feel it to be real. And you
panic.You panic. Lethargic still, your brain struggles, wrestling to comprehend,
searching blindly to find the pathways which command your languishing limbs. It
does not. It finds that this is yet another dream.
The world fades again as shock sets in.
Then, all is black.

Your eyes snap open.
You are breathing hard. Panting. In, out, in out, in out, in out. Your eyes are
heavy, mouth of cotton.
The room is bathed in a pink light, a psychedelic mixture of red and orange and
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pink, slowly phasing in and out, and you feel as though you are underwater, and
you smell the colors, and it smells of lovely forgetfulness and the deep drifting
waves of endless sleep. And you know: this is still a dream. Still, you struggle to
rise, mind now as body, caught in the glamour of the dream, like a riptide, you are
pulled in smoothly, soothingly, into the dark abyss, and yet you still struggle. It
seems as though by escaping from your bed, you will escape this dream. You do
not.

And your eyes open,
And you are rising. Saliva dribbles from one corner of your mouth onto a pillow.
This has to be real. You can taste the metallic flavor lethargy. It is a mouthful of
pennies. You choke on the tangy acid of it. You can smell your sweat, feel the
chills sweeping through your body like little ghostly gusts of snow, swirling,
sneaking across the ground.
You open your mouth to speak, though you don’t know to whom. But dreams are
not shared. You open your mouth, and instead find yourself swallowing pills you
didn’t know you had, and you wonder when you became addicted to painkillers.
You realize you aren’t, and then…

And then you awake.
Fuck.
Not again.
Morpheus has broken in, hacked your nervous system. It’s all a blur, color and
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light flashing like fireworks before your eyes, sonic highways unravelling in your
ears. There is panic now, true, unblemished, unfolding like a flower in bloom.
Your mind is not your own. It is a labyrinth of sensations, of shapes and colors,
light and darkness. The mad god of dreams has breathed deep into you, claiming
you forever for his realm of fog.
You know this now. For your eyes open.
Once, twice, ten, a hundred times, a thousand thousand dreams echo through the
caverns of your mind, flooding you with the chaos of a billion exploding stars.
Your eyes open, countless times, and time is irrelevant, unnatural in this place,
and your eyes open again, and again, and again. A whole universe has budded,
bloomed, withered, and died, in this infinite dimension of sleep; and whole
universes shall continue this cycle, time without end.
There is nothing. Only the dream

And your eyes open.
You are in bed, and you desperately shake, barely able to more. This is your only
chance. But only breath flows through you.
Nothing more. You cannot lift your arms. Your body is not your own. It belongs
to the dream. To sleep. To whatever living, sleeping death this is. You can move
enough to shake, and that’s a good sign. So you shake.
And you shake, and you shake, and you shake, as though you are willing your
body to seize, jerk and bend. And suddenly, you might be, you don’t know.
You’ve never had a seizure before. It’s terrifying, you are feeble. Your eyes snap
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to the door.
Help!
Your voice defies you, latching to the back of your tongue, grasping, as
shipwrecked Odysseus to a spar at sea. You shake yourself out of bed, and the
rough rug greets your face like a stilted lover.
Cheek burning, you grimace, but your face is still a boulder. Mind grimaces, flesh
is frozen.
You fight, shaking and panicking to get to the door, and you are consumed. Fangs
of fear drink you deeply. The shape of this is upon you, and it is an utterly
overwhelming doom. It is a doom made worse knowing that you have been here
countless times. A doom you will know time and again. Forever. This you know.
You heave and drag, and your body – insolent, indolent – revolts. But like the
conqueror worm you writhe, dragging your fleshy sack of a body, flailing
limbless to the door. The five feet from the bed is five million miles. It is all in
your head.
Somehow, you are there, sitting, leaning, falling against the door.
Your hand on the knob is that warm, sweaty feeling, the disgusting ghost of
someone else’s hand. Revolting. Your hand only met the doorknob a moment ago.
Yet the five feet from the bed to here is now a distant epoch, a bygone era.
Your hand is on the knob, and it turns as you wish, and you let yourself fall into
the hallway. But your bedroom door opens inwards.
This is not your bedroom.
The hallway is once again the night sky, and it is aflame. It is burning, and dying,
planets crumble to dust, carried by a cosmic wind into the smoldering coals of
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dim suns, blinking out of existence forever. It is all turning to shadow.
And you realize it is all in your head.
Everything burns. Everything goes dark.

And your eyes open, but only just.
Through slits you see your room.
You are exhausted. Is this even real? You cannot move.
No.
Maybe?
Again, you shake, and again, you hope. You shake. This time, you’ll do it. You
will wake. You will shake in this dream bed, so hard, that you shake your waking
body awake.

And your eyes open. You are awake. Standing on your neighbor’s patio door,
selling cookies, or maybe buying them. This is wrong. It’s November and the
peonies are blooming.
But peonies don’t bloom in November. And you’re wearing shorts. It’s not
November, it can’t be. It mustn’t be.
That tiny voice in the back of your head itches.
Pleasantries exchange, and empty conversation is blotted out by the molten panic
– at first slow – rising calmly. It is deep and viscous, not at all sweet like maple
syrup. You could drown in the flavor of it, imbibing deep gluttonous portions of
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that dreaming-dread. You cannot fight it. You are full of it, more fear than blood,
more than water. Your teeth ache against each other, wishing to crash together,
peals of thunder in your head, wishing to grind into dust.
Fuck.
It is endless. There is no hope.

And you awake.
Bed again.
You cannot move.
Shaking.
Black.

You awake, shaking.
Not enough.
Black.

Awake.
Bed
Shaking
Not again

Awake again,
Shaking
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No

Again
No
Again
No
Again
No
No
No

And on, and on, and on, and on, and on, and on,
And on, and on, and on, and on, and on, and on, and on, and on, and on, and on,
and on, and on, and on, and on,
Again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and
again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and
again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and
again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and
again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and
again and again and again and again and again and again and again and again and
again and again and again and again…
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It is all a blur.
You give up.
Then your eyes open, and you get up. You pretend this is real, that the world
burning is normal. That the chaos makes sense. That you aren’t stuck in bed.

And then your eyes open.
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